500.A15A4 General Committee/721
The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to
the Acting Secretary of State
No. 353
Berlin, December 14,
1933.
[Received December 26.]
Sir: Referring to my telegram No. 203 of
December 14, 10 a.m. and previous communications, I have the honor to
enclose herewith the text of the Hitler note to Sir Eric Phipps.
It will be noted that this communication is dated December 11. According
to the press, on this same day the French Ambassador again had an
interview with the Chancellor, in the course of which
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he received the latter’s views for
transmission to Paris for the consideration of the French Cabinet,
which, however, would not as yet have taken action. According to the
information given in my telegram No. 201 of December 10, which is
confirmed by the telegram from the Paris Embassy to the Department, No.
537 of December 8, 11 a.m., the French Government has already reached a
decision.
I may state in this connection, however, that in conversation with the
Undersecretary of the Foreign Office, Herr von Bülow, the latter gave me
to understand that no definite decisions would be made in this matter
until after the Christmas vacation period.
The Chancellor’s letter begins by reaffirming that the German Government
will be willing to enter into agreements stipulating the rejection of
force for the solution of all European questions, but that inasmuch as
the heavily armed Powers are apparently not disposed to reduce their
armaments he considers that his proposal for increasing the German army
coupled with 10 year pacts of non-aggression would offer the best
solution.
The note is not specific either as to German reserves or as to material.
Press accounts assert that the additional 200,000 men which Germany
asked for, would be subject to nine-twelve months’ service only, and
also refer to tanks, large field guns and military planes. The
Chancellor’s note, however, does not define what are the weapons
“essentially necessary for the defense of the country which we therefore
can not renounce and which we must accordingly insist upon as normal
armament”, otherwise than to give a low limit of 15 cm for the calibre
of artillery.
The Department will doubtless remember that this note has as its
background the intense Hitlerian propaganda against dishonorable
treaties that made such a powerful appeal to the German people. Now that
the Chancellor’s foreign policy has been approved by a plebiscitory
vote, it is natural for him to desire to show his constituents some
measure of success in his foreign negotiations. It is to be presumed,
however, that his principal care for the time being is really to
consolidate his position at home, a process to which very serious
foreign trouble might prove fatal. The stage is therefore all set for
negotiations with his neighbors, for the success of which mutual
concessions are essential.
I can quite sympathize with the point of view which regards this proposed
increase of the German army as a step in contemplation of war. But this
is in my opinion only a part of the picture. I regard it as primarily a
move to satisfy the self-esteem of the Germans who have been accustomed
from their youth to the idea of martial display and prestige and feel
themselves slighted by the restrictions placed upon their military
development.
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If a concession in the size of the German army would purchase 10 years’
peace and a measure of appeasement calculated to lengthen this term, I
should say that it would be worth while. Be this as it may, the Hitler
proposition, whatever its objections, at least seems to afford a
starting point for discussions. This is probably its principal
merit.
Respectfully yours,
[Enclosure—Translation]
The German Chancelor (Hitler) to the British Ambassador in Germany (Phipps)
Berlin,
December 11,
1933.
66
Your Excellency: In the name of the German
Government I have the honor to reply as follows to the enquiries
addressed to me through Your Excellency on behalf of the British
Government.
I. The German Government is ready to enter into agreements which
stipulate the rejection of force for the solution of all European
questions and which can thus be of service to the maintenance of
world peace. In view, however, of past experiences, the German
Government would propose to choose a form which makes it both
possible and easier for the Governments, as well before their own
consciences as also before their peoples, to accept such proposals
at the earliest possible moment. This consideration leads the German
Government to believe that the general agreements as to limitation
of armaments should be crowned by a system of reciprocal and general
non-aggression pacts, which would on principle prevent by treaty
every appeal to force between the European nations, in order to lay
compulsorily upon the Governments the obligation either to resolve
difficult or critical problems by means of peaceful diplomatic
intercourse or, in the case of such intercourse being obviously
impossible or fruitless, to prolong the negotiations until the
general calming of the European situation should permit of a
dispassionate examination and decision. In this way the fear of the
British Government that such treaties might possibly result in
internal conflicts with the constitution of the League of Nations
would be avoided and, on the other hand, every guarantee for the
maintenance of peace would be provided.
The German Government is ready to conclude such pacts with all States
surrounding Germany.
II. With a view to bringing about real disarmament, or alternatively
a limitation and equalisation of armaments, the German Government is
ready to enter into negotiations with all individual nations
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or their Governments in
regard to the various subjects and figures to be discussed. The
German Government does not, however, intend to take part in any
conference before the basic question of the actual equality of
rights of the German Reich has been decided, or alternatively before
this equality of rights has been recognised by the nations
participating in the conference. For on this condition alone can the
German Government be answerable to the German people for its
participation in a conference. The practical issue of such a
conference for Germany, as a Power to which equality of rights had
not been granted in advance, would inevitably be the procedure which
has been familiar to us for the last 15 years, and could only lead
to identical results. This would be neither supportable for the
honour of a great nation nor helpful to the cause of peace.
It is of course true that the German Government agreed to the first
draft convention of the English Prime Minister MacDonald, which had
disarmament as its basis for discussion. But it was not the German
Government which abandoned this draft; but the other Powers, under
the leadership of England, agreed amongst themselves upon a second
draft. This last has, however, never been recognised by Germany.
If the German Government now allowed itself to put forward a
suggestion of its own they did so out of a sense of responsibility
and for cogent reasons. On the ground of its previous experience the
German Government no longer believes that the highly armed States
are, in fact, seriously determined to disarm. Various statements
made by leading statesmen have confirmed this opinion. Without going
in detail into the various reasons, there are two essential facts
which cannot be neglected:
- (1)
- A reduction of the armaments of the other European States
is, in effect, only to be envisaged if it is undertaken by
all nations throughout the whole world. Nobody to-day,
however, believes any longer in the possibility of such a
general international disarmament.
