Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1932, General, Volume I

763.72119 Military Clauses/25

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[Washington,] September 8, 1932.

During the call of the German Chargé, Herr Leitner, he brought up the subject of the démarche. He produced the annexed paper which, he said, was the paper presented to France. It was understood by the German Government to be presented in confidence but, unfortunately, was published the next day, together with certain statements that Germany was about to arm by the method of building its number of munitions factories; all of this was not true.

The history of the situation was that the matter of the principle of equality came up at Lausanne⁵¹ and the British approved in principle but would not take it up at Lausanne because it was thought not to be germane. This was on July 6th, and the fact that this was done was mentioned in the procès-verbal.

Herr Leitner said that Germany was always for disarmament but found it very difficult to remain in that situation in view of the principle of equality of rights which obtains as a basic and fundamental principle in the family of nations. He referred to the representations and promises which were alleged to have been made by the victorious nations in and at the time of the Versailles Treaty, and he also quoted a statement of Henderson’s, made a year or two ago, to the effect that Germany had a treaty right to have the other nations disarm.

After he had finished and had suggested that his Government would be glad to have my view, I said in substance first, that this was the first time that I had received the document in question and, as my only information in regard to its contents was hearsay and indirect, I was at a disadvantage in commenting on it. I said that our chief interest in the matter was that we were interested in disarmament and therefore we were interested in the method by which the principle of equality which Germany rested upon should be attained. It might conceivably be attained by Germany going up on her armament or the other nations coming down. If the former were proposed we should be deeply interested on account of the disastrous effect which it would have upon the Disarmament Conference at Geneva.

Herr Leitner at once said that there was no proposal in this paper that Germany should arm. On the contrary, she did not wish to arm—she had no money to arm with. I then said there was one other consideration that I felt was necessary to mention because it had been mentioned by two others. I understood that when this was presented to the British, and probably also to the French, it was stated that the position taken in this paper was the same as that taken by the German Government at Bessinge, my house in Geneva, last April at a conference between the British and the Germans. If the position taken by the Germans was as it had been represented in the press reports of this démarche, I could only say that it must be very different from the position taken at my house, as to which my recollection was very clear. I then stated that there the German representatives said that they had no desire and made no request to increase their armament and that they showed great moderation and patience in their demand that the other governments should come down, recognizing that disarmament is necessarily a matter of gradual performance and takes a good deal of time. Herr Leitner said again that Germany did not seek to go up and that she was very moderate in her demands about going down but that she had waited a long time and that a new generation had grown up since the peace treaties which saw no reason for Germany remaining in a condition of inequality. I then said that I would have the paper translated and read it with great care but, subject to that, I would say that I was considerably worried and disturbed that Germany had brought up this question just at this time when there were so many disturbing elements and so much instability in the world and when we needed the influence of all of the great and stable powers, like Germany, in the interest of peace. I reminded Herr Leitner that Germany had just received a very great concession at Lausanne and that to follow that concession, which had been made to her there, so promptly by a demand of a disturbing character had made a very painful impression on the world. So I gave him as my final message to his Government that if they wished to know what my view was it would be that they should exercise the utmost patience and forbearance in regard to bringing up any such questions and that they should throw their influence with the rest of us in seeking to stabilize rather than to unsettle the world.

H[enry] L. S[timson]

[Annex—Translation]

(1) After the last Geneva negotiations concerning the disarmament problem, an attempt must be made to clear up at once by diplomatic means the question which the German delegation raised in its definitive declaration of July 22. For this purpose the German Government, pursuant to the confidential conversations already held in Geneva with the French representatives on this subject, would like to get in touch in the near future with the French Government. It is of the opinion that a confidential discussion between the German and the French governments, in which the views and desires of both parties shall be openly expressed, is the best means of bringing about an understanding. If the French Government is prepared for such a confidential discussion, both governments are, of course, at liberty to inform the other governments chiefly concerned, such as, in particular, the British, Italian, and American governments in an appropriate manner, and, at the proper time, to bring about their participation in the negotiations.

(2) The attitude of the German delegation with regard to the resolution of July 29th [23rd] of the General Commission⁵² was determined exclusively by reasons inherent in the question itself, and was unavoidable. The resolution establishes important points for the definitive disarmament convention, and, indeed, in a manner that already shows that the convention will fall very far short of the Versailles treaty in the reduction of armaments.

For this reason alone it was impossible for the German Government, which in view of this treaty, for the juridical and political reasons which it has often set forth, sees in the task of the Conference a much more radical disarmament of all countries, to assent to the resolution. There was however also another viewpoint involved. As a matter of fact, the conclusions reached had no meaning for Germany at all. For in spite of the discrepancy between the disarmament regime provided for in them and the regime of the Versailles treaty, the question remained entirely open in the resolution as to whether the conclusions reached were to apply to Germany. As long as this question is not cleared up, it is impossible for the German delegation to cooperate even in the future discussions of the definitive adjustment of the individual points of the disarmament problem.

