The British Chargé, Mr. Osborne,
came and presented me with an aide-mémoire, which
is annexed hereto, concerning the representations which Sir John Simon has made to the German
Government on the subject of their démarche in
regard to equality of arms. He also read to me from a telegram a few
sentences, indicating that Sir
John felt and had stated to the German Government that
this was a very dangerous move for them to make at this time. In this
telegram he stated also that the German Government had defended itself
by saying that their attitude was merely a continuation of the position
taken at Bessinge last spring in Geneva.
I at once said that this statement was not in accord with the facts; that
my recollection was that Chancellor Bruening at Bessinge had taken a very different position
from what the German Government was now reported as taking towards the
French. I told Mr. Osborne that
according to my recollection at Bessinge, at an interview at which Mr.
MacDonald and Lord Londonderry, Chancellor Bruening and von
Buelow, and myself and Mr. Gibson and Mr. Wilson were present, Chancellor Bruening said that Germany did not seek
to raise her armament, nor did she expect France to come down to her
level, that she only asked that France would make a material reduction
paving the way for further reduction in the future and Germany asked to
be relieved only from certain very technical or minor inconveniences. I
then sent for my diary and read to Mr. Osborne the memorandum of the interview in question at
Bessinge which took place on April 26, 1932,48 and which entirely corroborated my
recollection.
I told Mr. Osborne that I was
inclined to sympathize with Sir
John’s apprehension, and Mr. Osborne asked me whether I intended to make any similar
representation. I said I understood that Mr. Castle had already had a talk with the German Chargé on
the subject and I would look into that and see whether any further
representation was necessary on my part as I had just returned from an
absence. But I told him to assure Sir John
Simon that I shared his apprehensions and sympathized
with his desire that Britain and America should consult with each other
on the subject in order to avoid misunderstanding or divergence of
action; that in general I was sympathetic with his attitude.
[Annex]
The British Embassy to
the Department of State
Aide-Mémoire
On August 26th Sir John Simon
informed the French Ambassador in London,49 in reply to an enquiry from His
Excellency, as to whether the German Government had made any
representations to His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom on
the lines of their approach to the French Government in regard to
equality, that so far as he knew, no such representations had been
received. Count Bernstorff
had, however, said, when notifying the adherence of Germany to the
Anglo-French Consultative Declaration,50 that the
matter would be raised.
2. Sir John said that as soon
as any specific communication was received by His Majesty’s
Government, M. Herriot would
be fully informed. The French Ambassador said that M. Herriot would keep His Majesty’s
Government no less fully informed.
3. Sir John said that there
were three possible courses with regard to the German claims. The
first was to reject them outright, the second and third alternatives
were either to contemplate some upward change in German armaments,
or to secure on the part of Germany’s neighbours a real reduction in
armaments. He would like to know what attitude the French Government
would adopt to the German demand; he himself disapproved of the
first alternative and strongly deprecated the second; His Majesty’s
Government wished to see a method of treatment which would promote
general disarmament, applied to Germany’s aim.
4. The French Ambassador replied that M. Herriot was not proposing to reject the German
claims outright; he would discuss the question and see whether
agreement could be reached.
5. Sir John said that time
would be necessary for consideration of the representations which it
was understood the German Government would make. He would make a
communication to the French Government a little later. In the mean
time the question whether His Majesty’s Government could usefully
urge upon the German Government the inexpediency of raising the
matter in a challenging form at the present moment, was under
consideration.
6. The French Ambassador thought that it would be more useful if His
Majesty’s Government were to intervene on broad lines later on, and
Sir John gained the
impression that the French Government had come to the conclusion
that a point had been reached where Germany was determined to raise
the question specifically with them.
[Page 423]
7. On August 29th a further conversation on the subject took place
between Sir John Simon and
Count Bernstorff, of
which the following is Sir
John’s summary:—
“I told Count
Bernstorff today that I had heard from the
French Ambassador that the German Government contemplated
early discussion with the French Government regarding
Germany’s claim to equality of status in armaments. I
understood that Herr Von Bülow added
that Germany was approaching France alone because other
Powers had raised no objection to the broad outline of the
German claim. In order to avoid misapprehension I had told
the French Ambassador that we had received no
representations from the German Government on the subject
beyond Count
Bernstorff’s intimation, when notifying the
German adhesion to the Anglo-French declaration, that
diplomatic negotiations on German claims would be started.
The question had not been raised since, though the
possibility of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles being in
effect overlaid by the final Disarmament Convention had been
discussed informally at Geneva in April. Count Bernstorff confirmed
my statement, whereupon I observed that there seemed to me
no basis for inferring our assent. We had exchanged ideas,
but certainly never expressed judgment. Count Bernstorff suggested
that our side had derived from the conversation (between
Herr von Bülow and Monsieur
François-Poncet)
an impression that was not intended. I said that at any rate
there was now no possible misunderstanding, and asked him to
inform the German Government accordingly. I then said that
we regarded the present as a very inopportune moment to
raise the discussion on the German claim. The immediate
necessity of Europe was economic recovery, which must take
precedence. The Lausanne settlement was provisional and
nothing would prejudice success more than an upset of
confidence. A big discussion with France was most likely to
precipitate a clash of French and German public opinion. I
requested Count
Bernstorff therefore to represent strongly to
the German Government our view that this was very
unacceptable course to take at present.
“Count Bernstorff
undertook to report what I had said. The German intention
was to continue the Geneva discussions of last April, and,
in the first place, to ascertain privately how far the
French would meet the German view. I remarked on the
difficulty of insuring secrecy. Moreover the April
conversations had been quadrilateral. As regards the
expediency of raising the questions Count Bernstorff referred
to the German internal situation. Germany was united in its
disappointment at the result of the Disarmament Conference.
I pointed out that only the Bureau of the Conference was to
meet in September. The Conference would probably not resume
till early next year.
“Before Count
Bernstorff left, we exchanged assurances that
the two Governments would keep each other fully informed. I
said that this seemed to me doubly desirable in view or the
recent Consultative Declaration.”
8. On September 1st the German Chargé d’Affaires communicated to the
Foreign Office the text of a memorandum handed to the French [Page 424] Ambassador in Berlin on
August 30th and made at the same time the following verbal
communication.
- (i)
- The German Government hoped that His Majesty’s Government
would not abandon the attitude adopted at Geneva and
Lausanne regarding the German claim to equality of
armaments. In the interest of peace a solution must be found
for the problem. The German claim was to equality of status,
not actual parity and failing agreement it would be
impossible for the German Government to take part in the
meeting of the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference.
- (ii)
- The German Government wished to reply to the
representation made to Count
Bernstorff on August 29th. Both at Geneva and
at Lausanne agreement in principle had been reached, and the
German Government therefore did not understand why His
Majesty’s Government now said that they had never approved
the German point of view. The decision taken up now was the
result of agreement reached at the Disarmament Conference
between Herr Nadolny
and M. Herriot. A
conflict of opinion with France need only occur if the
French Government were intransigent. The German Government
would reply to any charges of infraction of the disarmament
clauses with the greatest equanimity.
Washington, September 6, 1932.
