While they may not be in exact accord with what you have worked out,
they are not far from it. You will find among the Embassy’s
despatches one, No. 1326, dated 7 December, 1931,2 which gives perhaps a few
observations that may be of interest in this connection.
The enclosed memorandum is a composite of the Embassy’s views, which
has been prepared by Mr. Kliefoth and subjected to a few amendments by the
rest of us. The only statement in connection with it which I cannot
quite agree with occurs at the bottom of the second page, where it
gives an estimate of what would be the results if a general election
were now held. I am inclined to think that the Social Democrat and
Communist group would be a larger percentage of the total than that
stated. In fact, in an interview with the Chancellor today, he made
the statement to me that if an election were held today it would be
found that the Social Democratic group was still the largest party
in Germany.
Assuring you of my pleasure in being able to send you this material
[etc.]
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the American
Embassy
(1) Hitler’s political future.
Hitler’s political
movement, which was practically down and out following the
abortive putsch in Munich in 1923, has
since gained a large ascendency with the increase of
unemployment in Germany. The past year particularly has
witnessed a phenomenal gain in successive local elections, the
Nazis having profited tremendously by the depression and the
growing unemployment. The belief, however, that there is no
limit to future Nazi gains and that they will continue in
geometric progression is undoubtedly erroneous.
The returns of the general election in September, 1930, showed
that the Nazis had, throughout the Reich, on an average of 18.3
per cent of the qualified voters. These elections showed that
Hitler’s gains were
made mostly at the expense of the non-Socialist parties of the
Middle and the Eight. Hitler has been unable to draw appreciably from
the strength of the two Catholic parties (Bavarian People’s
Party and Center Party), or to affect the combined strength of
the Socialist parties of the Left (Communists and
Social-Democrats) as the considerable losses of the
Social-Democrats, during the past year, were absorbed by an
equivalent increase in the Communist vote.
The most significant local election during the year 1931 was that
of the Free State of Hesse. Unlike the other local elections, as
pointed out in the Embassy’s despatch No. 1279 of November 17,
1931,3 it had
more than local significance. The distribution of political
strength in Hesse resembles more closely the political
constellation throughout the Reich. On the basis of the returns
of local elections throughout the Reich during the past year and
particularly considering that in Hesse, but not taking into
consideration further unexpected popular support of the Nazis,
it is estimated that, if a general election were now held, the
Catholic parties would obtain about 15 per cent of the votes
cast, the non-Socialist parties (from the State Party up to and
including the Nationalists) 15 per cent, the Marxist parties of
the Left (Social-Democrats and Communists) about 35 per cent,
and the Nazis 35 per cent. The Nazis would certainly become the
strongest party in a new Reichstag. That they can collect, as
Hitler claims, in a
new general election over 50 per cent of all the votes cast and
assume power alone, that is, without entering into a coalition
with other parties, does not seem at all probable. On the other
hand, a [Page 279] coalition with
the two Catholic parties seems probable, as a necessary
condition precedent to Hitler’s entering the Government.
Hitler’s interview with the
foreign press, on December 4, 1931, in which he stressed his
capitalistic program assuming the sanctity of private foreign
debts, has, according to his own lieutenants, cooled the ardor
of many of the more radical elements within the
“National-Socialist” Party, but while it has allayed their fears
it has failed to attract to his cause outstanding individuals.
The prominent Germans who are avowed followers of Hitler may be counted on the
fingers of two hands though several rich industrialists would be
included. The recent assurances in Hitler’s speeches on economic matters have won
over certain business elements but have very much slowed up the
intensity of his appeal to the particularly undigested youth of
the country who were previously attracted to him as a crusader.
As the latter far outnumber the former from a voting standpoint
it is felt in most circles that Nazi gains in voting strength
will be considerably diminished in the immediate future.
Though the Nazis’ gains in the communal elections held in the
Free State of Lippe on January 10th were about 40 per cent as
compared with the Reichstag election in September, 1930, the
result was far below their gains in other similar elections in
the past year, particularly in Hesse (see the Embassy’s telegram
No. 216 of November 16, 1931)4 where they were able to double their
following.
a) The extent to which his program and
ideas seem to resemble those of Fascist Italy.
