Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume II
759.6214/14
The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France ( Sharp )
Sir: The Department encloses, for the information of Colonel House, copies of the following despatches from the American Legation at Copenhagen, with reference to the cession of the Province of North Slesvig:
No. 1889, dated November 8, 1918; No. 1890, dated November 8, 1918, with enclosure; No. 1895, dated November 12, 1918, with enclosure.
I am [etc.]
The Chargé in Denmark ( Grant-Smith ) to the Secretary of State 4
Sir: Adverting to my telegram No. 2946, of October 14th,5 last, informing the Department of my interview with the King of Denmark regarding the matter of Slesvig I have the honor to report that after H. M. subsequently sent for M. Scavenius, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that the interview which followed was anything but of an amiable character.
The King is said to have reproached M. Scavenius for having assured me that no conversations were being had with Germany in regard to the cession of North Slesvig, when he knew the contrary to be the case. The Foreign Minister is reported thereupon to have reminded the King that diplomatic representatives should be called into audience only through the intermediary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
I have not been able to learn the details of the negotiations but the fact that they actually occurred, with the full knowledge of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, has been satisfactorily established and his denial, reported in my telegram No. 2940, of October 14th last,5 was based on purely technical grounds. I am inclined to think that he realized at the time that he was not deceiving me.
The forces which have been consistently opposed to Germany and friendly to the cause of the Allies, headed by the King, and composed chiefly of the shipping interests, are throwing their weight against the policy of the present Government which, from the beginning of the war, has been based on the presumption, if not of German victory, at least a draw between the belligerents whereby Germany would continue to be an ever present menace to the independence. Now that [Page 453] Germany has gone under and the Associated Governments are victorious they charge the Government with a lack of elasticity in adapting itself to the new conditions. The early retirement of M. Scavenius from the Foreign Office is prophesied but they do not seem inclined to seek the overthrow of the entire Cabinet. The feeling is that the more socialistic the complexion of the Government, the better chance it will have in dealing with the situation which is upon it.
I have [etc.]
The Chargé in Denmark ( Grant-Smith ) to the Secretary of State 6
Sir: Adverting to my telegram No. 3028, of October 25th last,7 I have the honor to enclose herewith a memorandum7 handed me by Lieutenant Commander John A. Gade, Naval Attaché to this Legation, which was given to him by the Chief of the Danish Admiralty, Admiral Jøhnke, with reference to the hoped for recovery of a portion of the Province of Slesvig, which was annexed by Prussia after the war of 1864, together with a revised version prepared by Lieutenant Commander Gade, in which he has attempted to make the meaning more clear. According to Admiral Jøhnke the memorandum in question was prepared by M. Munch, Minister for Defence, (a well known pacifist) and was revised by M. Scavenius, Minister for Foreign Affairs, as well as by a Committee of the Rigsdag.
On handing the note, accompanied by the charts, to the American and British Naval Attachés, Admiral Jøhnke is reported to have said that since it was the consensus of opinion of the present Danish Government, he hoped that it would be forwarded to their respective Governments; and that, owing to the fact that the Danish Government did not desire to take any official steps in the matter they took the unusual method of bringing it to the attention of the American and British Governments through their Naval Attachés because of the interest which they had personally shown in the matter.
The charts in question are being sent as an accompaniment.
I have [etc.]
Memorandum on the North Slesvig Question
Denmark ceded the Duchy of Slesvig in 1864 and has later disclaimed all rights to the Duchy as provided by paragraph 5 of the peace of [Page 454] Prague.8 This paragraph provided for the return to Denmark of the Danish speaking portion of the province in case a plebiscite should decide in favor of such a return. Denmark herself has thus no further rights in the matter, nor can well bring it forward, this devolves upon the Danish speaking inhabitants of Slesvig themselves.
It is stated that they are now most anxious to return to Denmark. They desire a new boundary line permitting the incorporation in Denmark of all who speak and feel Danish, but only of such.
