Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, Volume II

File No. 861.00/1707

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

No. 1036

Petrograd, January 24/February 6, 1918.
[Received May 2.]

Sir: I have the honor to enclose herewith report made by Consul DeWitt Poole, jr., upon his return to Petrograd after his recent journey through the south of Russia.

I take advantage of this occasion not only to remark upon the value of this report but to express my appreciation of the intelligence and ability displayed by Consul Poole in this connection.

I have [etc.]

David R. Francis

[Enclosure]

Report to the Ambassador Respecting the Movement in the Don Country for the Restoration of Order in Russia, the Holding of a Constitutional Assembly, and the Continuance of the War

Petrograd, January 26, 1918.

My Dear Mr. Ambassador: Having arrived in Rostov-on-Don December 18, new style, to investigate the question of the establishment of an American Consulate in that city, I took occasion, on the 21st, to go to Novocherkassk and call upon General Kaledin, who is the chief executive of the Don Province, and also upon General Alexeev and certain others who are now in that region unofficially engaged with the movement described above. On December 25 I sent a preliminary report to Consul General Summers, the substance of which I believe he has furnished to you.¹ This report distinguished three elements in the situation; namely, General Alexeev and the Volunteer Army; General Kaledin and the Cossacks; and the Southeastern federation. The Alexeev group has now become the dominant element, under the title “League for the Defense of our Native Land and Liberty.” General Kaledin is a member of the league and is working in full and hearty cooperation therewith. The recent entry of Mr. Ageev, representing the left wing of the Don Cossacks, signals the complete amalgamation of the Cossacks with the Alexeev element. The Southeastern federation has also become subordinate to the league. It serves to bring to the league’s support the other Cossack tribes and the mountain peoples of the Caucasus, also as a means of maintaining contact with the Ukraine (until just recently), with Siberia (so far as means of communication exist at present), and with the Trans-Caucasus and Bessarabia.

Colonel Hucher of the French Military Mission for the provisioning of Rumania arrived at Novocherkassk on December 23. On December 27 he informed General Alexeev that the French Government had granted him (Alexeev) a credit of 100,000,000 rubles for the purpose of restoring order in Russia and continuing the war against the Central powers.

The sum of 100,000,000 rubles was that fixed by General Alexeev as necessary to carry out a military program which he had formulated as follows:

		The organization of:
Between December 15 and January 15, old style:	}	6 battalions of infantry
		3 batteries of artillery
January 15 to February 15:		12 battalions of infantry
		6 batteries of artillery
February 15 to March 15:		18 battalions of infantry
		6 batteries of artillery
March 15 to April 15:		12 battalions of infantry
		6 batteries of artillery
Total:		48 battalions of infantry
		(of 800 men each) and
		21 batteries of artillery
		(4 guns to a battery)

in addition to which four technical battalions (engineers, etc.).

General Alexeev at once communicated to the French representative his desire that a financial commission be created to control the expenditure of this money, as well as a bureau of organization for the army, in both of which he asked that French officers be included.

At this juncture, military questions gave way to political, due to the attitude of Boris Savinkov, former terrorist, and later member of the Kerensky government. When I first saw General Alexeev he took particular pains to say that Mr. Savinkov had endeavored to become associated with him but that his advances had not been encouraged. General Alexeev said it had been his first endeavor to bring together in the Don country what remained of the old Provisional Government, but this proving quite impossible he had appealed to certain persons in Moscow who brought about meetings in that city resulting in the choice of two delegates each by the Cadet Party, the nationalist patriotic group, the industrials, the landowners, and the right wing of the Socialist Revolutionary Party. This group was the nucleus, General Alexeev said, of an organization which would sooner or later proclaim itself to be the Provisional Government of Russia. He said that the principles of this government would be in substance as follows:

(1) As to internal affairs, to create such a situation of order in Russia that elections might be held for a Constitutional Assembly in which every citizen might vote according to his wish without fear or molestation; and, a Constitutional Assembly having been so elected, to place the existing military forces at its disposal.

(2) As to foreign affairs, to keep Russia’s engagements with the Allies.

Mr. Savinkov persisted in his efforts to be admitted to the Alexeev group. He threatened, by intimation, to attack Alexeev before the people as a counterrevolutionary and pro-monarchist. Let me say at this point that I am personally absolutely convinced of General Alexeev’s high patriotic purpose. I am sure that he does not seek to carry out a partisan program. Savinkov’s threat had some validity, however, because there had naturally rallied about General Alexeev certain elements which have been designated, for purposes of political propaganda, as counter-revolutionaries.