The program of Fascist Italy really has little in common with
that of the Nazis in Germany. Whereas Fascism is based on the
idea of a cooperative state, Hitlerism is based on the old
Hohenzollern and Prussian idea of strong centralization,
imperialism and expansion (Hitler’s advocacy of centralized government was
undoubtedly responsible for the present hostile attitude toward
him by the Bavarian Government). The programs are similar in
that both Fascism and Hitlerism depend on chauvinism and are
opposed to emigration of their peoples. Whereas in the latter
the element of anti-Semitism plays a prominent role, it is
entirely lacking in the former. The substance of Fascism is
Mussolini’s
personality; the same applies in a much lesser degree to
Hitlerism. Mussolini has
the intellect and bearing of a martial hero; Hitler has the intellect of a
crusading sectarian leader—oblivious of dangers which surround
him—but with intense energy and relentless in the pursuit of his
aims.
The Brüning Government by emergency decrees has established a [Page 280] situation which under
certain circumstances would enable a complete transition to
government by dictatorship without upsetting the country.
Banking, commerce and industry are already accustomed to
function under a semi-dictatorial government and the change to a
Hitler dictatorship
would not be great, provided Hitler did not impose compulsory measures. It is
doubtful, however, whether Hitler would succeed in bringing the German
trade unions under a Nazi national dictatorship. The present
existing trade unions make up the Social-Democratic Party,
oppose dictatorship and constitute the strongest opposition to
Hitler, and the two
movements are irreconcilable. The strongest of these are the
trade unions organized by the Social-Democrats, which are in
control of communications and the key industries. The
conservative Catholic trade unions are next in strength. They
constitute the Left wing of the Center Party and the link with
the Social-Democrats. The rest of the trade unions are under the
control of the Communists. The workers controlled by Hitler are principally those who
represent the floating labor population of Germany, who lack the
disciplined organization of the trade unionists. They are also
apt to drop away from Hitler the minute the depression ends. The
opposition trade unionists possess a most powerful weapon
against Hitler, that is,
the general strike, which they would probably employ in case the
Nazis attempt to obtain control by use of force. The Nazis, on
the other hand, claim that their S. A. troops are organized
principally for the purpose of dealing with internal disorders
and would be able to cope with a general strike (see the
Embassy’s despatch No. 1330 of December 8, 1931).5
b) Hitler, especially during the last two months,
has taken a very strong stand to obtain the favor of
international private banking groups. He promised them the full
payment of Germany’s private debts, but not “a cent of tribute,”
that is, the cancellation of all political debts, reparations,
etc. His purpose was to reassure them and, quite obviously, to
gain their support in opposing the French reparations
demands.
c) Hitler’s patriotic utterances in general
resemble those of Mussolini a few years ago—national war cries
without defined objective.
Both Hitler and Mussolini demand territorial
expansion for their peoples. Hitler apparently hopes to achieve the union of
all German nations, that is, Austria and Germany, and the return
of all former German territory, as Memel,6 Danzig,7 Upper Silesia, and
not excluding Alsace-Lorraine, under a
strongly federalized German state, [Page 281] and a return of German colonies. Hitler’s war cries, especially
up to last December, greatly resembled those of Mussolini of a few years ago.
Now he endeavors to be more diplomatic, especially in order not
to offend Great Britain, Italy and the United States. The real
program of Hitler,
especially in the field of foreign affairs and the economic
reform of Germany, has not been sufficiently revealed to enable
careful examination.
d) The reaction of the French and the
French Government to the Nazis.
Following Hitler’s recent
interview to the representatives of the American and British
press in Berlin, the French press showed increased interest in
the Nazis aspirations. A spirit of dismay, uneasiness and alarm
characterized the editorial comment. The French Nationalist
press seems to be in constant fear of a Hitlerized Germany, and
of an alliance between Hitler and Mussolini although men like Léon Daudet welcome a Nazi
regime of intransigence, as this, they feel, would give France
an opportunity to down Germany. The French Government points to
the agitation of the Nazis as an argument in support of the
French demands for security. The French, too, are much concerned
over the attitude of the British. Great Britain, they fear,
would not sympathize with another invasion of the Ruhr, in case
the Germans under Hitler
repudiate reparations.
Poland, the ally of France and the Eastern neighbor of Germany,
would welcome the advent of Hitler. The Polish belief is that little or
nothing would be changed in Germany but that the “real aims” of
the Reich would be “unmasked.” Moreover, a German-French rapprochement would be made impossible,
thus eliminating one of Poland’s major sources of concern.
