837.00/3215
The Ambassador in Cuba (Guggenheim) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 29.]
Sir: I have the honor to report that at a luncheon of political and military figures in Pinar del Rio on December 22, 1931, the President of Cuba announced his determination to stay in office until the end of his term, May 20, 1935.
The announcement has occasioned no particular surprise here. A few days ago a newspaper published a similar statement from the President, which was not confirmed, and some such official announcement has been currently rumored to be a possibility in the near future. The President’s trip to Pinar del Rio was hailed as a visit of good will, which involved the release of some fifteen political prisoners, and his announcement at the luncheon was vigorously applauded by the other guests, consisting of officials of the General Staff and officers of the Army, the Governor of Pinar del Rio, the Mayor of the city of that name, the leader of the Conservative Party, and various Senators and politicians. The President’s speech, the significant parts of which are attached in original and translation,41 stated that a short time ago some Cubans had wished that he abandon his presidency, and he had therefore summoned his friends in Congress to suggest [Page 81] the enactment of a measure for political reform, which would give the opportunity of offering the presidency to another person; after a trip through the Republic, however, in which he perceived “the sentiment of a people,” he decided that it would be mere cowardice on his part to resign before the fulfillment of his term. The President referred to the recent mortal shooting of a policeman attempting to apprehend an alleged bomb thrower as an indication of the fact that his efforts to achieve a cordial relationship with the opposition had not been received in kind.
As the Department has been informed, there is a very strict censorship imposed on the Cuban press, and no editorial comment on the President’s speech appeared in any of the leading Habana papers. The speech itself was reprinted in full, but not on the front page.
In the meantime, there is no immediate indication of any reconciliation on the part of the Opposition. In the past four days, some seven or eight bombs have been discharged, all of which did some damage to property, but no damage to life. The so-called Orthodox or Menocal Conservatives have issued a proclamation, a copy of which is enclosed, in original and translation,42 in which a committee headed by Carlos de la Cruz condemns the effort at reorganization of the parties. This committee believes that any political reorganization is futile at a time when so many political leaders are in jail, and points out that the Conservative Party, in particular, is suffering from the imprisonment of its principal figure, ex-President Mario G. Menocal.
Ferrara has returned to Habana for the holidays. His presence is reported to be linked with Torriente’s mission, and, as the Department knows, Ferrara has claimed to be seeking to find a solution to the present unfortunate political situation. After Ferrara’s first conference with President Machado, the former informed me that the President asked to be given “five or six days for consideration of the political problem.” In my opinion, Ferrara’s interest in Cuba’s present problem is almost entirely self-centered like that of the other Cuban political personages. During the summer, he was wholly occupied with his mission to Japan and the League of Nations activities. The world drama is infinitely more inspiring to Ferrara’s talents than the opera bouffe of Cuban politics. Ferrara has endeavored to maintain the status quo especially during this period of his absence. The means employed have been twofold (1) to alarm as far as he might be able the United States Government by predicting dire consequences in Cuba upon Machado’s retirement, or even upon intimation of his retirement at some time in the future and (2) to advise Machado that he had [Page 82] nothing to fear from the United States Government, which was not interested in the internal political situation of Cuba.
At the present moment, in my opinion, Ferrara is looking over the ground to ascertain how any political changes may affect his future. In the meanwhile, I think Machado and Ferrara have one immediate problem in mind, which is to find some relief from the burdens of the foreign debt services. They may make conciliatory gestures to the opposition, if they believe that by so doing they will create a more sympathetic attitude on behalf of the United States Government when the Chase Bank reviews the Cuban Government Public Works Debt situation early in January.
Respectfully yours,