500.A15A4 General Committee/721

The Ambassador in Germany ( Dodd ) to the Acting Secretary of State

No. 353

Sir: Referring to my telegram No. 203 of December 14, 10 a.m. and previous communications, I have the honor to enclose herewith the text of the Hitler note to Sir Eric Phipps.

It will be noted that this communication is dated December 11. According to the press, on this same day the French Ambassador again had an interview with the Chancellor, in the course of which [Page 337] he received the latter’s views for transmission to Paris for the consideration of the French Cabinet, which, however, would not as yet have taken action. According to the information given in my telegram No. 201 of December 10, which is confirmed by the telegram from the Paris Embassy to the Department, No. 537 of December 8, 11 a.m., the French Government has already reached a decision.

I may state in this connection, however, that in conversation with the Undersecretary of the Foreign Office, Herr von Bülow, the latter gave me to understand that no definite decisions would be made in this matter until after the Christmas vacation period.

The Chancellor’s letter begins by reaffirming that the German Government will be willing to enter into agreements stipulating the rejection of force for the solution of all European questions, but that inasmuch as the heavily armed Powers are apparently not disposed to reduce their armaments he considers that his proposal for increasing the German army coupled with 10 year pacts of non-aggression would offer the best solution.

The note is not specific either as to German reserves or as to material. Press accounts assert that the additional 200,000 men which Germany asked for, would be subject to nine-twelve months’ service only, and also refer to tanks, large field guns and military planes. The Chancellor’s note, however, does not define what are the weapons “essentially necessary for the defense of the country which we therefore can not renounce and which we must accordingly insist upon as normal armament”, otherwise than to give a low limit of 15 cm for the calibre of artillery.

The Department will doubtless remember that this note has as its background the intense Hitlerian propaganda against dishonorable treaties that made such a powerful appeal to the German people. Now that the Chancellor’s foreign policy has been approved by a plebiscitory vote, it is natural for him to desire to show his constituents some measure of success in his foreign negotiations. It is to be presumed, however, that his principal care for the time being is really to consolidate his position at home, a process to which very serious foreign trouble might prove fatal. The stage is therefore all set for negotiations with his neighbors, for the success of which mutual concessions are essential.

I can quite sympathize with the point of view which regards this proposed increase of the German army as a step in contemplation of war. But this is in my opinion only a part of the picture. I regard it as primarily a move to satisfy the self-esteem of the Germans who have been accustomed from their youth to the idea of martial display and prestige and feel themselves slighted by the restrictions placed upon their military development.

[Page 338]

If a concession in the size of the German army would purchase 10 years’ peace and a measure of appeasement calculated to lengthen this term, I should say that it would be worth while. Be this as it may, the Hitler proposition, whatever its objections, at least seems to afford a starting point for discussions. This is probably its principal merit.

Respectfully yours,

William E. Dodd
[Enclosure—Translation]

The German Chancelor ( Hitler ) to the British Ambassador in Germany ( Phipps )

Your Excellency: In the name of the German Government I have the honor to reply as follows to the enquiries addressed to me through Your Excellency on behalf of the British Government.

I. The German Government is ready to enter into agreements which stipulate the rejection of force for the solution of all European questions and which can thus be of service to the maintenance of world peace. In view, however, of past experiences, the German Government would propose to choose a form which makes it both possible and easier for the Governments, as well before their own consciences as also before their peoples, to accept such proposals at the earliest possible moment. This consideration leads the German Government to believe that the general agreements as to limitation of armaments should be crowned by a system of reciprocal and general non-aggression pacts, which would on principle prevent by treaty every appeal to force between the European nations, in order to lay compulsorily upon the Governments the obligation either to resolve difficult or critical problems by means of peaceful diplomatic intercourse or, in the case of such intercourse being obviously impossible or fruitless, to prolong the negotiations until the general calming of the European situation should permit of a dispassionate examination and decision. In this way the fear of the British Government that such treaties might possibly result in internal conflicts with the constitution of the League of Nations would be avoided and, on the other hand, every guarantee for the maintenance of peace would be provided.

The German Government is ready to conclude such pacts with all States surrounding Germany.

II. With a view to bringing about real disarmament, or alternatively a limitation and equalisation of armaments, the German Government is ready to enter into negotiations with all individual nations [Page 339] or their Governments in regard to the various subjects and figures to be discussed. The German Government does not, however, intend to take part in any conference before the basic question of the actual equality of rights of the German Reich has been decided, or alternatively before this equality of rights has been recognised by the nations participating in the conference. For on this condition alone can the German Government be answerable to the German people for its participation in a conference. The practical issue of such a conference for Germany, as a Power to which equality of rights had not been granted in advance, would inevitably be the procedure which has been familiar to us for the last 15 years, and could only lead to identical results. This would be neither supportable for the honour of a great nation nor helpful to the cause of peace.

It is of course true that the German Government agreed to the first draft convention of the English Prime Minister MacDonald, which had disarmament as its basis for discussion. But it was not the German Government which abandoned this draft; but the other Powers, under the leadership of England, agreed amongst themselves upon a second draft. This last has, however, never been recognised by Germany.

