862.00/2682

The Ambassador in Germany (Sackett) to the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Boal)

My Dear Mr. Boal: Your letter of December 10th, enclosing memorandum of certain brief observations regarding events in Germany, was duly received by pouch and I have been at work compiling the necessary data to give you the Embassy’s views on the subject matter.

While they may not be in exact accord with what you have worked out, they are not far from it. You will find among the Embassy’s despatches one, No. 1326, dated 7 December, 1931,2 which gives perhaps a few observations that may be of interest in this connection.

The enclosed memorandum is a composite of the Embassy’s views, which has been prepared by Mr. Kliefoth and subjected to a few amendments by the rest of us. The only statement in connection with it which I cannot quite agree with occurs at the bottom of the second page, where it gives an estimate of what would be the results if a general election were now held. I am inclined to think that the Social Democrat and Communist group would be a larger percentage of the total than that stated. In fact, in an interview with the Chancellor today, he made the statement to me that if an election were held today it would be found that the Social Democratic group was still the largest party in Germany.

Assuring you of my pleasure in being able to send you this material [etc.]

Frederic M. Sackett
[Page 278]
[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the American Embassy

(1) Hitler’s political future.

Hitler’s political movement, which was practically down and out following the abortive putsch in Munich in 1923, has since gained a large ascendency with the increase of unemployment in Germany. The past year particularly has witnessed a phenomenal gain in successive local elections, the Nazis having profited tremendously by the depression and the growing unemployment. The belief, however, that there is no limit to future Nazi gains and that they will continue in geometric progression is undoubtedly erroneous.

The returns of the general election in September, 1930, showed that the Nazis had, throughout the Reich, on an average of 18.3 per cent of the qualified voters. These elections showed that Hitler’s gains were made mostly at the expense of the non-Socialist parties of the Middle and the Eight. Hitler has been unable to draw appreciably from the strength of the two Catholic parties (Bavarian People’s Party and Center Party), or to affect the combined strength of the Socialist parties of the Left (Communists and Social-Democrats) as the considerable losses of the Social-Democrats, during the past year, were absorbed by an equivalent increase in the Communist vote.

The most significant local election during the year 1931 was that of the Free State of Hesse. Unlike the other local elections, as pointed out in the Embassy’s despatch No. 1279 of November 17, 1931,3 it had more than local significance. The distribution of political strength in Hesse resembles more closely the political constellation throughout the Reich. On the basis of the returns of local elections throughout the Reich during the past year and particularly considering that in Hesse, but not taking into consideration further unexpected popular support of the Nazis, it is estimated that, if a general election were now held, the Catholic parties would obtain about 15 per cent of the votes cast, the non-Socialist parties (from the State Party up to and including the Nationalists) 15 per cent, the Marxist parties of the Left (Social-Democrats and Communists) about 35 per cent, and the Nazis 35 per cent. The Nazis would certainly become the strongest party in a new Reichstag. That they can collect, as Hitler claims, in a new general election over 50 per cent of all the votes cast and assume power alone, that is, without entering into a coalition with other parties, does not seem at all probable. On the other hand, a [Page 279] coalition with the two Catholic parties seems probable, as a necessary condition precedent to Hitler’s entering the Government.

Hitler’s interview with the foreign press, on December 4, 1931, in which he stressed his capitalistic program assuming the sanctity of private foreign debts, has, according to his own lieutenants, cooled the ardor of many of the more radical elements within the “National-Socialist” Party, but while it has allayed their fears it has failed to attract to his cause outstanding individuals. The prominent Germans who are avowed followers of Hitler may be counted on the fingers of two hands though several rich industrialists would be included. The recent assurances in Hitler’s speeches on economic matters have won over certain business elements but have very much slowed up the intensity of his appeal to the particularly undigested youth of the country who were previously attracted to him as a crusader. As the latter far outnumber the former from a voting standpoint it is felt in most circles that Nazi gains in voting strength will be considerably diminished in the immediate future.

Though the Nazis’ gains in the communal elections held in the Free State of Lippe on January 10th were about 40 per cent as compared with the Reichstag election in September, 1930, the result was far below their gains in other similar elections in the past year, particularly in Hesse (see the Embassy’s telegram No. 216 of November 16, 1931)4 where they were able to double their following.

a) The extent to which his program and ideas seem to resemble those of Fascist Italy.

