500.A41a/43: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Warren) to the Secretary of State
[Received 5:30 p.m.]
354. Referring my 347, October 14. Admiral Baron Kato referred to local press statements that since he was an Admiral and Minister of the Navy he would oppose limiting the strength of the [Page 80] Japanese Navy. He said that he was not a militarist and hoped that I would make this point clear to my Government. He knew that the Japanese people eagerly desired to limit armaments in order to lighten the taxation burden. Baron Kato felt qualified for the task ahead of him as he is familiar with the Navy’s needs and is also anxious to meet the aspirations of the people. He added that he had stated publicly last March that he did not regard the 8 battleship–8 battle cruiser standard as the absolute minimum necessary to Japan’s self-defense. His position on this question was unchanged. He dwelt upon the fact that Japan could not alone reduce armament but stated that he proposed to exert every effort to persuade the other powers to reduce their armament. He stated that it was easy for statesmen to discuss proportionate limitation but difficult for technical experts to agree upon a basis for unification [limitation?]. He thought, however, if America, Great Britain, and Japan reached an agreement among themselves it could be carried through. He said he had been a Minister of State for almost 14 years, being the oldest Cabinet member in point of service. He asserted with much emphasis that he was going to the Conference as a statesman and expected to center his activities in the Conference on matters of policy leaving in the hands of naval advisers technical details regarding naval affairs. However, he did not intend to permit the Navy’s young men to stand in the way of reaching a limitation of armament agreement. More than once he dwelt upon the fact that he was charged with responsibility respecting other questions in addition to limitation of armament and is willing to first discuss Pacific and Far Eastern questions in the hope of reaching an agreement that would make possible provision for national defense by means of a force smaller than the 8–8 standard.
I have discussed the Conference in some rather long conversations with Prince Tokugawa at the Embassy and at his home. I have concluded that he is going to the Conference desiring earnestly to reach an agreement on Far Eastern problems which will lead to limitation of armament. He will be very friendly toward delegates of other Governments and can be persuaded to keep with his delegation in furthering a fair understanding. … The delegation will regard Baron Kato as the leader and his opinion will be the most influential with the Premier and with other political factors in Japan which will be consulted.
I also had a long talk with Hanihara86 who told me confidentially that the Premier had told him to be ready to accept a place on the Japanese delegation if it should be enlarged. Hanihara [Page 81] thought Pacific and Far Eastern questions should be discussed broadly first to establish the understanding that no nation was seeking territorial expansion in the Far East by force. He thought the Conference should then consider the question of arriving at some basis for limitation of armaments to satisfy the public that progress was really being made respecting the question uppermost in the thoughts of people of all nations. He believed the Conference could then consider the detailed discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern questions regarding which he expected differences and some heated discussions. I told Hanihara as I have told others here that Japan’s policy in sending along its system of administration and a military force when it expanded commercially was directly opposed to the principle of equal opportunity for commerce of all countries and did not meet with approval of other countries. He applied the statement to Siberia and said Japan sought no territorial grant or exclusive timber or mining rights but desired only a trade agreement and some opportunity to tell the Japanese people that a de facto government existed in order to withdraw the military force. Hanihara will be very influential in the delegation on matters of procedure and on details of Far Eastern questions.
- Masanao Hanihara, Japanese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs.↩