Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1933, General, Volume I

500.A15A4 General Committee/710: Telegram

The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Acting Secretary of State

Berlin, December 19, 1933—6 p.m.
[Received December 19—3:25 p.m.]

209. Interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs⁷⁹ yesterday. He gave me memorandum containing French Ambassador’s questions⁸⁰ and German replies⁸¹ and point of view regarding proposed change in German armaments. This amplifies British Ambassador’s statement, (see my telegram 147 [198?], of December 11 [9?]) full text by mail, meantime following indefinite answers to precise queries posed by the French throw light on prospects of further negotiations:

(1) As to whether 300,000 army susceptible of reduction or discussion, Germans replied that this figure rendered necessary by length of their frontier and neighbors’ armament.

(2) The question as to time necessary for reforming Reichswehr answered by “several years” financial situation being also a factor.

(3) Concerning specific number of 6 ton tanks, 15 cm. guns and airplanes, Germans answered that these must conform to requirements of a modern defensive army.

(4) Tempo of growth of armament is not altered; 3 must correspond to that of increase of troops as indicated in 2.

(5) German Government agreeable to an international periodic automatically working and equal control when agreement reached on basic questions.

Minister for Foreign Affairs did not commit himself as to whether or not negotiations for 10-year nonaggression to be renewed after New Years could take place under aegis of League of Nations. In this connection he assured me that Suvich’s arguments on the occasion of his recent visit were not aimed at destroying League of Nations but rather at fortifying it by limiting power of interference of smaller countries.

Quite unsolicited he referred also to grave situation in the Far East. His information was that Japanese would attack Soviets with probable success in the spring. He stressed danger of delay of solution in Europe because an outbreak in the Far East would upset everything. He considered that an economic boycott would be ineffective unless all of the greater nations had come to some general understanding beforehand. He expressed opinion that Soviets would collapse under any serious attack in the Far East with resultant chaos in Russia.

Code text mailed to Geneva, Paris and Rome.

Dodd

79. Konstantin von Neurath.
80. See aide-mémoire of December 13, 1933, printed in République Française, Ministère des Affaires Ètrangères, Nègociations relatives a la reduction et à la limitation des armements; Vingt-quatre pièces (14 octoore–17 avril 1934) (Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1934), p. 13.
81. See aide-mémoire of December 18, 1933, ibid., p. 15.