500.A15A4 General Committee/477: Telegram
The American Delegate (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State
[Received 11:08 p.m.]
692. In a declaration at the close of the General Commission’s discussion this morning Sato explained that his Government could only accept the abolition of aerial bombardment upon the condition [Page 189] (1) of the total abolition of all aircraft carriers and the prohibition of the equipment of war vessels with landing decks or platforms; (2) the establishment of an agreement by which civil aircraft could be effectively prevented from being used for military purposes in war time. The removal of these preoccupations was inspired by the necessity of taking into consideration the security of his country, of its peculiar geographical situation which rendered it extremely vulnerable particularly to aerial attacks from the sea. The prospective menace of aircraft carriers to Japan was a very real danger and one which could in the opinion of the Japanese Government only effectively be met by the retention of the power of aerial bombardment which was one of the most efficacious means of minimizing the offensive character of these vessels. It was difficult, he explained, for Japan to give up aerial bombardment without a compensating measure. He referred to the London treaty66 as providing no limitation whatsoever upon aircraft carriers and added, furthermore, that instead of bringing an appeasement to all the signatory states, that treaty had resulted in the creation of an atmosphere of uneasiness and apprehension which did not increase the feeling of security. His remarks on aircraft carriers, he added, were only the reflection of Japan’s own preoccupations in the domain of national defense and that they were not intended to cover any concrete case.
- 2.
- Basing my observations upon the Department’s 349 June 2, 1 p.m. I replied to Sato this afternoon making it clear that what I said must of necessity only be of a preliminary nature but that there were observations which I thought it essential to lay before the General Commission. The acceptance by the American delegation of the draft convention was given upon the draft as a balanced whole and that any reopening of the naval chapter which this suggestion of Japan would necessitate caused us considerable uneasiness as it would not only affect the structure of the whole plan but would give rise to long discussions which would delay the realization of the important progress represented by this draft. Moreover, the problem of aerial bombardment was essentially a land question and to make its abolition contingent on one technical aspect concerning navies alone could only becloud the main issue. All delegations had, I explained, certain general technical preoccupations as regards the problem of aerial bombardment but its abolition would be one of the greatest things that the Conference could achieve and I hoped the Japanese Government would reflect upon the broad aspect and not merely upon one technical phase. As far as the remarks concerning the London treaty were concerned this idea was so new to me that I would not go into it deeply but I felt that it was difficult in international situations [Page 190] to single out one factor which causes uneasiness. The state of international apprehension to which Sato referred may well have been caused by other factors in addition to the London treaty.
- 3.
- The British representative supported my declaration at some length. He pointed out that the Japanese delegation had previously explained that any amendments it had to offer would not affect the fundamental structure of existing naval treaties. While he did not wish to minimize the problem of aircraft carriers he felt that more properly that was a question which should be dealt with at the 1935 naval conference. Further, article 33 provided for discussion of this and related questions by the Peace [Permanent?] Disarmament Commission.
- 4.
- In reply to these observations Sato explained that it was necessary for his Government to present these preoccupations for it could only with difficulty abandon its own interests to those of general profit without compensating security being granted. He hoped that some arrangement might be arrived at which would take care of the very real apprehension caused by the existence of these aircraft carriers to Japan.
- 5.
- At the close of the discussion Henderson rose and said that Sato had cast very serious reflections upon the London naval treaty and that as one of the sponsors of and fellow-workers in the creation of that treaty Sato must realize that he could not accept these reflections.
- 6.
- The General Commission adjourned.