862t.01/1
The Observer on the Rhineland High Commission ( Noyes ) to the Acting Secretary of State
[Received March 16.]
My Dear Secretary: Reporting further on the lines of my recent letter:15 the Rhineland Commission and its policy are suffering from pressure—hidden pressure and open pressure—directly from the [Page 290] French Government. M. Tirard16 would, I think, personally be inclined to give fair trial to the plan laid down in the Rhineland agreement last June. He, however, spends more than half of his time in Paris where the pressure for a “strong policy” in the Rhineland is evidently kept before him with great emphasis.
The French High Command is continually demanding from the Commission power for extensive and unnecessary controls of German affairs—controls of transportation, controls of economic laws, and interference with the life of the people. It is not, however, these demands which are worrying me as much as the controls which are exercised in the French and Belgian areas and which we have very little means of checking up.
This week, Sir Harold Stuart17 and I brought to an issue the illegal acts of the Armies in the case of the suspension of a German law. The Commission had declared this law unobjectionable and not at all within the scope of our power. The French High Command, on their own responsibility, suspended the law and we only learned of the suspension several weeks later. M. Tirard frankly apologized for this violation and said that General Degoutte18 claimed that it was a mistake and was willing to apologize, but, in the course of discussion, M. Tirard came out with a great deal of feeling on the subject of the complaints made by the Government in France as to the weak policy of the Commission. M. Tirard said the Army was becoming so dissatisfied that if things went much further the authorities in France would remove General Degoutte, as being too easy-going, and would send a man here who, he intimated, would ride things in a much rougher way. He added that he himself would probably be removed and a much stronger man sent in his place. I was shocked at the statement, as he made it. Sir Harold and I both asked him if he really meant that France was bound to put through her plans of “strong” military domination and if what he said was intended as a threat. He disclaimed this latter idea, but maintained strongly that it would be necessary to handle matters more to the satisfaction of the Army if the Commission was to survive.
I mention this incident, because it fits in with the events of the past few weeks and with the revelations of M. Tardieu, published during this month in l’Illustration. I enclose a copy as reprinted in the Amaroc News, which possibly you have already seen.19 I think you will be interested in the expose, especially the rather inappropriate boasting that the occupation was included in the [Page 291] Treaty in spite of Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson. This fits in with recent evidence that the French are planning to nullify the one concession made by Clemenceau, namely civilian control of the occupation.
You will note in Tardieu’s article it is stated that British and American Premiers, struggling against an occupation of Germany, offered him the triple alliance. M. Clemenceau wanted them both, and Tardieu boasts that he persisted until he got them both. The final struggle over this, according to the dates given by M. Tardieu, came just at the time of my letter to President Wilson and Clemenceau’s acceptance of a civilian occupation seems, in the light of later events here, to have been intended as a concession made to ensure the occupation. It seems possible that the French policy has always involved nullification of this concession when opportunity should offer.
The ultimatum sent by the French Government to Germany on the matter of coal deliveries, copies of which ultimatum were circulated by the French High Commissioner to his colleagues and myself, was, as everyone realizes, illegitimate, on the basis of the relations established by the Treaty, since these matters were left entirely in the hands of the Reparations Commission. This ultimatum, read with Premier Millerand’s speech, added to local developments here, lead me to the conclusion that France has decided to handle the occupation as largely a French affair.
It will add to your view of the direction French policy is taking if I tell you that M. Tirard has concluded many of his discussions and arguments with me recently by asking: “Do you not think that we must occupy the Ruhr?”
I now have first hand evidence (very likely you have the information) that the French Premier has approached other Governments directly on the subject of moving forward and occupying the Ruhr about March 1st, with eight divisions of troops. The proposal was headed off in London by Lord Curzon’s insistence that it be referred to the Reparations Commission. This information was given me in strict confidence by Sir Harold Stuart.
Sir Harold and I agree that the recent attempts in the Commission to take food control in the Rhineland away from the Germans, to take the coal distribution away from the Germans, and many other of the annoying incidents, are part of a general policy to throw off moderate control and to move much more energetically in the matter of separating the Occupied territory from the rest of Germany. The talks I have had with Monsieur Tirard convince me that the French feel if the Ruhr were added to the Occupied Rhineland territory it would create a wonderfully strong economic unit which would [Page 292] really offer a temptation to the population to back up a separatist movement. Not only this, but the Ruhr contains the great bulk of the industrial coal production of Germany, as well as the iron and steel production. If it were for 15 years part of a territory occupied very largely by French troops it would be a tremendous economic asset for France, and I am sure it is in their minds that, at the end of 15 years of such occupation, a way would be found to make the separation permanent.
