Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1933, General, Volume I

500.A15AA General Committee/492: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis)⁸²

Washington, June 17, 1933—11 a.m.

357. Your 681, June 1, 2 p.m. and 280 June 16, 11 a.m. from Paris. As we see it, the problem of establishing an adequate control of the manufacture of and trade in arms divides itself into three phases:

(1) With respect to weapons which are subject to qualitative limitation, the Convention should bind the signatory powers to abstain from and to prohibit the manufacture, possession, importation or exportation of weapons such as heavy artillery, heavy tanks, substances and devices used in chemical and bacteriological warfare, et cetera, which are abolished by the Convention. The passage of the legislation necessary to impose the requisite restrictions on private industry and commerce would thus become a treaty obligation. We have previously informed you that in spite of doubts expressed in past years, we are now convinced that there is no constitutional objection⁸³ to such an undertaking on our part.

(2) With respect to weapons which are subject to quantitative limitation, the Convention should bind the signatory powers to abstain from and to prohibit their manufacture except to such extent as is necessary to provide for the stocks permitted to their armed forces and for quantities to be exported. Manufacture of these types of weapons should be permitted only on order from a government. Some system of licensing both for manufacture and for importation and exportation will probably have to be worked out. This should be established on a national and not on an international basis, but there should be provision for prompt transmission to the Permanent Disarmament Commission of information in regard to all licenses issued and for full publicity.

(3) With respect to other types of weapons not subject to limitation either qualitatively or quantitatively, the system of licensing applicable in Case (2) should apply.

The foregoing together with continuous and automatic supervision of the execution of the Convention should amply meet French preoccupations and at the same time avoid such provisions as are unacceptable to us as constituting unnecessary international interference with our national industry and commerce. We are willing to have this supervision extended to include inspection at any time of Government owned matériel in use or in warehouses or elsewhere carried out, however, in such a way as to exclude inspection of the actual processes of production only. We are also willing to have it include inspection of privately owned stocks in warehouses or in transit.

Phillips

82. This telegram bears the notation: “Approved by the President.”
83. See telegrams Nos. 232, 236, and 240, November 5, 10, and 11, 1932, to the American delegate, Foreign Relations, 1932, vol. i, pp. 363, 370, and 372.