500.A15A4 General Committee/377: Telegram
The Chargé in France ( Marriner ) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 15—7:30 a.m.]
215. From Norman Davis. I feel that Hitler’s statement before the Reichstag will be of overwhelming importance on the fate of the Disarmament Conference. If he makes a statement which we now anticipate claiming the right of even sample types of weapons which are permitted to other powers and the determination to rearm in case their demands are not granted there is a strong chance that the subsequent debate in the Disarmament Conference will prove that further attempts are futile. If on the other hand he can be induced to accept the British plan in its essence as a first step toward equality provided express provision is made for the destruction or the demilitarization [Page 142] of prohibited material then of course the Conference can reconvene with real hope.
Time is so vital that I fear that even a public declaration by the President no matter how wisely conceived may not have time decisively to influence Hitler’s action before the Reichstag. I feel also that urgent steps are necessary or advisable to bring out points that cannot be made in a speech or public declaration.
The German people are in a state of mind today where broad arguments of world reconstruction, success of the Economic Conference or peaceful cooperation in Europe would not weigh against their present conception of national honor and prestige. The argument that is most likely to convince them at the present time would be that if they throw in the weight of their influence in favor of the British plan (interpreted to provide for strict demilitarization and ultimate destruction of prohibited material) and accept this as a first step towards equality then overnight the burden of responsibility for the success of the Disarmament Conference rests on the heavily armed powers. By such a step Germany would instantly align itself with the United States, Great Britain and Italy and public opinion in our countries would make it essential for us to press for the ultimate acceptance by all powers of the plan in toto.
It has occurred to me that in this very urgent situation the President may think it wise to call in the German Ambassador and present this side of the question to him. This must of course be handled with the greatest care and without direct reference to France to prevent her from becoming irreconcilable.
Referring to my 213, May 15, 1 a.m.; and 214, May 15, 2 a.m.,89 I still feel that a statement by the President prior to Hitler’s speech would be helpful not only to clarify publicly our position but it also might have some tempering effect upon Hitler if it reached him in time. However, it is only considerations such as the above which would most likely influence him to make his speech along constructive rather than obstructive lines. [Davis.]
- Latter not printed.↩