I might add that the newest movement of the German separatists has been started at Boppard, which is about 12 miles up the Rhine from here, and which is the nearest town in the French zone of occupation to Coblenz, capital city of the Rhineland. Boppard is the headquarters of the French Army and of the French Commissioner, for their portion of the Bezirk of Coblenz.
According to the views expressed by M. Tirard, this urge for a “strong policy” in Occupied territory is founded on the reasoning that the Treaty looked forward to a general participation of America and England, and that, with America’s threatened withdrawal and England’s partial withdrawal, France must take her own measures. This is a mistaken policy, as it seems to me and as I told M. Tirard, for it is only through the alliance with England and America that safety for France is possible, and a military policy which attempts to strangle Germany cannot afford to gain strategic advantages at the expense of the sympathy of her Allies. Certainly, if France is able to drag the Allies into an enterprise of further invasion of the Ruhr coalfields, she will need some very tangible help in soldiers to support it.
My personal relations with M. Tirard and M. Rolin-Jaequemyns, the Belgian High Commissioner, are excellent. I may say also that the anomalous position in which I am placed by the delay of ratification has not, so far, weakened my standing. The desire of the French to keep the United States here has led M. Tirard to give my position the same consideration as if I were High Commissioner. I see no reason why this will not continue, unless the Millerand–Tardieu–Poincaré administration forces M. Tirard to change his policy. The personal predilections of Sir Harold Stuart, as well as instructions from the Foreign Office, have so far been always parallel with my own conception of your wishes.
On paper, Sir Harold and I have made some real progress this week in forcing the High Command to relinquish the economic control in favor of the Commission’s functions. I am always worried, however, that the many small incidents which come to light in regard to the local management of representatives in the French and Belgian areas is an index of the exercise of a local control entirely in violation [Page 293] of the Rhineland Convention. Three quarters of the territory is French and it is very hard to know what is taking place. Sir Harold is of the opinion that, in many ways, the Commission’s representatives in these areas, who are the same officers employed locally by the Army during the armistice, have changed their practices very little from the personal domination of local affairs practiced during the armistice.
German Military Forces
I ought to report to you all the information I have regarding German Military Forces.
The French have sent me two and three reports a week purporting to give information showing that Germany is organizing an army of over 4 million men and implying that this is designed for use against the Allies. Much of the material in these documents is propaganda and could have been written in Paris as well as in Germany. The details of German plans were given so definitely that I finally sent a secret service man through all the large cities of Germany, to ascertain the truth.
I will give the facts as he got them.
The “Reichswehr” is the regular army and will be controlled by the Reparations Commission as to numbers.
The “Einwohnerwehr,” which is the home defence force, has been fairly well organized throughout Germany. They are not in uniform, their only distinguishing insignia being a blue armband bearing the inscription “Einwohnerwehr Stadt …” These men are all recruited from soldiers who have seen service and are officered by officers of the old regime.
The “Sicherheitspolizei,” or safety police, have been organized nominally to preserve order. The French feel that they are being made the cover for a very effective army. It is a fact that this force is the most reliable in Germany; it is recruited from officers and non-commissioned officers who served in the war.
These two unofficial forces, the “Einwohnerwehr” and the “Sicherheitspolizei” will probably number 2 million men at the present time.
Under present circumstances, there is certainly excuse for the very effective organization of a “safety police.” We have discovered in the Rhineland that Germany never depended, as we do in the United States, on local police for anything but the simplest work; the army has always been at hand to do the serious police work. This is so much so that we must either allow an effective organization of the “Sicherheitspolizei” in the Occupied territory, or we shall have to do much of the policing and repression of disorder. The local police [Page 294] are helpless to handle even a small strike. There are only 800 policemen in Cologne, a city of over 600,000 population. I mention this as it offers a logical reason for a fairly large organization of “safety police,” especially considering the unsettled condition of the country.
I quote from a communication recently sent me by General Allen, in connection with the discussion we were having on this subject:
“German psychology is as yet unable to grasp firmly the principle that the maintenance of public order in a democracy is in the first instance a function of local self-government. We should, therefore, I think, be prepared to accept, for a time at least, the German theory of centralized control of the police power, but limited in the Occupied area to the minimum requirements and maintained strictly under Allied supervision. In no other way, I feel sure, can your Commission eliminate the constant temptation to call for Allied troops for police protection, and it does not seem to me that under the Rhineland Convention troops should be used for this purpose except as a last resort.”
