862.00/2703
The Counselor of Embassy in Germany (Wiley) to the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Boal)
[Received March 26(?)]
Dear Pierre : Many thanks for your letter of February 2. The Embassy has over a period of years reported pretty much all that it could learn on the National-Socialist movement. The various consulates in Germany have done likewise. Of particular interest is a despatch from the Consulate General at Munich of November 13, 1931, which reports the intellectual conception of the movement [Page 282] in extenso. In attempting to give any concise statement as to the vague aims and vaguer program of the Party, there has been the danger that a report from the Embassy might be more misleading than helpful.
There is a great tendency on the part of the Nazis to talk in generalities and to evade any clear-cut commitment as to the future. To one inquirer Herr Hitler will state that General Motors, for example, need fear nothing from his advent to power. To another, Herr Hitler has declared that of course the Woolworth Stores in Germany would have to go at once. No very clear-cut line!
Since I have been here I have had the opportunity to see a number of Nazi and Stahlhelm leaders. The former, in talking with foreigners, have become very moderate. The Stahlhelm on the contrary has become rabid.
Today I encountered Dr. Goebbels. He is one of the National-Socialist Party’s chief orators, edits the Angriff, the evening organ of the Party, with Frick heads the Reichstag faction, and plays a heavy role in the party councils. Government circles regard him as particularly radical. I found him more intelligent than any other Nazi I have met. He obviously has first-rate ability and much personal magnetism.
Goebbels characterizes the Party as a pyramid: at the head is Hitler; under him stand the chief party leaders, such as Epp, Goehring [Goering] (I have previously reported one or two conversations with Goehring), Frick (who may be the Nazi candidate in the first presidential elections) and Goebbels. Goebbels divided the pyramid into sectors. One section of approximately 40 percent represented, he said, the agrarian element; the peasantry, small, middle and large farmers and estate owners. Another 40 percent represented the labor element, the intellectual proletariat and very small bourgeoisie. The remaining sector was mostly taken up by the middle bourgeoisie, officer and professional classes and small industrialists. There was a tiny participation of big industry. This last element played no role per se but exerted some influence behind the scenes. I suggested to Dr. Goebbels that at the base of his pyramid there was a considerable distance from the extreme Right to the extreme Left. Did that not constitute a great division of opinion within the party? He admitted that this was the case; there were great contrasts of views. The final decision, however, always rested with Herr Hitler. This is what Captain Goehring has emphasized to me repeatedly in private conversation. Political observers in general in Germany, though, characterize the manifestation [Page 283] of this final authority of Hitler as rather the reflection of pressure on him from party subordinates.
The intellectual conception of the Party, according to Dr. Goebbels, is as follows: Germany has for years been divided sharply in two. On one side of the dividing line were the bourgeois elements; on the other were the Marxists. Neither could overcome the other but one could always negative the other. An element of stalemate has thus characterized the domestic constellation in Germany; a stalemate which threatened to become permanent. National-Socialism was created on the outside. It represented no caste or class or precise political or economic policy. It wished to become a synthesis of all national elements. Its principal objective was to break down this line which divided Germany into two camps. In the process it had broken through into the bourgeois ranks as the point of least resistance. From within the bourgeois ranks it was encroaching on the Marxist ranks. To the same degree as the Communists were eating into the Social-Democrats, the National-Socialists were nibbling away at the Communists. On the extreme Left the irreconcilable Communists would remain immune to their propaganda campaign—a campaign which was intended to appeal to the racial instincts of the population—das Nationalgefühl. The power of State, when the Nazis came to power, would be used to bring the recalcitrants to heel.
Dr. Goebbels had made a careful study of the electoral estimates since the beginning of the Party. In all elections they have obtained in votes from 20 to 38 times the inscribed number of their party members. In smaller communities the party organization was more effective than in larger communities. Never, however, had the multiple been less than 20. Dr. Goebbels proceeded to tabulate the results of his findings. He was obviously hypnotized by his own logic. In the first of the forthcoming presidential elections he has estimated that the Nazi candidate will receive 13,500,000 votes. For this estimate he took an average multiple of only 15. Hindenburg would get 10,000,000; Thaelmann, the Communist candidate, 7,000,000; Hugenberg or the Nationalist candidate 2,500,000; and the Stahlhelm candidate, if any, 500,000 votes. In the second election the Nationalist Opposition together (this presupposes that Hugenberg and the Stahlhelm will bow before the inevitable and support unconditionally the Nazi candidate, presumably Hitler himself) 18,000,000 votes; Hindenburg 10,000,000; Thaelmann 6,000,000. I have frequently seen bright-eyed people figure out with pencil and paper that a certain horse must win. I have somewhat the same feeling with regard to Dr. Goebbels’ estimated calculation. In other words, I am not [Page 284] yet ready to bet on Hitler or against Hindenburg! His conclusions were, though, extremely interesting.
With regard to Fascism and Socialism there are many points of analogy. According to Dr. Goebbels the idea of the cooperative state is identic. The Fascists maintain the monarchy. The National-Socialists have not yet decided this question. Nazi ideas in respect of constitution and organization are identic with Fascism. There is no analogy with regard to anti-Semitism or racial questions as these problems do not exist in Italy. I think it has been previously reported to the Department that the Nazi idea is not to harm a hair of any Jewish head, but to treat them as foreigners; to tax them, but not to subject them to military service; to deport eastward as many Polish and Russian Jews as possible. In respect of free-masonry, National-Socialists and Fascists see eye to eye. The National-Socialist opposition to international banking in general is much more accentuated than in Italy. Moreover, the National-Socialists believe in domestic currency—Binnenmark—which they believe would have a very alleviating effect on domestic economy. The Nazis lay much greater emphasis on the role of labor as the backbone of the State; on its material welfare.