The program of Fascist Italy really has little in common with that of the Nazis in Germany. Whereas Fascism is based on the idea of a cooperative state, Hitlerism is based on the old Hohenzollern and Prussian idea of strong centralization, imperialism and expansion (Hitler’s advocacy of centralized government was undoubtedly responsible for the present hostile attitude toward him by the Bavarian Government). The programs are similar in that both Fascism and Hitlerism depend on chauvinism and are opposed to emigration of their peoples. Whereas in the latter the element of anti-Semitism plays a prominent role, it is entirely lacking in the former. The substance of Fascism is Mussolini’s personality; the same applies in a much lesser degree to Hitlerism. Mussolini has the intellect and bearing of a martial hero; Hitler has the intellect of a crusading sectarian leader—oblivious of dangers which surround him—but with intense energy and relentless in the pursuit of his aims.

The Brüning Government by emergency decrees has established a [Page 280] situation which under certain circumstances would enable a complete transition to government by dictatorship without upsetting the country. Banking, commerce and industry are already accustomed to function under a semi-dictatorial government and the change to a Hitler dictatorship would not be great, provided Hitler did not impose compulsory measures. It is doubtful, however, whether Hitler would succeed in bringing the German trade unions under a Nazi national dictatorship. The present existing trade unions make up the Social-Democratic Party, oppose dictatorship and constitute the strongest opposition to Hitler, and the two movements are irreconcilable. The strongest of these are the trade unions organized by the Social-Democrats, which are in control of communications and the key industries. The conservative Catholic trade unions are next in strength. They constitute the Left wing of the Center Party and the link with the Social-Democrats. The rest of the trade unions are under the control of the Communists. The workers controlled by Hitler are principally those who represent the floating labor population of Germany, who lack the disciplined organization of the trade unionists. They are also apt to drop away from Hitler the minute the depression ends. The opposition trade unionists possess a most powerful weapon against Hitler, that is, the general strike, which they would probably employ in case the Nazis attempt to obtain control by use of force. The Nazis, on the other hand, claim that their S. A. troops are organized principally for the purpose of dealing with internal disorders and would be able to cope with a general strike (see the Embassy’s despatch No. 1330 of December 8, 1931).5

b) Hitler, especially during the last two months, has taken a very strong stand to obtain the favor of international private banking groups. He promised them the full payment of Germany’s private debts, but not “a cent of tribute,” that is, the cancellation of all political debts, reparations, etc. His purpose was to reassure them and, quite obviously, to gain their support in opposing the French reparations demands.

c) Hitler’s patriotic utterances in general resemble those of Mussolini a few years ago—national war cries without defined objective.

Both Hitler and Mussolini demand territorial expansion for their peoples. Hitler apparently hopes to achieve the union of all German nations, that is, Austria and Germany, and the return of all former German territory, as Memel,6 Danzig,7 Upper Silesia, and not excluding Alsace-Lorraine, under a strongly federalized German state, [Page 281] and a return of German colonies. Hitler’s war cries, especially up to last December, greatly resembled those of Mussolini of a few years ago. Now he endeavors to be more diplomatic, especially in order not to offend Great Britain, Italy and the United States. The real program of Hitler, especially in the field of foreign affairs and the economic reform of Germany, has not been sufficiently revealed to enable careful examination.

d) The reaction of the French and the French Government to the Nazis.

Following Hitler’s recent interview to the representatives of the American and British press in Berlin, the French press showed increased interest in the Nazis aspirations. A spirit of dismay, uneasiness and alarm characterized the editorial comment. The French Nationalist press seems to be in constant fear of a Hitlerized Germany, and of an alliance between Hitler and Mussolini although men like Léon Daudet welcome a Nazi regime of intransigence, as this, they feel, would give France an opportunity to down Germany. The French Government points to the agitation of the Nazis as an argument in support of the French demands for security. The French, too, are much concerned over the attitude of the British. Great Britain, they fear, would not sympathize with another invasion of the Ruhr, in case the Germans under Hitler repudiate reparations.

Poland, the ally of France and the Eastern neighbor of Germany, would welcome the advent of Hitler. The Polish belief is that little or nothing would be changed in Germany but that the “real aims” of the Reich would be “unmasked.” Moreover, a German-French rapprochement would be made impossible, thus eliminating one of Poland’s major sources of concern.

  1. Not printed.
  2. Not printed.
  3. Not printed.
  4. Not printed.
  5. For correspondence relative to Memel, see under “Lithuania”, pp. 466 ff.
  6. For correspondence relative to Danzig, see vol. i, pp. 861 ff.