I shall keep you informed of everything I learn bearing on the arming of Germany. Personally, I do not believe that there is any deliberate attempt to arm for attacking the Allies, or that there will be, unless France forces Germany to it through strangling her economically by taking over the Ruhr, or otherwise. The contest between parties throughout Germany is so intense that much military organizing may take place, either secretly or openly.
In some of the French memoranda, which seem to me quite largely propaganda, situations are frequently described showing parties organizing secretly, in a military way, against each other. I quote from one of these papers, which attempted to convey to me the usual panic regarding the organization of the militia:
“The ‘Heimatsdienst’ (Home Service) is to the Government what the D.O.B. (German Officers’ League) is to the Monarchists. These two bodies are completely antagonistic, they work one against the other each trying to have their agents penetrate the others domain.”
Also:
“Recruiting: All men between the ages of 17 and 40 years are eligible for enlistment. The laboring classes in Magdebourg are opposed to this organization, which they believe to be directed against them; they are not enlisting, most of the members being bank and commercial employees, merchants and professional men.”
Personally, I am not alarmed by Germany’s military preparations and believe that the Commissions of Control will place German military preparations against armed nations out of the question for many years.
[Page 295]Economics
The seemingly impossible reparation demands and their very disastrous indefiniteness have ruined the mark and the German credit in such a way as to place a blockade around Germany more effective, I believe, in keeping out raw material and food than the Allies ever maintained during the war.
The impossible coal demands of the French at the present time, together with the very bad situation of coal production, due partly to deterioration during the war and partly to the unwillingness of the coal miners to work, has reduced coal for industrial purposes to such a point as temporarily to make the lack of raw materials somewhat unimportant. The allowance of coal to industry, on the program submitted to the Rhineland Commission, was 30% of their requirements. Investigation has convinced me that we get a larger share here than in Unoccupied Germany, yet in no month have we received 30%, and a very large proportion of the industrial population is out of work, or working on short time.
This industrial situation has permitted employers to move wages up slowly and grudgingly, as the cost of food and material mounted, so that in many localities the trouble is not so much the lack of food as a total inability of the working classes to pay for nourishing food. For the rest of the winter the average ration will not go much above 1000 calories. Last summer the Germans kept it up to 1400 or 1500 calories, and the “La Morlaye” ration decided upon by the Allies, and kept up by supplementary Army food, was 2100 calories.
In general, the economic situation in Germany is as bad as it can be and is, I believe, growing worse. The Occupied territory has not been relieved in such a way as to permit complete economic unity with the rest of the country. This territory is by far the most important single economic unit, normally furnishing a share of the exports out of all proportion to its 7 million population.
I shall be glad to furnish you facts and statistics along any particular line which interests you. I believe I have a staff capable of obtaining any such figures which we may now lack.
In my view the two outstanding facts are:
- I.
- A steadily deteriorating economic and industrial condition throughout the country—a deterioration which is, to say the least, looked on complacently by the French;
- II.
- A firm determination on the part of the responsible masters of France to effect, in some way, a separation of the Rhineland from Germany and, in doing this, to make it as economically disastrous to that country as possible and to obtain for France a corresponding economic advantage.
The Dorten fiasco in Mayence last summer turned practically all sentiment in the Rhineland against separation, even from Prussia. There was, prior to that time, I believe, a very substantial sentiment for separation from Prussia, but the French intrigue put the fear into the hearts of all Rhinelanders that such a separation would be only the first step to a complete separation and an exploitation by France; considering the threat of 15 years occupation largely by the French troops, this fear seems not unjustified.
You may be interested in a quotation from a speech recently made by the Social-Democratic member of the National Assembly from the Cologne district:
“French Annexationists, who have always coveted the Left Bank of the Rhine, but who found themselves unable to acquire it as the result of secret negotiations with the Entente, have so framed the Peace Treaty as to lead gradually and inevitably to a permanent control of Rhineland by France. The Treaty contains conditions and demands, which the makers themselves know to be beyond fulfilment. Just as Austria did with Serbia in 1914, so now the conquerors have imposed upon the conquered terms which he cannot fulfil, so that they can proceed to deal with him as they wish.”
I shall continue to oppose these tendencies as far as I can and believe that I shall always have the support of the British High Commissioner. As I have suggested in my previous report, I think it would be profitable if I were called to Washington to give you all the facts of the situation.
Very truly yours,