500.A15A4/1728: Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson) to the Secretary of State

540. From Gibson and Wilson. Subject disarmament and Far East. The Japanese Government has definitely decided to give notice of its withdrawal from the League of Nations.

No decision has yet been made as to withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference. There is an acute division of opinion inside the delegation here, the diplomatic and naval members favoring continued participation and the army people favoring withdrawal or at the most leaving junior officers as observers.

We know that even those who desire to stay are reluctant to do so unless assured that their presence in spite of the acceptance of the draft report41 by the Assembly would not be unwelcome to the nations participating in the Disarmament Conference. These Japanese realize that a decision to stay calls for no affirmative action but it is clear that the peculiar Japanese sense of good manners makes them feel the need for some intimation of this sort.

We know that the naval delegate Nagano, Chief of Naval Staff and next in authority to the Minister of Marine, is able to settle the matter [Page 17] himself here in Geneva. He is desirous of remaining chiefly in order to emphasize the desire of the Japanese to continue within the framework of the Washington and London Treaties42 and keep contact with the treaty powers; further to emphasize his desire to maintain relations with the United States on the best possible footing in the circumstances and his readiness to resume naval discussions in 1935 or sooner if desired. Press despatches from Tokyo which we believe to be inspired from Geneva emphasize the fact that Japan does attach importance to remaining within the treaty framework of the great naval powers and to participating in any further discussions.

As we see it here the question at issue is whether from our point of view it is more advantageous, (1), to have continued Japanese participation in the Disarmament Conference particularly as regards naval matters or, (2), whether on the other hand it is considered more salutary to have a clear cut and complete break at the time of Japanese withdrawal from the League. Obviously you alone can decide this point.

In considering these two questions, however, we should like to submit a few considerations.

1.
It appears significant that Nagano with his essential functions in Japan should be not only willing but anxious to remain in Geneva in such a crisis when the normal desires of a naval officer would be to hurry home.
2.
Nagano is both influential and outspoken and might serve a useful purpose in conveying to his own Government an understanding of developments in the Occident.
3.
With the rather hysterical attitude of the army element the question arises as to whether it is not desirable to encourage the restraining influence of the naval and civilian element and to hold up the hands of men like Matsudaira43 and Nagano who have consistently, if unsuccessfully, argued reasonable action by their Government and who will inevitably regain influence as the pendulum swings back.
4.
Further, the whole Disarmament Conference is in an extremely rickety state and tension is acute in the discussions between France, on the one hand, and Germany and Italy, on the other hand, with a general feeling that very little would suffice to bring about a complete collapse. How far Japanese withdrawal would tend to bring about collapse we cannot say but it certainly would not be helpful.

In the event you feel continued Japanese participation is desirable we are convinced we can make an effective contribution to this end without taking any official steps. A personal conversation with Matsudaira who is still chief of the disarmament delegation would [Page 18] suffice. It would only be necessary to assure him that we should view with regret Japanese separation from the Conference with its possible complication of future naval discussions.

So far as we can diagnose the case the only element of doubt still in the minds of the naval and civilian representatives is that before taking a decision to remain they want to be sure that they will not receive a rebuff from the Americans. If you authorize us to eliminate this doubt we feel that this would contribute materially to forming their decision. In other words, we feel that the decision as to whether the Japanese remain rests largely with us. You will be able to judge as to whether this fits in with your broader conception of policy.

At tomorrow’s meeting of the Assembly for the first time in history an undefeated great power will be subjected to a humiliating condemnation by the whole civilized world. The clear-sighted Japanese are shattered by this step. In this situation you may still feel it advantageous to attach Japan to future international effort and whatever we may say under the present circumstances will have double significance and effect.

The time element is essential as the report will be acted upon tomorrow morning. In the event you wish to talk to us by telephone please send advance notice as to the hour. Immediately after you decide to give us an answer by telegraph please expedite.

Gibson
  1. Telegram in three sections.
  2. For text of the report on the Sino-Japanese situation (Lytton Report), see League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supp. No. 112, p. 56.
  3. Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament, signed at Washington, February 6, 1922, Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 247; Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament, signed at London, April 22, 1930, ibid., 1930, vol. i, p. 107.
  4. Head of the Japanese delegation to the General Commission; Ambassador to Great Britain.