File No. 861.00/2424a

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)

[Telegram]

For your information: Japanese Ambassador called on Wednesday and presented reply of his Government to proposals in regard to expedition to Siberia to assist Czechs. He said that his Government feared a limitation on the number to be sent would be misconstrued by Japanese people and considered evidence of lack of confidence. [Page 307] Said he had understood from his military attaché that his Government was considering sending division on peace footing. At present his Government also felt that the force was inadequate and therefore as reinforcements would have to be sent it was inadvisable for that reason also to place any limit on the force. Presented form of statement which their Government would give out when the matter was settled.

This statement spoke of the “special position of Japan.” On the 25th I told the Ambassador that his answer was a new proposal. This Government felt limitation as to numbers was essential in order to create the proper impression on the Russian mind. Any indefiniteness as to the number of troops would create the impression of a large expedition for the purpose of interfering with Russian internal affairs, which would be most unfortunate. Assured him we had utmost confidence in Japanese motives and in no way wished to interfere with their field of action, and if they and the other Allies considered it necessary for military reasons to have a large expedition we would be compelled to withdraw as that was not our plan. I said we had no objection to their sending more troops than we did, indicating a maximum of 10,000 or 12,000, the question to be discussed after the expedition had landed as to whether this force was adequate. If the Japanese and other powers felt the force to be inadequate we could then decide whether we would wish to go on with them or withdraw. He was informed that we were bending all our energies on the western front in accordance with the decision of the Supreme War Council and it was impossible for us to supply or finance an expedition of any size in the East. This was a material factor.

In regard to “special interest,” the Ambassador was informed Department felt that in view of declaration in Lansing-Ishii agreement, and in view of the fact that they would have supreme command and larger number of troops than all the other powers put together, this declaration was unnecessary, and further than that, this assertion would be apt to create a misunderstanding in the minds of the Russian people and would be seized on by the Germans as having much greater significance than was intended.

Polk