If the German Government now allowed itself to put forward a suggestion of its own they did so out of a sense of responsibility and for cogent reasons. On the ground of its previous experience the German Government no longer believes that the highly armed States are, in fact, seriously determined to disarm. Various statements made by leading statesmen have confirmed this opinion. Without going in detail into the various reasons, there are two essential facts which cannot be neglected:

(1)
A reduction of the armaments of the other European States is, in effect, only to be envisaged if it is undertaken by all nations throughout the whole world. Nobody to-day, however, believes any longer in the possibility of such a general international disarmament.
(2)
The events of the last months make it appear more than doubtful whether measures of disarmament, even though they were earnestly intended by the Governments of certain countries, could be successfully laid before the parliaments of those countries for ratification.

For this reason the German Government finds itself unable any longer to cherish an illusion which is calculated rather further to confuse than to improve the relations between the peoples. Having regard to practical reality, the German Government therefore feels bound to make the following declaration:

(a)
Germany is the only State which has actually carried out the disarmament obligations imposed in the Peace Treaty of Versailles,
(b)
The highly armed States do not intend to disarm or feel themselves unable to do so.
(c)
Apart from other considerations Germany has a right by any means to obtain her equality of rights in connexion with her security.

In order to prevent a complete breakdown of the idea of disarmament and the limitless armaments race of all against all which would inevitably follow it, the German Government feel it their duty to put forward a proposal:

(1)
Germany receives complete equality of rights,
(2)
the highly armed States engage themselves mutually to engage in no further increase in their present armaments,
(3)
Germany becomes a party to this convention with the undertaking that she will, of her own free will, only make such moderate actual use of the equality of rights granted to her as could not be regarded as constituting any danger of aggression against any other European Power.
(4)
All States undertake certain obligations for the humane conduct of war or for the avoidance of the use of certain weapons of war against civilian populations.
(5)
All States accept an equal general control, which shall examine and guarantee the observance of these engagments.
(6)
The European nations guarantee each other the absolute maintenance of peace, by means of the conclusion of pacts of nonaggression, which after the lapse of 10 years shall be renewed.

III. Under these conditions, however, the demanded increase of the figure of 200,000 men, which was accepted in the MacDonald plan, to 300,000 is not only not considerable, but on the contrary represents rather a worse situation for Germany. According to the first draft convention of the British Government France should have received on the continent, exactly as Germany, an allotment of 200,000 men. Since France is evidently not prepared to carry through this measure of disarmament, the ratio between Germany’s demands to-day and the effective strength of France and the other European armies would become even more unfavourable. A total French strength of 651,000 men, which would be increased to about 1.2 million men by the States connected by friendship to France, would be faced by 300,000 men in Germany.

In addition, the 9.6 million trained reserves in these States, to put against which Germany possesses practically nothing, represent a further security which could hardly be exceeded.

Accordingly the demands for equality in armaments for Germany are more than moderate, particularly since the German Government, for its part, is ready to renounce from the outset any offensive weapons which might conceivably appear threatening even to the enormous French defensive system. Germany, who on her side is completely defenceless, has more reason to complain of the offensive weapons of [Page 341] the surrounding States than the latter have for representing the defensive weapons demanded by Germany on her side as a danger. The German Government must categorically reject any idea of so-called “sample” weapons (Musterwaffen). There are weapons which we renounce from the outset and which we shall therefore not manufacture and there are weapons which are essentially necessary for the defence of a country, which we therefore cannot renounce and which we must accordingly insist upon as normal armament. The lowest limit for the calibre of the artillery could therefore, for example, on no account be less than 15 cm.

IV. The German Reichswehr will, of course, be absorbed in the new army. But its absorption or remodelling cannot of course be accomplished in one year but will require a series of years.

V. The S. A. and S. S. are not military organisations. They are an inseparable component part of the political system of the National Socialist revolution and so of the National Socialist state. They include some 2½ million men ranging from the eighteenth year to extreme age. Their only task is, by means of this organisation of the Political masses of our people, to prevent forever the return of the Communist peril. Whether this system can or will ever be abandoned depends upon whether this Bolshevistic-Communistic peril remains or is removed. With military matters these National Socialist organisations, which stand in opposition to the former Marxistic Reichs-banner and the Communistic Red-Front League, have absolutely no connexion whatever. The attempt to bring the S. A. and S. S. into military connexion with the Reichsheer [Reichswehr], and to refer to them as military reserve formations, originates with those political circles which see in the removal of this protective organisation of the National-Socialist State the possibility of a new disintegration of the German people and thus a new advance towards the Communistic goal. Just as the German Government would never take the liberty of proposing to the English Government the dissolution of any English party or of any particular form of organisation of such a party, the German Government must reject every demand for the putting into effect of such a wish in Germany. The German Government, when taking into account the military strength of other States, does not consider, in making its demands, any other formations than those of the actual army organisation. The German Government will, also in future attach no political significance, which might affect its attitude, to such political, sportive, or post-military societies as may be considered necessary in other States.

VI. The German Government is, as has been emphasized, ready, in principle, to agree to an international, general and identic system of control, functioning periodically and automatically. In order [Page 342] to prove the character of the S. A. and S. S. to be, as was emphasized above, that of political organisations for a general, spiritual and physical inoculation against the dangers of a Communistic upheaval, the German Government does not decline to provide proof, in the course of this control, that this definition is being accurately adhered to. In conclusion, I will add once again, in the name of the German Government, the assurance that in the event of the other nations—contrary to the expectation of the German Government—deciding upon complete disarmament, the German Government declares in advance its readiness to accede to such a convention, and similarly to disarm if necessary to the last cannon and to the last machine gun.

I avail myself [etc.]

Adolf Hitler
  1. Received at the British Embassy December 12, 1933, 1:10 p.m.