It is feared, in case the German portions of the Duchy are also returned to Denmark, that endless controversies will ensue, making affairs unbearable for the Danish portions and a union which might not prove lasting. It is further feared that Germany once again having regained its strength might take occasion to interfere in the affairs of Slesvig, should the incorporation of a discontented German portion prove unsatisfactory and troublesome. This fear on the part of the Danish Slesvigers is shared by an overwhelming majority of the Danish people. The Danish people further hope that the matter may be so decided that the entire Danish population of Slesvig may be rejoined to Denmark, but none of the German inhabitants. Should Germans come under Danish rule, it is then feared that the troubles of centuries will be reverted to. The population of Northern Slesvig is essentially farmers, of similar manners and customs to those of North Jutland. The rural population of Southern Slesvig consists on the other hand principally of large owners of estates, thoroughly German in names and sympathies. Returning the German speaking portion of Slesvig to Denmark would thus in reality bring about a reversal of the state of affairs since 1864, instead of a Danish speaking population under German rule, there would be a German speaking one under Danish. The position Denmark has up to now taken in the matter would have been absolutely inconsistent—it would be following a course which it has for years reproached Germany with.
With the principles of today of the self determination of nations—principles which have been supported by leading Germans it seems beyond doubt that Germany will consider it its duty to cede to Denmark the Northern portion of Slesvig. Germany could decidedly oppose the ceding of any territory to Denmark which has a German population. Should such territory be ceded by outside powers, Germany would constantly be considering the recovery, with the resulting dangers to Denmark. Should the Allies now determine that entire Slesvig should revert to Denmark, such a determination would probably in time be regretted by them. The Allies will probably remain hostile to Germany for some time to come. Such a feeling cannot [Page 455] naturally be participated in by Denmark. Any future Slesvig trouble would thus mean diplomatic and military difficulties to be met by the Allies who had caused the return of the Entire Duchy including its German source of trouble.
We have but to revert to the first Slesvig war of 1848–50 to see what might happen. The fruits of it were denied Denmark by the great powers who were guarantors of the peace which concluded it. In 1852 the same powers deemed it in the interest of Europe that the whole of the Danish Monarchy be kept intact. A few years later Denmark was advised by them to give way to Prussia’s demands, and when she preferred to fight was left absolutely isolated.
It may be urged that one of the many reasons of the present war was the error committed by Prussia, permitting her to seize Slesvig in 1864. The maritime and military results of the seizure, including the Kiel Canal have been far reaching.
The powers were however not unaware of what might happen. As early as the first Slesvig war, they fully understood the change of status which would take place in regard to the Baltic if Prussia were permitted to procure the harbor of Kiel and develop its naval power.
In judging the Slesvig question, at this present moment, Denmark cannot merely consider the political situation of today, nor the possibility that this way will do away with “might being right”. She must look ahead. Whatever political developments may ensure [ensue?], the fact remains that Denmark and Germany will remain next-door neighbors. If Denmark is forced into a position which is beyond her and one opposed to Germany, the latter will surely, even without exerting military pressure, force Denmark into a corner. Owing to Denmark’s geographical position she must out of economic reasons, remain on friendly terms with Germany, whatever the latter’s position may be after the present war. Added to this, should Denmark have numbers of Germans within her borders, she might be subjected to considerable German intellectual, economic and political pressure. Germans within Danish borders will not assist Denmark in her effort to maintain her national characteristics nor her economic and political independence. They would on the contrary weaken them and bring with them the danger of German influence, up to now so successfully withstood.
It is thus desirable from a Danish point of view that the question of Northern Slesvig be solved by the claims of nationality. If such claims are abandoned, conditions will only arise claiming future readjustment Those that have been wronged will claim redress.
Such is the opinion of practically the entire Danish nation. A small minority, not worth considering, claim that the new Slesvig frontier should be the old historical frontier of the Eyder river. None [Page 456] desire a more southerly line. All Danish parties are agreed in hoping that the coming peace conference may give Denmark back such territory as is genuinely Danish, and nothing more, and that Denmark may thus receive national justice.
The Chargé in Denmark ( Grant-Smith ) to the Secretary of State
Sir: Adverting to my despatches Nos. 1889 and 1890, of the 8th instant,10 I have the honor to transmit herewith, for the information of the Department, copies and translations of two newspaper articles on the Slesvig question, the first from the Copenhagen Nationaltidende of October 2nd last and the second from the Hamburgischer Correspondent of the 3rd instant.11 Both these articles indicate that the Germans resident in Slesvig expect to meet with stubborn resistance any attempt to return the territory to Denmark.
In this connection, I learn through the British Legation that the proposed German condition for a franchise in any plebiscite which may be held to decide the Slesvig national question is residence in Slesvig for at least five years ending not less than five years ago, and that the German Government have offered pecuniary assistance, including all expenses, to persons in other parts of Germany who have fulfilled these conditions if they are willing to return and vote.
I have [etc.]