(3) Under these circumstances, the resolution of July 23rd immediately brought up the fundamental question, which in the discussion up to the present has been called the question of the equal rights of Germany. From the beginning of the disarmament conference, Germany has asserted her claim to equality of rights, and has repeatedly made plain the significance and extent of this claim, not only within the framework of the discussions themselves in the conference, but also through diplomatic channels and in unofficial conversations between the representatives of both sides. In order to prevent any misunderstanding in this respect, what Germany understands by equality of rights and how she conceives from a practical point of view the realization of this principle, will be once more set forth hereinafter in résumé.

(4) In this connection, it must be stated as a premise, that in view of the drastic form of general disarmament desired by the German Government, there are no stipulations that Germany would reject, on account of the extent of the obligation inherent in them, if the general regime to be created by the convention applies to all states. Accordingly, Germany has always demanded that the other states reduce their armament to a status which, in view of the special conditions in each country, corresponds in kind and extent to the status of armament which is imposed on Germany by the Versailles Treaty. The claim of Germany to equality of rights would thereby receive consideration in the simplest way. The German Government was, however, to its great regret, obliged to infer from the resolution of July 23rd, that the convention will not correspond to the Versailles standard either in methods or extent of disarmament.

Under these circumstances, nobody can expect that the German Government will be reconciled to a result of the conference, which for the heavily armed countries will involve only a slight change in their present status of armament, while for Germany, on the other hand, it would maintain the Versailles status. Germany has the same right to security as any other state. Therefore the question at present can be only that of considering how the way can be prepared by the first convention for the necessary adjustment of armament and thereby the realization of the national security of all states.

(5) In this respect three elements of adjustment may be differentiated: namely (1) the juridical form of adjustment; (2) the period of its application, and (3) its material content. It is obvious that there is but one conceivable solution for the first two elements. The juridical form as well as the period of validity of treaty obligations must hereafter be the same for Germany as for all other states. If a distinction unfavorable to Germany were established on these two points it would mean that Germany must also continue to play the role of a second-class nation in the field of armament. Therefore the only solution can be that for Germany the Disarmament Convention shall replace Part V of the Versailles Treaty, and that with regard to the period of its validity as well as with regard to the juridical status after its expiration no special stipulations shall apply to Germany.

(6) In contrast to the two first elements of adjustment the material content of this adjustment affords room for negotiations. The German Government certainly cannot forego appropriate expression in the convention of her right to a status of armament in keeping with her national security. She is, however, ready to acquiesce for the period of the first convention in certain modifications of her status of armament because she is of the opinion that after the expiration of the first convention there must be another convention which will go much further in the reduction of the armaments of the heavily armed nations, and that more justice will be done thereby to the German standpoint in the disarmament question. In order to present an idea of the measures to be considered for a reconstruction of the German defense forces, the German Government would like to explain a few principal points as follows:

(7) In the field of qualitative disarmament the German Government is ready to accept every inhibition of arms that will apply in equal measure to all states. However, those classes of arms which are not universally forbidden by the Convention, must in principle also be permitted to Germany.

So far as the system of defense is concerned, the German Government must also claim the right enjoyed by all other nations to organize it, within the framework of the stipulations universally applied, in a manner to meet the needs, as well as the economic and social characteristics of the country. In this connection there is the question, on the one hand, of changes in organization, as for example gradations in the active period of service of those serving for long periods, and freedom in the organization of the defense forces; and on the other hand, of the short term training of a special militia liable to military duty, for the purpose of maintaining internal order as well as for coast and boundary defense.

Of course the German Government, in carrying out its proposed measures will take into account the financial situation of the Reich.

(8) In remarks made by the French Prime Minister, in direct connection with the question of German equality of rights, the importance of the question of security for France was recently again emphasized. The German Government cannot very well take any position in this respect at present, as it does not know the object of the actual desires of the French Government. The German Government, however, will always be ready to discuss plans, that serve the purpose of establishing equal security for all states.

(9) In conclusion, the German Government would like to make the following remarks: In view of the existing juridical and factual situation it confidently hopes that the foregoing statements will convince the French Government of the fair and moderate character of German intentions, and that they will open the way to a speedy understanding. As a matter of fact the state of affairs today is such that the question of German equality of rights must no longer remain unsettled. The necessity of its solution is shown by the previous course and the present status of the Geneva disarmament negotiations, as well as by reasons connected with the general international situation. It will contribute materially to eliminate existing tensions and quiet political relations, if military discrimination against Germany, which is felt by the German people as a humiliation, and which at the same time hinders the restoration of peaceful stability in Europe, finally disappears.

51. For correspondence concerning the Conference at Lausanne, June 16–July 9, see pp. 636 ff.
52. Ante, p. 318.