Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1933, General, Volume I

500.A15A4/1737: Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State

Geneva, March 5, 1933—1 p.m.
[Received 2:15 p.m.]

553. We have been endeavoring to formulate some ideas on the probable development of the work here in order that you might have them before you in your discussions with Davis.⁴⁷

A new element of complication has been introduced through the announcement that MacDonald⁴⁸ and Simon are coming to Geneva in the near future in the hope of helping forward the work of the Conference. No date has yet been set for their arrival but Eden is returning tomorrow to resume the leadership of the British delegation.

Sassoon has told me confidentially that he considers the visit ill-timed as unless they have a definite plan which they are already certain can be adopted (he knows of no such plan) he feels their arrival will merely stimulate exaggerated hopes without any possibility of early achievement. He added that so far as his delegation could see there was no possibility of submitting a proposal which would satisfy both the French and the German Governments.

Massigli tells me that Boncour promptly telegraphed to London welcoming the forthcoming visit but adding that any attempt to resume the Five Power Conversations⁴⁹ was to be deplored in view of the state of mind of the delegations not belonging to this group. From another source I learn that the French have given assurances that if the Five Power Conversations are again mooted, they will flatly refuse unless they be broadened to include the Little Entente, Belgium and Poland. After sending this telegram the French evidently gave thorough guidance to their press which is unanimous in criticising the visit and in the categorical statement that France will not permit any improvised solution to cut across ample discussion of the French plan, that there will be no further Five Power Conversations, and that altogether the British visit is ill-timed and unfortunate. Boncour made it clear that he and the French Prime Minister,⁵⁰ with whom he talked on the telephone yesterday, are extremely irritated at the British for having made this rather sensational announcement without any previous consultation with the French and thereby creating the impression that they consider the discussion of the French plan as something that could be brushed aside.

We share the impatience which probably led to the decision of the Prime Minister and Simon, to come to Geneva but cannot help feeling that the manifestation of impatience is premature. Davis will remember the attitude of the French during the conversations in December and their insistence that nothing should be allowed to interfere with a thorough discussion of their project. This attitude is today stronger if anything on account of the developments as regards Germany and Italy which are giving the French genuine concern. Their firmness on this point has strong backing from a number of delegations ranking among those powers which will be called upon to make substantial contributions to any eventual scheme of reduction.

We are told confidentially that what has been discussed in London is a treaty of limited objectives. Whether this is what Prime Minister will eventually bring with him still remains to be seen but in any event I have just had it from Paul-Boncour that the French will insist on going through a full public discussion of the French plan consuming perhaps a fortnight or more which will lead to the acceptance or rejection of this plan, and only after a decision has been reached by the Conference on this general question will they consent to consider the possibility of a treaty of limited objectives.

In view of the tension in the Conference as a result of the present conditions in Europe it is difficult to prophesy as to developments here but it seems safe to say that if the French succeed, as they well may, in keeping the Conference focused on a discussion of the French plan for the next few weeks, leading in all probability to failure to secure agreement on this plan in its present form, there will be little disposition to make a fresh start on disarmament questions in the General or Political Commissions until after Easter recess. This would not preclude committees of the Conference such as those on effectives, material, private manufacture and traffic in arms, et cetera, continuing to work on questions which have been referred to them. However, in view of the number and intricacy of these questions they cannot be expected to make anything approaching a complete report at least until after Easter.

From our estimate of the situation we feel that the best hope lies in letting the discussion take its course for the present, getting the controversial questions out of public discussion, getting the Easter recess over, and concentrating our major effort on an attempt to bring about an agreement after Easter. We feel that this would lead to better results than to upset final reports now under way as any plan introduced now would cause keen resentment with no assurance that it could offer any satisfaction to the French or the Germans.

Ever since the idea of a limited objective treaty has been under consideration here the tabulation of subjects for such a treaty has been indulged in by all delegations outside of their regular conference work. It is significant that all attempts of this sort lead to approximately the same results—the possibility of a treaty embodying provisions for

(1) A permanent disarmament commission

(2) European agreement for renouncing force

(3) Abolition of chemical warfare

(4) Measures of protection for civilian population against bombing

(5) Armament truce and

(6) Some form of truce in expenditure.

(7) It may in addition be possible to get some attenuated form of qualitative limitation.

Such a treaty could presumably be so drafted as to secure ready acceptance by France and a large number of other nations. But as it stands it would undoubtedly be rejected by the Germans who have gone on record in the most definite way at home and abroad as to the necessity for an early treaty to embody clear recognition of Germany’s equality of status in such form as to do away with part V of the Treaty of Versailles,⁵¹ either from the date of signature or as a last concession at the date of reversion of the new disarmament treaty. The Germans are rigid in their insistence on this as a sine qua non, and the French are equally rigid in their refusal to entertain any such provision unless they have far-reaching political guarantees of security such as those outlined in the French plan.

Whether or not an answer can be found to this essentially Franco-German difficulty will be the deciding factor in the success or failure of a treaty of limited objectives, and although this is the subject of constant discussion in Geneva I have yet to hear anyone suggest a way out of the difficulty. In this connection see our telegram number 383, September 23, 11 p.m.,⁵² especially the concluding paragraphs.

To be successful a plan must be introduced at a moment when all delegations are convinced of the futility of lengthy public discussions and are looking for a way out. Such a moment has not yet come. This leads us to consider our role in the work of the Conference. We have thus far been able to avoid being drawn into discussions in which we were not ready to express ourselves but a number of important decisions at least from the continental point of view are being held in abeyance until the United States can have an opportunity to pronounce upon them. The debates have shown more and more clearly the very real concern of the Continental states as to our attitude towards political questions.

Such a procedure as we have envisaged, namely, an early pause in the work of the General and Political Commissions until after Easter, would be desirable from our point of view in that it would afford our Government time to examine the various problems which will confront us. We would then be in a position to state our views and perhaps promote the work of the Conference upon its reconvening.

Gibson

47. Norman H. Davis, appointed Chairman of the American delegation to the General Commission.
48. J. Ramsay MacDonald, British Prime Minister; head of the British delegation to the General Commission.
49. For memorandum on the Conversations of December 1932, see Foreign Relations, 1932, vol. i, pp. 489–528.
50. Édouard Daladier.
51. Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1910–1923 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1923), vol. iii, pp. 3329, 3398.
52. Foreign Relations, 1932, vol. i, p. 444.