500.A15A4 General Committee/394: Telegram
The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 23—12:30 p.m.]
654. A meeting of the five was held this morning, that is, Simon, Boncour, Nadolny, Aloisi29 and myself, presided over by Henderson, to consider whether the Conference should return to detailed consideration of the so-called security chapter, part I of the British plan, or continue with the discussion of war material.
In the course of the discussion it seemed important to make it entirely clear that we proposed to deal with the question of consultation and neutral rights by a unilateral declaration and to indicate in a general way the form this declaration might take as our attitude in this matter vitally affects part I of the British plan.
Accordingly I made the following statement after indicating that it was done for the purpose of showing the method we proposed to adopt rather than to give any final phraseology:
“Our ideas regarding what we might term ‘consultation’ and ‘neutral rights’ on the one hand and the nonaggression pact on the other can be covered in two parts.
1. Concerning the first. This might be envisaged under two hypotheses: (a)—that additional consultative machinery such as suggested in the British plan, part 1, is set up; (b)—that in view of the fact that the Covenant already establishes machinery for consultation and that part I is designed primarily to facilitate the inclusion therein of non-member states, it may be deemed unnecessary to establish this additional machinery provided a method of consultation between nonmember [Page 167] states and states members of the League can be provided within existing machinery.
Whichever of the two hypotheses may be found advisable we are prepared to make a unilateral declaration which would have to be conceived in slightly different form in accordance with whether (a) or (b) were chosen. For example, we have prepared in tentative form the type of unilateral declaration which might be made in the two hypotheses:
‘Recognizing that any breach or threat of breach of the Pact of Paris (Kellogg-Briand Pact)30 is a matter of concern to all the signatories thereto, the Government of the United States of America declares that in the event of a breach or threat of breach of this pact, it will be prepared to confer with a view to the maintenance of peace in the event consultation for such purpose is arranged pursuant (a) to articles 1 to 5 of part I of the Disarmament Convention or (b) pursuant to the machinery for general consultation which now exists or may hereafter be constituted.
In the event that following a decision by conference of the powers in consultation in determining the aggressor with which, on the basis of its independent judgment, the Government of the United States agreed, the Government of the United States will undertake to refrain from any action and to withhold protection from its citizens if engaged in activities which would tend to defeat the collective effort which the states in consultation might have decided upon against the aggressor.’
This declaration would be drafted in final form previous to signature of the Disarmament Convention and would be attached to our act of ratification of that convention.
2. Concerning the nonaggression pact. We feel that the mechanics by which this pact will be brought into being is of secondary importance. It must eventually of course be determined whether it can best be given form as a measure to reenforce the Pact of Paris as a part of the Disarmament Convention or as an independent instrument”.
After reading this statement it was decided that Simon in consultation with the other four would proceed to a reconsideration and possibly the redrafting of part I in the light of the American position as explained by me yesterday and today.
I did not give out any copies of this statement as I desired to reserve the right to make textual changes. I would appreciate, however, if you would advise me urgently whether the statement which is based on your 94, May 5, 8 p.m.,31 to London correctly sets forth your views as Simon has asked me for a copy for his guidance in connection with redrafting part I. In this connection Simon intimated to me privately and informally that he rather inclined to the view that it might be better to drop articles 1 to 5 of part I in favor of existing machinery for consultation in the Covenant.
When we finally make our declaration it should presumably be related to either (a) or (b) and not both. I am inclined to think that the British and French will ultimately decide to give up or essentially [Page 168] modify part I. I assume from your 94 that in this latter event we are authorized to drop (a) from our declaration and relate our consultation to existing machinery.
- Head of the Italian delegation to the General Commission; Chief of Cabinet, Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.↩
- Treaty for the Renunciation of War, signed at Paris, August 27, 1928, Foreign Relations, 1928, vol. i, p. 153.↩
- Ante, p. 124.↩