In reply to a question as to what the policy of the National-Socialists would be if and when they came into power, Dr. Goebbels stated that from a foreign-political point of view the chief objective of Germany would be to make herself bündnisfähig. In other words, instead of a house divided within itself, Germany should present a united front to the outside world and would thus constitute a country whose yes or no could be expressed authoritatively. I suggested that in making Germany bündnisfähig, the sole implication would be that Germany intended to enter into the system of foreign alliances. Dr. Goebbels said that this was the case.
In regard to financial-economic matters, he stated that the National-Socialists unitedly recognized private debts. These included the Dawes and Young loans which had been commercialized. The chief purpose of Germany would be, by drastic means, to reestablish Germany’s credit. First there would be a drastic emergency program; later an “idealistic” economic program. Neither had been formulated. He said that only a united Germany could succeed in freeing the country from the “yoke” of Versailles and of the “tribute” payments. He was careful not to imply that the National-Socialists intended any policy of repudiation; the implication was that for a strong Germany anything would be possible along peaceful lines. I naively asked how he interpreted German sentiment in respect of a revision of the eastern frontiers. He emphatically replied that [Page 285] German national feeling was united in this respect. I asked, if Germany could not accomplish a revision by peaceful means, would an offensive policy be undertaken. He said he was not able to deny or affirm this.
At a recent lunch with Captain Goehring, who is reputed to be Hitler’s chief political lieutenant, he was much more explicit in respect to the East. He declared then that many Poles were in agreement with the idea of cooperation with Germany as against Russia; that National-Socialist policy toward Russia was one of implacable hostility irrespective of the political structure there. There were many Poles, he said, who were willing to cooperate with Germany in an attack on Russia. The National-Socialists, he declared, would be willing to compensate Poland with Kiev, Odessa and access to the Black Sea. Yencken, the First Secretary of the British Embassy here, has been in touch with various National-Socialist leaders too. He describes this Eastern policy of the Nazis as one of “floating frontiers”. It sounds like a rather dangerous theory; one of pure conquest.
The Nazis have become, as you have noted, more and more moderate. To the same degree the Stahlhelm has become more and more intransigent. Several acquaintances of mine, who are important provincial Stahlhelm leaders, have been called to Berlin to confer on Stahlhelm policy in respect of the forthcoming presidential elections. Their remarks are amazing. Dr. Wagner, the Berlin head of the Stahlhelm organization, told me yesterday at luncheon that the Stahlhelm could not forgive Brüning for not having hammered his fist on the table at Geneva in respect of the Memel question. Dr. Brüning should have presented a 48-hour ultimatum and at its expiration ought to have sent the Reichswehr to occupy the city. Dr. Wagner’s remarks in respect of the reparations settlement and all other outstanding problems were equally farfetched. As the Stahlhelm has always represented a well-disciplined organization representative of the better bourgeois tradition, this Alice-in-Wonderland orientation is certainly disquieting.
Reverting to the Nazis, François-Poncet, the French Ambassador, denied to me that France desired the advent of National-Socialist power in Germany. It would, he said, unduly complicate the situation. Ministerialdirektor Dr. Ritter, the Economic Adviser of the Foreign Office, tells me, however, that the Nationalist elements in France are very anxious to see the Hitler régime come into being as soon as possible. When recently the prolongation of the B.I.S.8 [Page 286] credit to the Reichsbank came before the Banque de France, Moret and the other heads of the bank were entirely disposed to prolong the French part without any difficulty whatsoever. The Board of Regents, however, had endeavored to bring as much political pressure on Germany as possible. Ritter stated that, according to Foreign Office information, de Wendel urged that a financial catastrophe in Germany now would insure Hitler’s taking over the Government. This in turn would have a most salutary effect on the forthcoming French elections; on American “debt cancellation” too.
Rumors are current that a considerable number of French are in Berlin this week to confer with the Nazi leaders. In fact, Dr. Hanffstängel, Hitler’s personal adjutant, boasted of this to me today. I mentioned the subject casually to the French Ambassador. He merely shrugged his shoulders and said that it was a question of entirely unrepresentative people; no conversations of importance were going on. I happen to know, however, that the Nazis are doing their best to flirt with the French. An acquaintance of mine was commissioned by Goehring to inform the French at Geneva that the Nazis were prepared to reach an agreement with France in respect of both reparations and armaments. On the subject I suggested to Hanffstaengel today that if the Nazis were able to live up to their pretensions in respect of shortly coming into power (which incidentally I do not believe to be the case) they might influence the French elections in a sense very unfavorable to German interests. He said: “Not at all; we could always more easily reach an understanding with the extreme Right than with any weak Middle government.”
The present course of events in Germany is somewhat disquieting. The constant playing of the political passions of the people is certainly not wholesome. The German mind, as the war demonstrated, is particularly susceptible to nationalist appeal.
Other questions mentioned in your letter will be taken up later.
Yours very sincerely,
- Bank for International Settlements.↩