Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1933, General, Volume I

500.A15A4/2241

Memorandum of Trans-Atlantic Telephone Conversation⁸⁶

[Washington,] October 16, 1933.

President: Hello, how are you?

Ambassador: I have been a little busy, but I am all right.

President: Good.

Ambassador: And, while I feel disturbed, I am not hopeless at all. We have decided to adjourn for ten days until Wednesday of next week, because most of the delegates feel they must consult their governments in view of the changed situation. They have all got to consider about three aspects—the question of disarmament, European political problems, and the maintenance of peace. I outlined that last night in a cable which I presume you have seen, No. 748.

President: Yes. I have it.

Ambassador: Roughly, I sent it about one o’clock in the morning; I wanted to give you an idea of the policy I was trying to pursue.

President: I think you have got to make some kind of a statement, because over here there is a growing feeling that we are getting mixed up with the political side—with England, France and Italy.

Ambassador: Yes.

President: I think you should make it very clear that we are in Geneva solely for disarmament purposes; that we will continue there as long as there is a possibility of carrying on disarmament negotiations; but that we are not interested in the political element, or in the purely European aspect of peace.

Ambassador: That is exactly what I told all of our newspaper men this afternoon, and in view of what you say, I think it will be just as well for me to give them a formal statement.

President: Yes. We have drafted a short statement here which I can put on the wire right away in plain English, and then you can give it out over there with such changes as you think necessary. That we are not actually sitting in in these conferences in regard to purely political European matters.

Ambassador: That is perfectly true.

President: And that we will be willing to stay there and discuss with them again as soon as they come back to the purely disarmament phase.

Davis: I see you are in entire agreement with what I outlined in my cable. Now there is one thing—of course we can say we want to do anything we can to help preserve peace because [?] our interest in disarmament has got a bearing on this but that if any political question is brought up we are not going to interfere or confer with them about it.

President: But on the angle of preserving peace, we should take the position that that is an European matter, unless both sides—say, Germany and France—should come to us and ask us to become amicus curiae. I think we should stay out of relations relating to European peace.

Ambassador: If we can help general agreement on disarmament, we are helping indirectly to promote peace. That is the whole point. I knew they would try in every way to begin to draw us in—particularly if they decide that they are not going ahead with disarmament.

President: That is right.

Ambassador: In that case they will begin political maneuvers and will try to draw us in. Mussolini is very eager to keep peace and to reach an agreement. He feels it can be done and he is constantly sending me private messages to that effect. His representative here now is suggesting that during these ten days’ vacation it would be very helpful if I would go down and have a talk with Mussolini, but I just want to speak to you about it.

President: My horseback opinion is it would be a mistake, because my general slant is that people would say we were being drawn into the Four Power Pact, which is a purely European political pact.

Ambassador: They are not going to call a meeting of the Four Power Pact members, because France says it is too embarrassing to confer now for the Little Entente has not ratified the Four Power Pact, and if a meeting is called now, will not ratify it. They say that is frankly the situation. All the meetings we attended yesterday, all day long, were entirely on disarmament and nothing else.

President: I think you want to make that clear.

Ambassador: Absolutely. There was not the slightest discussion of anything else.

President: I doubt very much if we should take the initiative in any way or attend meetings towards the drawing of a treaty with the idea that that would be imposed on Germany. A treaty which has to be imposed is a political and European matter.

Ambassador: The British tried to get me to make a proposal, and I said, “No.” Because if we made a proposal and it were not acceptable, why then it would have political implications.

President: That is just it.

Ambassador: No, I tell you we, Wilson, Dulles and I, have all been in accord on that. We must keep absolutely free of that. One other thing. I think what you say about Mussolini might apply to the British. Today, Simon and Eden were saying that during this time we could go over to London and get the French and Italians, and we could all go over what to do and how to bring about an agreement.

President: I think it would be better for you to go up to Chamonix.

Ambassador: All right. (Laughter.)

Ambassador: I am glad to get your slant on this. It helps me to know what the reaction is at home.

President: We want it made very clear over here.

Ambassador: I will get my press together. Are you sending me that message tonight?

President: Yes. I will send it in the course of the next hour.

Ambassador: Good. I think the quicker I give it out, the better. The only thing is this:—as long as there is a chance of doing something with Germany, we do not want to give the idea that we are in any way getting away from these fellows in their idea to get disarmament.

President: Yes. That is why I would stay right there.

Ambassador: So far as Germany[?] is concerned, my information today, from a good source, is that it is primarily an internal political move. Hitler has got to have some changes. There is some opposition to him, particularly in the Reichswehr, and certain elements which he could not combat and at the same time he has had to give in to, and he has lost a certain amount of prestige by it. A man came to me today direct and I will get you a cable tonight of what he said, because he only authorized me to give it to you, as to what is going to happen, and to keep the conference going until after the elections on November 12th.

President: Yes. That is all right.

Secretary: Our best impression over here is that the Germans will be intensely and completely engrossed until after November 12th with all the confusion and complications of their election and until then will not be in a very suitable situation to talk about resumption of disarmament relations at Geneva.

Ambassador: I do not think we can do a thing on disarmament with them until after November 12th. The idea now of what is to be decided is whether we can come back here in a week or ten days and then decide to let the British go ahead and redraft their convention, conforming to the amendments indicated in Simon’s speech of Saturday, and get that all ready; then be ready to say to the Germans, “Here is what we are ready to bind ourselves to, if you will sign it.” It has this advantage. It really helps to smoke these fellows out, and they have either got to refuse to commit themselves definitely and finally to disarmament, or they have got to be put on the defensive and by their actions justify the German accusations.

Secretary: Of course, you know better than we do. The internal state of mind is entirely different from what it was when they went out before and different from anywhere else in the world today, and you cannot deal with them as you would ordinarily.

Ambassador: That is perfectly true. My information is that Hitler is the best one of the lot and this election is probably going to get rid of some of the worst part of his group. He certainly wants to make peace with France.

Secretary: The only thing I have to suggest in addition is to be a little careful to avoid the appearance of being in too many conferences with three or four—the big powers, as they say over here. That makes an impression over here that there is some plan to involve us. Instead of having three or four when you talk about disarmament, see if you cannot get a dozen or two. That is all I have in mind.

Ambassador: That is what I want to mention. Yesterday at the meetings—all day yesterday—there were the French, the Italians, the British, ourselves, the President of the Conference, Politis the Vice President of the Conference, and Beneš. They were all present at every meeting we had, and we did not discuss one single political question.

Secretary: That is good for us to know over here, so we can correct misinformation. We will keep in touch with you right along and will send you over the statement the President speaks of for you to give out.

Ambassador: Any time you can flag me on anything, do it.

Secretary: Yes, we will send you code material principally because talking over the telephone is a very public affair.

Ambassador: I won’t get that text by cable until tomorrow now and will have to wait and give it out tomorrow.

President: What time is it there? 7:30? We can get it on the wires in plain English in twenty minutes.

Ambassador: We ought to get it here by ten o’clock then.

President: Fine. Goodbye.

86. Between President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull in Washington and Mr. Norman Davis in Geneva, October 16, 1933, 1:15 p.m.