At the same time another group was forming about General Kornilov. It appeared toward the end of December (new style) that the whole movement might miscarry for want of agreement among these different groups. In part, I believe, as a result of pressure brought to bear by the French representative, the following results were obtained:

(1) An agreement was signed January 7 among Generals Alexeev, Kornilov, and Kaledin, by which the first named undertook the leadership on the political side and such duties as pertained to a Minister of War; the second, the organization of the Volunteer Army and chief command of all forces whenever operations might be pushed beyond the Don; and the third, the command of the Cossacks and of all defensive operations within the Don.

(2) A council was formed about General Alexeev, in which Mr. Savinkov was included.

As conditions precedent to joining, Mr. Savinkov demanded and General Alexeev conceded:

(1) The admission to the council also of Mr. Ageev, Mr. Vinderzgolski, Mr. Mazurienko, a representative of the central organization of the employees of the railways of the Caucasus and the southeast, and a representative of the armies of the Caucasus front;

(2) An immediate proclamation of the purposes of the movement.

Mr. Ageev is the leader of the left wing of the Don Cossacks and president of the parliament, or so-called “krug,” of the Don government. Mr. Vinderzgolski is former commissar of the Eighth Army and former president of the committee of the First Army. Mr. Mazurienko is a member of the All-Russian Peasants’ Union and president of the Peasants’ Union of the Don. At the time of my leaving Rostov the representatives of the other organizations mentioned above had not yet been chosen.

Negotiations are in progress for the admission to the council of three representative Social Democrats, namely, Chaikovski, Ruskova, and Plekhanov; and two Social Revolutionaries, namely, Argunov and Potresov.

On the conservative side the council, as now constituted, includes, besides the three generals (Alexeev, Kornilov, and Kaledin), Mr. Milyukov; Prince Gregory Trubetskoi; Professor Struve; Mr. Fedorov, representing the banking and other larger commercial interests of Moscow; two other Cadets or nationalist patriots yet to be chosen; Mr. Bogaevski, the vice ataman of the Don Cossacks; and Mr. Paramonov, a rich Cossack. The council will undoubtedly undergo changes in personnel, but a framework of an equal number of conservatives and radicals, not counting the three generals, appears to have been adopted.

In pursuance of the agreement with Mr. Savinkov, a proclamation to the Russian people has been drafted. At the last report it had been sent to Moscow for discussion there. The proclamation, which has been read to me, appeals to the people on the ground that the Bolshevik government has failed to provide them with the chief things promised, that is, peace with liberty and bread. It refers to the suppression of the Constitutional Assembly and asks for the support of the people in defending that institution. It is sound on the subject of the continuance of the war. The proclamation will be issued in the name of the league, unsigned, because it is frankly admitted that it has not yet been possible to obtain the names of persons who, it is thought, would be thoroughly acceptable to the people at large. For example, Alexeev’s signature would be politically helpful but Milyukov, one of the other ablest men in the movement, is known as the father of the Cadet Party which has been a special butt of radical attack. Among the “left” members the most prominent is Savinkov and to his name not a little distrust attaches, owing to his part in the Kornilov affair of last September and to his record as a terrorist. These are difficulties natural at the inception of a movement of this kind and it is believed that later a further signed proclamation can be issued revealing adhesion to the movement by a good proportion of the substantial political leaders of Russia.

Returning to the military phase, the adhesion of General Kornilov has injected perceptible vigor into the work of organizing the Volunteer Army. General Lukhomski has been made Chief of Staff, with General Romanovski as his assistant. General Denikin commands the First Division, which is now being organized. General Erdelli has no definite position at present but is assisting in a general way.

General Kornilov will follow General Alexeev’s military program, stated above, but will endeavor to accelerate it. Early in March (Russian style) he hopes to have two divisions organized, each division consisting of 12 battalions of infantry with machine-gun complements, and 6 batteries of artillery (3 batteries of field pieces and 3 batteries of howitzers). By the end of April he hopes to have the 48 battalions and 21 batteries (40,000 men) called for by the Alexeev program. In addition, he hopes to have within two months two regiments of Kalmuk volunteer cavalry, and within three months an infantry brigade (6 battalions) recruited from the mountain tribes of the Caucasus.

He has at present in the territory of the Terek Cossacks two divisions of native troops (Circassian mountain tribes), each division made up of 4 regiments of infantry and 3 batteries of artillery. These are the troops which he directed against Petrograd last fall. As there has not been money to pay them recently, some of the regiments are dispersed but he believes that it will now be possible to bring them together again.

