[Enclosure]
The Head of the Eastern Department, British
Foreign Office (
Monteagle
), to the
Counselor of the American Embassy (
Atherton
)
[
London
,] 18 February, 1929.
No. E 751/245/93
My Dear Atherton: We had hoped to be able
to answer before now Mr. Houghton’s note No. 2133 of December 12th
last, regarding the proposed Convention between the United States,
the United Kingdom and Iraq, and to make arrangements for the
signature of the Convention and of the assurances set forth in the
memorandum enclosed in that note. Unfortunately since that date the
Iraqi Cabinet has resigned, in consequence of certain difficulties
which arose over the negotiation of the new Military and Financial
Agreements referred to in Articles 12 and 13 of the new and as yet
unratified Anglo-Iraqi treaty of December 14th, 19274—a copy of which was sent to you two days
later; and as a new Cabinet has not yet been [Page 292] formed, and the Ministers who resigned are at
present only carrying on current business, it has proved impossible
to obtain their agreement to the final settling up of this matter.
We understand that they do not consider that in their present
position they possess authority to conclude treaties with foreign
Powers. Their present unwillingness to proceed to signature arises
therefore out of constitutional scruples and, as they have
explained, is not to be ascribed to any wish to withdraw from their
previous acceptance of individual clauses of the Convention or of
the assurances which will accompany it. We hope that there may be no
further delay in getting the Convention signed when a new Cabinet is
formed at Bagdad.
Meanwhile, the Secretary of State wishes me to let you know
confidentially, before any public announcement is made on the
subject, that His Majesty’s Government have recently had under
consideration the various anomalies and difficulties created by the
existing Anglo-Iraqi Judicial Agreement of March 25th, 1924,5 and have come to
the conclusion that it is desirable to take preliminary steps with a
view to the eventual abolition of that Agreement, and the
institution in its place of an uniform system of justice for all in
Iraq. Sir Austen6 is going
to bring this matter before the Council of the League of Nations at
their next meeting early in March; and I enclose herein for your
information a copy of a memorandum which is about to be circulated
to the members of the Council,7 setting forth the
motives and intentions of His Majesty’s Government in making this
proposal. You will see from the last paragraph of the memorandum
that all we are doing at present is to invite the Council to approve
in principle the proposal to abrogate the
Agreement, and to authorise the preparation of detailed proposals
for submission to the Council at a later session. This process is
bound to take a considerable time, and meanwhile the existing
Judicial Agreement will continue to have full force and effect. It
is, moreover, clearly understood here that in view of the terms of
Article 6 of the proposed Convention with the United States, no
modification (such as the abolition of the Judicial Agreement) in
the existing “special relations” between Great Britain and Iraq can
make any change in the rights of the United States under the
Convention, before the assent of the United States Government has
been obtained. The position of the United States as regards any
eventual change of this kind in the “special relations” is, in fact,
exactly similar to that as regards the other contemplated changes in
those relations (i. e. the treaty of December 14th, 1927) of which
we informed you at that time—namely that in the event of any such
change being made, the rights of the United States and its citizens
[Page 293] in Iraq would be fully
protected by Article 6 of the draft Convention. In these
circumstances, and having regard to the considerable time which must
elapse before anything in the nature of abolishing the Judicial
Agreement can be negotiated and brought into force, your Government
will no doubt agree that we should proceed to sign the Convention in
its present form as soon as the consent of the new Iraqi Cabinet has
been obtained.
As regards the treaty of 1927, the present position is that until the
new Military and Financial Agreements have been concluded, it is
impossible to take any steps to obtain the approval of the treaty by
the Iraqi Parliament and the League Council, which must be secured
before it can be brought into force. We will of course see to it
that your Government are informed as soon as steps to this end are
contemplated.
Yours sincerely