- (2)
- The events of the last months make it appear more than
doubtful whether measures of disarmament, even though they
were earnestly intended by the Governments of certain
countries, could be successfully laid before the parliaments
of those countries for ratification.
For this reason the German Government finds itself unable any longer
to cherish an illusion which is calculated rather further to confuse
than to improve the relations between the peoples. Having regard to
practical reality, the German Government therefore feels bound to
make the following declaration:
- (a)
- Germany is the only State which has actually carried out
the disarmament obligations imposed in the Peace Treaty of
Versailles,
- (b)
- The highly armed States do not intend to disarm or feel
themselves unable to do so.
- (c)
- Apart from other considerations Germany has a right by any
means to obtain her equality of rights in connexion with her
security.
In order to prevent a complete breakdown of the idea of disarmament
and the limitless armaments race of all against all which would
inevitably follow it, the German Government feel it their duty to
put forward a proposal:
- (1)
- Germany receives complete equality of rights,
- (2)
- the highly armed States engage themselves mutually to
engage in no further increase in their present
armaments,
- (3)
- Germany becomes a party to this convention with the
undertaking that she will, of her own free will, only make
such moderate actual use of the equality of rights granted
to her as could not be regarded as constituting any danger
of aggression against any other European Power.
- (4)
- All States undertake certain obligations for the humane
conduct of war or for the avoidance of the use of certain
weapons of war against civilian populations.
- (5)
- All States accept an equal general control, which shall
examine and guarantee the observance of these
engagments.
- (6)
- The European nations guarantee each other the absolute
maintenance of peace, by means of the conclusion of pacts of
nonaggression, which after the lapse of 10 years shall be
renewed.
III. Under these conditions, however, the demanded increase of the
figure of 200,000 men, which was accepted in the MacDonald plan, to
300,000 is not only not considerable, but on the contrary represents
rather a worse situation for Germany. According to the first draft
convention of the British Government France should have received on
the continent, exactly as Germany, an allotment of 200,000 men.
Since France is evidently not prepared to carry through this measure
of disarmament, the ratio between Germany’s demands to-day and the
effective strength of France and the other European armies would
become even more unfavourable. A total French strength of 651,000
men, which would be increased to about 1.2 million men by the States
connected by friendship to France, would be faced by 300,000 men in
Germany.
In addition, the 9.6 million trained reserves in these States, to put
against which Germany possesses practically nothing, represent a
further security which could hardly be exceeded.
Accordingly the demands for equality in armaments for Germany are
more than moderate, particularly since the German Government, for
its part, is ready to renounce from the outset any offensive weapons
which might conceivably appear threatening even to the enormous
French defensive system. Germany, who on her side is completely
defenceless, has more reason to complain of the offensive weapons of
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the surrounding States
than the latter have for representing the defensive weapons demanded
by Germany on her side as a danger. The German Government must
categorically reject any idea of so-called “sample” weapons (Musterwaffen). There are weapons which we
renounce from the outset and which we shall therefore not
manufacture and there are weapons which are essentially necessary
for the defence of a country, which we therefore cannot renounce and
which we must accordingly insist upon as normal armament. The lowest
limit for the calibre of the artillery could therefore, for example,
on no account be less than 15 cm.
IV. The German Reichswehr will, of course, be absorbed in the new
army. But its absorption or remodelling cannot of course be
accomplished in one year but will require a series of years.
V. The S. A. and S. S. are not military organisations. They are an
inseparable component part of the political system of the National
Socialist revolution and so of the National Socialist state. They
include some 2½ million men ranging from the eighteenth year to
extreme age. Their only task is, by means of this organisation of
the Political masses of our people, to prevent forever the return of
the Communist peril. Whether this system can or will ever be
abandoned depends upon whether this Bolshevistic-Communistic peril
remains or is removed. With military matters these National
Socialist organisations, which stand in opposition to the former
Marxistic Reichs-banner and the Communistic Red-Front League, have
absolutely no connexion whatever. The attempt to bring the S. A. and
S. S. into military connexion with the Reichsheer [Reichswehr], and to refer to them as military reserve
formations, originates with those political circles which see in the
removal of this protective organisation of the National-Socialist
State the possibility of a new disintegration of the German people
and thus a new advance towards the Communistic goal. Just as the
German Government would never take the liberty of proposing to the
English Government the dissolution of any English party or of any
particular form of organisation of such a party, the German
Government must reject every demand for the putting into effect of
such a wish in Germany. The German Government, when taking into
account the military strength of other States, does not consider, in
making its demands, any other formations than those of the actual
army organisation. The German Government will, also in future attach
no political significance, which might affect its attitude, to such
political, sportive, or post-military societies as may be considered
necessary in other States.
VI. The German Government is, as has been emphasized, ready, in
principle, to agree to an international, general and identic system
of control, functioning periodically and automatically. In order
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to prove the character of
the S. A. and S. S. to be, as was emphasized above, that of
political organisations for a general, spiritual and physical
inoculation against the dangers of a Communistic upheaval, the
German Government does not decline to provide proof, in the course
of this control, that this definition is being accurately adhered
to. In conclusion, I will add once again, in the name of the German
Government, the assurance that in the event of the other
nations—contrary to the expectation of the German
Government—deciding upon complete disarmament, the German Government
declares in advance its readiness to accede to such a convention,
and similarly to disarm if necessary to the last cannon and to the
last machine gun.
I avail myself [etc.]
