500.A15A4/2226: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 16—1:50 a.m.]
748. In the situation brought up by Germany’s action in withdrawing from the Conference and the League one fact emerges [Page 271] clearly. Now that Germany has withdrawn from the Disarmament Conference the problem of dealing with Germany becomes preeminently a European one. We have maintained under your direction a unity of purpose with France, England and Italy through the recent phases of the disarmament discussion. Wherever we have urged them to modify their position it has been on questions relating to the form of presenting our common position on the fundamentals where we are in agreement with them.
Germany’s withdrawal intensifies the European nature of the problem of disarmament. Her action makes it more necessary than ever for the other powers to decide what further efforts they will make to reach an agreement and what their alternative will be if there is no agreement. While they will probably decide to make a further effort to reach agreement every move from now on will be influenced by what their position will be and what they will do in case of failure. From now on the situation as regards Germany will be influenced largely by Germany’s obligations under the Treaty of Versailles,82 under the Covenant,83 under Locarno84 as well as the reciprocal ones of France and England.
You will remember that both Boncour and Daladier emphasized in Paris that if France failed to get a disarmament treaty some form of decisive action had to be envisaged to prevent Germany’s continued rearmament in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and that they mentioned specifically the possibility of taking action under Article 213 of the Treaty of Versailles. This in itself shows clearly the European nature of the problem.
Thus unless some means is found for overcoming the present impasse forms of direct or indirect pressure may well be attempted against Germany, and France and England,—since she is bound by Locarno—will doubtless make every effort to maintain that unity of effort with the United States which has already been established both for the sake of availing themselves of the additional weight which our influence would give and of having us sympathetically and benevolently disposed in case of trouble.
Up to the present two possible means of procedure are being contemplated.
- (1)
- The powers other than Germany to agree upon the kind of a treaty which they would be willing to accept conditional upon Germany’s adherence.
- (2)
- A meeting of the five powers to avert a possible crisis and promote agreements in which event it would be necessary to keep the Conference alive so that if the five powers reach an agreement the machinery will be here with which to complete it.
Soragna told me in confidence today that Mussolini has asked him to inform me that he thinks that Italy and the United States might now be able to exercise a very helpful and effective influence in securing an agreement and that while it would not be feasible to call a meeting under the Four Power Pact it might be possible and advisable to arrange a meeting of the five powers. It is most important that nothing be done just yet in that direction and that in the meantime such a possibility should not be mentioned.
In view of the situation as outlined in this cable I feel that we should continue our efforts to surmount the difficulties so long as there is any hope of bringing about agreement. While we could cooperate sympathetically with the endeavors which France, England or Italy may make to bring Germany back into work for disarmament, we should refrain from trying to influence their political decisions and when their effort enters fields beyond the scope of disarmament, we should make it plain that we cannot associate ourselves with them.
I hope you will feel as I do that such a policy is wise in the light of the real gravity of the decisions which France and England, particularly the former, will be called upon to face in the next few weeks. Since these decisions are of such magnitude that they may possibly even lead to some form of coercive action, I feel that we should keep free of any commitment as to the course which we will pursue.
You will understand that in the present situation it is difficult to predict how events will shape themselves. I have, therefore, confined myself to giving you such information as I can and my views of what our own attitude in this matter should be during these troublous days. I shall be glad to know if my views are in accord with your own.