File No. 861.00/929½

Memorandum of the Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long)

The Russian Ambassador called this morning and read me three telegrams which he had received during yesterday and to-day, one from each of his colleagues, respectively, at Tokyo, Paris and London. Each of them expressed not only the fear but the conviction that the Japanese intended and were making preparations to effectuate an occupation at Vladivostok and Khabarovsk. At the latter place there are large supplies of munitions and war materials.

The Ambassador said that it was necessary for the Allies to insist that all decisions made and all actions taken in the Far East be by the Allies combined and not by Japan alone. He suggested that warships be sent to protect the various interests of the United States, Great Britain and Japan at Vladivostok to operate in unison but to be under the command of an American senior officer. He felt that this would effectually checkmate Japan’s activities.

He said that he had been slow to take the position he now was forced to take but that he felt convinced, from the telegrams, that there was needed action on the part of the Allies if they would prevent the occupation of eastern Siberia by the Japanese.

He said, confidentially, that the British Ambassador had just told him that he had information to the effect that the Germans were sending submarine parts across the Trans-Siberian to a point of assembly on the Pacific Asiatic coast. I told him that in regard to that matter there was absolutely no foundation for it as it was a physical, military and naval impossibility. He requested that we send telegrams to our Ambassador at Tokyo requesting the Japanese Government to act in unison with us. I told him that I would be very glad to consider his suggestions and that if there was anything to communicate I would do so.

I told him that possibly the Japanese feared that all the German and Austrian prisoners in Russia and Siberia would be reofficered and rearmed and sent eastward through Siberia to direct a blow against Japan and her interests in the Far East. He said that of course they might fear that, but that there was no foundation for that fear; that such a move could not be effected, and that most of the prisoners in Russia were Austrians and not Germans.

I asked him if he had heard the press report that Russia had made a separate peace with Bulgaria. He expressed great surprise and said that he had not heard it, but, that if it was so, it might be advantageous, because (1) it would be additional cause for dissension [Page 24] in Germany; and (2) it would put Germany in a very bad light as regards Russia.

B[reckinridge] L[ong]