The Volunteer Army consists at present of from 1,500 to 2,000 men. Being made up of earnest soldiers, under good discipline and without committees, it has a much greater value than its meager numbers would at first suggest. It is proving effective against the much larger Bolskevik units which are being directed against the Don.

The units of the Volunteer Army, all still in process of formation, are as follows:

• Battalion of St. George’s Cavaliers: present strength about 400 men.
• First officers’ battalion: present strength 200 men.
• Second officers’ battalion.
• Junkers’ battalion: 300 men.
• Company of naval officers and sailors.
• Three batteries of field artillery, officers, men, and horses complete but only four guns.

In addition, there is the so-called “Kornilov regiment” comprising from 500 to 600 men. The officers and equipment are at Novocherkassk. The soldiers are now reassembling from leave.

There are 30 regiments of cavalry among the Don Cossacks and 10 batteries of artillery.

General Kornilov is endeavoring to stimulate recruiting for the Volunteer Army, apparently with success, by increasing the pay of officers and soldiers. General Alexeev proposed originally to pay soldiers only 20 rubles a month. There is pretty good evidence that Bolshevik soldiers fighting against the Don are receiving as much as 20 rubles per day. The Volunteer Army now offers to private soldiers 30 rubles a month with an additional 30 rubles monthly while on active service, and appropriate indemnities for injuries and deaths Second lieutenants are offered 100 rubles per month; if married, 100 rubles additional for the family, plus one ruble and a half per day while on active service. Posters setting forth these facts and asking for enlistments had been printed just before my departure and are now being displayed wherever possible.

It is hoped to supply the immediate needs of the Volunteer Army for ammunition and equipment by purchases from the Bolshevik soldiers in the Caucasus. General Kornilov says that this expedient may suffice for the ensuing two months. A regular scale of payments has been established. For example, 1,000 rubles is offered for a field piece, 500 rubles for a machine gun, 100 rubles for a rifle, etc.

To meet expenditures for material and men reliance is placed in the first instance upon the French grant. The needs for January (Russian style) are estimated at 20,000,000 rubles, of which the Russians hope to supply 4,000,000 themselves. Needs to the end of April are now estimated at 200,000,000 rubles, of which the Russians think that they may be able to supply one fourth.

As there is a great lack of currency in the Don country, a local emission by the Don government, guaranteed by one or more of the Allied governments or by some private banking firm, is considered necessary. This matter is receiving the particular attention of the French and British representatives.

For immediate needs the French representative has endeavored to realize on the credit granted by his Government through the sale of drafts to bankers in Rostov and other cities. At the time I left Colonel Hucher informed me that he had some 5,000,000 rubles in sight. The Russians say that they are also receiving certain sums, amounts mentioned in a very indefinite way, from Petrograd and Moscow.

At present, then, the league is developing in the right direction politically, that is, toward the left; its proposed proclamation is sound both as to continuance of the war against the Central powers and as to interior politics, that is, it is not separatist but national and seeks to reestablish order and give expression to the will of the people. On the military side, the organization of the Volunteer Army has been gotten under way, since General Kornilov took charge, with a vigor unusual in Russia, and the attacks of the Bolshevik troops on the Don, according to my last information, were being withstood satisfactorily.

I beg to quote here my No. 3 to the Department, dated January 14:

It is presumed that the policy of the United States in Russia is (1) to hold as many enemy troops as possible upon the Russian fronts, and (2) to assist the Russian people to establish as soon as possible an orderly government representative of their political desires.

No. 2 being the avowed purpose of the present movement and resistance to the common enemy an integral part of its foreign policy, in principle it should receive the countenance and support of the Government of the United States. Whether or not aid should actually be extended should be determined by a consideration of the probabilities for and against the practical success of the enterprise.

On the military side the first question is, Can Alexeev carry out his military program? The French subsidy having disposed of the financial question for the moment, if we accept Alexeev’s assurance, as I think we may, that sufficient men are available, his success depends chiefly upon the continued maintenance of order and security in his organized base, that is, the Don country. This may be disturbed (1) by unrest among the Bolsheviks in Rostov and other larger centers, or disaffection among the Cossacks themselves, who have been influenced by Bolshevikism at the front and must be allowed to return to their native villages to regain a more healthy outlook; (2) by hostile military action by Bolsheviki forces on the Caucasus front, or those to the north or west.

