862t.01/22: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Wallace) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 3—10:50 a.m.]
885. Mission. President of the German peace delegation, Goeppert, called at the Embassy this morning and presented a memorandum with regard to the situation [in] the Ruhr a translation of which will be sent in separate telegram.23 Goeppert stated that contrary to the most recent press reports that the situation had materially improved, conditions had become worse. The mining of coal had been seriously interrupted. It was impossible to transport coal as trains could not run. The soviet councils had lost all control the Red troops who were pillaging everything. If this state of affairs were allowed to continue for even a few days, the entire economic life of Germany would collapse, the railroad and gas companies were provided with coal for but a few days. At that time all railroad transportation would stop and consequently the supplying of food to the population not only in the region immediately affected, but throughout the whole of Germany. It was certain that the communists would take advantage of the general disorder to establish a regime of Soviets.
This information had been received by telephone from Chancellor Müller this morning and Goeppert had been instructed to make every possible endeavor to obtain freedom of action for the German Government.
He added that yesterday afternoon the French general acting president of the military control commission in Berlin had informed the Chancellor that three battalions, six batteries and a battalion of engineers had entered the neutral zone near Borken. Although the exact number of these troops was unknown it was true that they had entered the neutral zone. The French general had been informed that following the announcement made by the Chancellor in the National Assembly the Government Commissioner Severing had given the troops permission to enter the neutral zone believing that the consent of the Entente had been obtained [as they] feared for the safety of the railway bridges in the area of Kappel [Wesel?]. No fighting had as yet taken place and the troops had been instructed not to advance if they should not be withdrawn. Later [Page 304] operations, in the event that the consent of the Entente should be obtained, would be delayed by several days. The Chancellor added that the situation was so critical that a decision was urgently needed.
In reply to a question as to whether the information in the press this morning to the effect that an arrangement had been reached with the communists in the Ruhr district was true, Dr. Goeppert stated that this was the case but that the communist authorities had no longer any control over the Red troops who had formed themselves into roving bands and were pillaging and destroying property. No coal was being mined and this would result in the complete break down of railroad transportation and consequently in the distribution of food throughout Germany. He seemed to be very much concerned. He stated that he had been in telegraphic communication with Von Haniel of the Foreign Office who he said seemed to be more worried over the situation than he had ever known him to be.
In reply to a reference to Millerand’s note to Mayer of March 31st definitely refusing permission for the German troops to enter the Ruhr, Goeppert made the following statement: During the afternoon of March 29th the Germans had received a telephone message from the Foreign Office which was confirmed later by a note signed Paléologue reading as follows:
“If the German Government insists in its demand to send German troops into the Ruhr Valley, M. Millerand would be disposed to consent thereto on the condition that the said troops would be withdrawn from the neutral zone within a delay of two or three weeks. At the expiration of this delay that Allied troops shall have the right immediately to occupy Frankfort, Hanau, Homburg, Darmstadt and Dieburg on the conditions specified in the note of March 28th.”
This message was repeated to Berlin and as the Germans felt that the French were the one Ally opposing the entry of German troops into the Ruhr Valley they had therefore [omission] permission to proceed and the Chancellor had made a statement to the National Assembly to that effect.
On March 30th Millerand had claimed that there had been a misunderstanding; that he had referred the question to his military advisers who were responsible for the safety of France and that they were of the opinion that there was no necessity to send them into the Ruhr.
Goeppert also stated that he had been to the British Embassy only to find that Lord Derby had left for London last evening and that he had laid the matter before a Secretary who would see Sir George Graham. He would also see the Italian Ambassador and M. Millerand. He laid particular stress on the urgency of the matter [Page 305] and the vital importance which the Germans attached to obtaining immediate permission for their troops to enter the Ruhr. In reply to a question as to the numbers of the troops, he stated that these would amount to about 60,000. Although it was a hard decision to take, nevertheless his Government were prepared to permit the Allies to occupy Frankfort and the other towns mentioned above should the additional troops not be withdrawn within three weeks. He felt that in that time it would be possible to restore order.
- Not printed.↩