500.A15A4 General Committee/706: Telegram
The Chargé in Great Britain ( Atherton ) to the Acting Secretary of State
339. Last paragraph of your 313, December 15, 1 p.m. I am sending under telegram 338, December 16, 4 p.m.70 pertinent portions of the Hitler memorandum dated December 11. This is essential to comprehension of the situation.
[Page 343]Wilson has talked with Simon, Eden, and Henderson and this message is sent in collaboration with him.
It will be remembered at the time of the last Bureau meeting in Geneva that Simon made it clear to Boncour that he could not consider the so-called (accord) of October as binding on the participants in view of the changed situation created by Germany’s departure. This, the British feel, leaves them free to explore the situation with or without French collaboration.
The British further reached the conclusion that previous attempts of a number of powers to decide among themselves the question of Germany’s place in a disarmament treaty had in every case lamentably failed. It was impossible, especially with the present leaders of Germany, to do other than really negotiate with them on a real footing of equality. Instead of endeavoring to prescribe what Germany might have, the British Ambassador at Berlin was instructed to make an attempt to ascertain what Germany wants. This was done with the idea that, however extravagant Hitler’s demands may be, at least it would be valuable to have a concrete statement of those demands as a point of departure for negotiations. The Conference had suffered in the past, the British believed, because, not having stated her demands, Germany was able continually to cry that what was being done was not sufficient. They have now obtained from the Germans the document transmitted under my 338, December 16, 4 p.m. They already know the French point of view and there may be a possibility of finding a compromise between the two. Such a a hope, however, the British do not entertain during the life of the present precarious French Cabinet.
The French show a measure of irritation against the British both because the latter do not consider themselves bound by the (accord) of October and because the British acted directly in Berlin instead of after previous discussion with the French in Paris.
However, this direct action in Berlin of the British conforms to a strong opinion that has existed for some time among the members of the Cabinet that the policy of cooperation with France should never result in Great Britain being the tail to the French kite in negotiations with Germany. I understood that Simon intends to stop in Paris for a couple of days next week enroute to Italy and will endeavor to soothe the French temperament while the British Cabinet has not yet decided what its course of action will be, they are considering the preparation of a reply to Hitler’s memorandum of December 11 (Phipps is detained in London pending Cabinet’s deliberations). This reply will welcome certain phases of the memorandum, for instance, Germany’s acceptance of control; will rebut certain [Page 344] arguments in the memorandum; will take exception to certain demands and will ask further elucidation on detail, notably on tanks and aircraft. When this reply has been sent to Germany and presumably after the receipt of further detail, they plan to talk the matter over with the French. It is believed by members of the Cabinet that Germany’s attitude cannot be greatly modified by further direct negotiations.
British have now in large measure ascertained Germany’s position, they know France’s position, and are considering whether at the next meeting of the Bureau or the General Commission the British Government should not present some project offering a middle course between the two theses. I repeat that this is not a Cabinet decision but is as yet merely a project of some of the members.
Unquestionably the position taken in the German memorandum December 11 is a shock to the British even though they knew that Germany was going to demand modern equipment for their army. The British are particularly concerned at the possibility of the construction of a fleet of the latest type of pursuit planes if the numbers of such a fleet are calculated, as the Germans suggest, on one-quarter the force of their immediate neighbors.
As to the general conception that the British hold of the situation; they appear to be convinced that some treaty is better than no treaty. As Simon phrased it in a recent speech, the choice in their minds is between regulated or unregulated armament. They are trying to examine the situation on a basis of what is really practical of thought and, having indulged in the luxury of hate of the Nazi regime for some months, the departure of Germany from the Conference and the League showed them the cost of a policy not based purely on reason. We do not feel, although no proof can be produced at the moment, that the British have abandoned the idea of reduction in the armaments of the heavily armed states. They recognize the increased difficulty of such reduction if Germany received a measure of immediate rearmament. But they are trying to separate for the sake of greater clarity of approach the two questions (a) Germany’s place in a disarmament convention and (b) the disarmament to be applied to the armed powers.
Since my return from Washington and since Wilson’s arrival here71 we are both more than ever convinced of the soundness of the Department’s policy that while the States of Europe are concerned with the question of the rearmament of Germany we should not play an active role or offer advice in a matter in which we cannot accept responsibility, but that if and when this problem is solved and the discussion [Page 345] comes back to disarmament of the great powers we will play as active a part as before.
Wilson will be able to amplify the foregoing.
Cipher text mailed to Paris and Geneva.