File No. 861.00/1173
The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State
[Received 11.15 a.m.]
3259. Department’s 3229, February 26, 3 p.m.1 I communicated this evening to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the contents of the telegram and Mr. Pichon thereupon expressed at considerable length his views upon all the phases of the question involved in the entrance of Japanese troops into Siberia. Reiterating his views as expressed in my No. 3221,2 he added that the developments of the last two or three days made it all the [more] imperative that the Japanese Army should push forward from Vladivostok.
From advices which he had received from the French Minister at Tokyo, it seemed not improbable that Japan would act independently of the Allied powers unless their consent and approval were soon forthcoming.
He mentioned as one of the ultimate possibilities growing out of such independent action, some sort of an alliance between Germany and Japan, providing for the division of Russia. This seems to me such a bold suggestion, that if any weight could be given to it, one might well question the very integrity of Japan, once she was in occupation of Siberia, whether with or without the sanction of the Allies. It would seem that the position taken by Mr. Pichon in his talk with me, that the effect on the Allied cause would be very much stronger with the entrance of Japanese troops in Siberia with [Page 59] the approval of all of the Allies, [rather] than against it or only with that of a part of them, is entirely reasonable.
He was perfectly free to say, however, that the French Government would not act in the matter unless it was by joint action in which the United States freely participated. At the same time he did not see how it was practicable for the forces of other Allied powers to join the Japanese troops. This brought out the question from me as to what he thought of Japan’s request or rather expressed condition, that she be permitted to alone enter Siberia with an army. He replied that he did not know the reason and agreed with me that it would create a much better impression if such a condition had not been imposed by Japan. The Minister was very emphatic in the declaration that a full understanding and agreement would first have to be had with Japan by all the other leading Allied powers, providing for the retirement of Japanese troops from Russian soil after the war, in addition to certain other guarantees illustrating [sic] her part in such a campaign. He evinced a keen curiosity as to the reason for the United States Government’s opposing exclusive Japanese intervention in Siberia. The same question was raised yesterday by Mr. Cambon, and Mr. Clemenceau, with whom I was talking on another matter, [when they] took occasion to point out the desirability of having a Japanese army enter Siberia as rapidly as possible. Against it all must come the discouraging fact of not only the vast extent of territory to be traversed but the poor facilities for transportation of an army and its equipment. For some months the political effect of such a move would probably outweigh its military advantage. However, the opinion of men prominent in the government is that such a move is not only now necessary, but would result in keeping the German Army not only on its eastern front, but result in keeping away food supplies and other advantages from that country in its occupation of Russian territory.
This morning the Russian Ambassador, Mr. Maklakov, [asked] for an appointment with me and later laid before me his views on the Russian situation which he frankly said had been changed by the events taking place in his country during the past two weeks. His whole talk had to do with the question of Japan’s intervention and occupation by her of Siberian territory. He said that the situation in Russia was now so hopeless, though his position was full of embarrassments in so advising, yet he believed if the Japanese Army could now enter Siberia with the approval of the Allied powers including the United States, the mass of his people would feel that such action was taken in the real interest of their country. He [said] however that the United States must necessarily be party to such [Page 60] a move on the part of Japan or the Russian people would look with suspicion upon the action alone of the latter power.
The known friendship for Russia of the United States and her disinterested[ness] would be a guarantee of the good intention with which such an action would be taken. He seemed to be troubled lest [Japan, after?] seizing Vladivostok, would not push her armies across Siberia by which alone she could be of help to the Allies. When I later raised this question with Mr. Pichon, he said that such a plan of simply holding Vladivostok alone would not be tolerated.
When I asked Mr. Maklakov if he thought in such a great extent of territory the Japanese Army could be of any considerable direct aid against the Germans, he said that while probably not, in so far as even ultimately reaching their present lines, yet they might be able to march into the Caucasus, preventing the resources of that country from aiding either the German or Turkish troops.
He said that he had just been informed by a young man coming from Siberia that Admiral Kolchak, former Russian commander of the Black Sea Fleet, leaving Russia upon the assumption of authority at Petrograd by the Bolsheviks, was now in Tokyo. He said that the Admiral had been one of the big men of Russia and his presence now in Tokyo was significant.
[As] having a possible bearing upon the attitude of France toward Japanese troops’ taking possession of the Siberian Railway for military operations, the [Chinese] Minister told me on my interview with him Sunday that Mr. Pichon had informed him that French investors were largely interested in the bonds of that railroad.