Alexeev states that for the present the Cossacks can not be counted upon for active military operations. The Volunteer Army now organizing includes as yet no infantry to speak of, and what artillery exists is practically without ammunition. From a military point of view the position of the Don government is lamentably weak. It may, however, continue to exercise its present control of the situation, but that it will certainly do so can be assured only by the prompt receipt of (1) money and (2) ammunition and equipment. You are already informed respecting the measure for satisfying the first need. As to the second, some munitions may be found in the Caucasus, but for a permanent solution, and more particularly for the supplying of Alexeev’s volunteer army, contact with the Allies through Siberia is absolutely essential.

The second question is, if Alexeev carries out his military program, what may then be expected? The projected army will be a mobile police force, whose action against certain centers may bring about the restoration of order in those portions of Russia which are not at the moment occupied by German troops or German organized units of Bolsheviks and released German prisoners. It will be quite ineffective against the regular German fighting machine.

In estimating the value of this rather meager promise, sight must not be lost of possible concurrent action by Ukrainian troops, of the general consideration that small initial successes may bring greater successes not now to be foreseen, and that the exclusion of Germany from this rich southern country, or the mere necessity of a German movement against it, have each an important military value. The capacity of this coal and food-producing region for passive resistance, especially against unproductive northern Russia, is great and might become of decisive importance if its munition deficiency were remedied by outside contact through Siberia.

On the political side the movement has these elements of strength: (1) general recognition of the high patriotic purpose of the leader Alexeev; (2) the respectable character of the men about him and the manner in which some of them have been chosen, giving them as near a mandate from the people as it is probably physically [possible] to obtain in Russia at the present moment; and (3) its very acceptable chief political aim. Elements of weakness seem to me: (1) existence of the not unjustified but often misguided social unrest which is now manifesting itself as Bolshevikism, but which may appear to-morrow in another form directed against some of the elements included in the present movement; (2) the undertaking to keep Russia’s engagements with the Allies, that is, to continue an unpopular war. These factors are imponderable and judgment of their relative importance is purely personal.

For myself, I think that the movement will have moral and therefore political strength in the measure that it adheres to the simplicity and high character of its main purpose; that is, to enable the Russian people to choose their own government through the action of their duly chosen representatives, an aim which should find sympathetic response in the popular mind, where it will, stand in contrast to the Bolsheviki suppression of the Constitutional Assembly.

Since the above was written, it seems to me that the league has been weakened by the trend of events in the Ukraine. On the other hand, if the Bolshevik government is about to make a peace, or is succeeded by a party which would make a peace, the league is revealed as the one serious hope of saving at least a part of Russia. Envisaging the contingency, first, that the Bolsheviki decide to continue the war, I respectfully refer to your own suggestion that the United States might, without formally recognizing any one, offer to assist, under proper control and advice, any and all factions purposing seriously to fight the Central powers. In the case of the opposite eventuality, namely, that the Bolsheviki make a separate peace and the Embassy possibly withdraws from Petrograd, I am convinced that the United States should then actively support the league as the only serious nationalist movement in the country.

Pending events, I respectfully recommend continued observation of the work of the league by a consular officer stationed at Rostov and immediate careful study of the Siberian situation. It is needless to dwell further on the two fundamental corollaries: (1) that substantial assistance can be extended to the league only over the Siberian Railway; and (2) that without such aid the league can not develop its possibilities in any important measure.

In considering the league’s possibilities permit me to point out that it may have three results other than complete failure: (1) the complete accomplishment of its purpose, namely, the restoration of order in Russia, continued resistance to the Central powers, and the holding of a Constitutional Assembly; (2) the maintenance of an orderly government in part of southern Russia and all or a part of the Caucasus and continued resistance to the Central powers from that base; (3) the maintenance of enough resistance in southern Russia to necessitate a military movement in that direction by the Central powers. Any one of these results has an important military value for the Allies. In fact the success of our blockade is seriously involved in each.

You are aware that France and Great Britain are already committed to the movement. According to the information given by the French representative at Novocherkassk, France has taken under its particular care the Ukraine, the Crimea, Bessarabia, and Rumania; Great Britain has taken the Caucasus and the Cossack country.

In conclusion, I respectfully recommend that the attention of the Department be drawn at the earliest opportunity to the fact that the league is not such a sectional movement as the Department has very naturally instructed us not to support. Of necessity its organization base is now in a particular section of the country but the activities of the league have already extended throughout Russia and reach into Siberia as well. In contrast to those of the Ukrainian government, the aims of the league are nationalist in the broadest Russian sense.

To complete the record I append a copy of my last cablegram to the State Department, No. 4 of January 18.¹

Very respectfully,

[File copy not signed]

1. Not printed.
1. Not printed; it summarizes portions of this report and discuss communication with Siberia (in two sections, File Nos. 861.00/1149 and 1150).