File No. 861.00/2244a
The Secretary of State to the President
My Dear Mr. President: As I surmised Lord Reading was responsible for the interview which I had this afternoon with him and the French and Italian Ambassadors (you see they asked Jusserand to come with them). This was evident because Jusserand requested Reading to do the talking and he did it all though Jusserand, being the doyen of the corps, was the natural spokesman.
Lord Reading stated that they wished to know whether the Allied Governments were not to take part in the initial landing of troops at Vladivostok or whether it was our purpose to confine the enterprise to Japanese and American troops.
I replied that I had never discussed the question with you and I could see no object in doing so until the Japanese had agreed to the principle of joint equal military action; that our view had been that it was useless to consider details until the Japanese had approved the general plan; and that it had been always our purpose to lay the matter before the Allied Governments and to advise with them provided the Japanese accepted our program.
Lord Reading said that he was not complaining of the course which we had pursued but that he thought that the Allies should have a chance to land available troops in this initial movement in order to impress the Russians with the idea that we were a unit and that the United States and Japan were not acting independently without the sanction of the other powers.
To this I answered that this seemed to me rather a matter of national pride and sentiment than a practical question; that I could not understand why this subject should be raised and that it showed to me the wisdom of the course which we had taken in not consulting all the Allied Governments before we had acted as apparently there would have been delay in discussing the details which would have been very unfortunate in view of the necessity of prompt action.
Lord Reading said that I should not hold that point of view as he only intended to suggest that it would be wise to have unity of action in this important step and that he felt that we should impress the Russian people with the united purpose of all the Governments to resist the attacks upon the Czecho-Slovaks.
[Page 270]I answered to this that I unfortunately could not agree with him; that the whole question was one of expediency which involved the advisability of participation by other powers in the proposed enterprise; and that I was not disposed to consider the sentimental phase but only the expedient side of the question. I went on to say that after Japan had agreed to the proposed program of 7,000 American and 7,000 Japanese being landed this Government would consider the question of British troops being incorporated in the landing force, but until Japan had so agreed the details seemed to me to be needless.
To this Lord Reading answered that while I might be right, he was sure that his Government would not understand action which did not include all parties. I said in reply that I was sorry to have him express this opinion, because I was sure that you had no intention of submitting the questions to the Allied Governments until Japan had declared that she was favorable to the general plan. I repeated that I thought expediency should control and that if expediency was opposed to British participation that, to my mind, ended it, although it possibly might be advisable for all the powers to declare in favor of preserving unimpaired Russian political and territorial sovereignty.
The British Ambassador was manifestly disturbed but did not pursue the subject further.
The French Ambassador asked if we had made any suggestion about superior military command. I replied that the subject had not been raised; that I could see no value in raising it at the present time; that the principal question was as to Japan’s military cooperation; and that inviting controversy at a time when the Czecho-Slovaks needed our assistance immediately was most unwise.
Throughout this conference I felt that the French Ambassador and in a measure the Italian approved of our program, but that the British Ambassador was not entirely favorable because he felt Great Britain had been ignored.
Faithfully yours,