Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, Volume II

File No. 861.00/2983

The Consul at Omsk (Thomson) to the Secretary of State

No. 1

Omsk, July 4, 1918.
[Received October 17.¹]

Sir: I have the honor to report that on May 19, 1918, I sent despatches to the Embassy and the Moscow Consulate General commenting on the local situation and emphasizing the fact that, as elsewhere in Russia, Slavic peoples in western Siberia possessed little initiative; and consequently a small group of energetic radical socialists had been able to secure sufficient support from dissatisfied elements to seize control of the cities, while not representing the will of the majority of the rural or urban population. Further, I pointed put that the Soviet authorities seemed incapable of handling the local political and industrial situation.

A fall of the Soviet authority in Siberia probably would have been brought about by the workingmen, sooner or later, as they were becoming the ultimate sufferers in the demoralized industrial situation which the Soviet régime had produced. The end of the Soviet power was hastened by the “Czecho-Slovak incident,” which demonstrated that the Soviets had the support of only a portion of the workingmen, and that armed Hungarian and German prisoners were the chief military support of the Soviet authority.

The Czecho-Slovak Incident

The circumstances in connection with the plan to send the Czechoslovak troops to the French front are doubtless known to the Department. The details will be given in another part of this report.

As reported in my telegrams of May 26 to the Embassy in Vologda and the Consulate General in Moscow, an armed conflict occurred at Maryanovka station (25 miles west of Omsk) which was caused by the attempt of the Omsk Red Guard to disarm an echelon of Czechoslovak troops there. The fight occurred on the evening of May 25. The Czech echelon had approached Omsk, but learning that an ambush was prepared for them retired to Maryanovka where they were overtaken by two fully armed echelons of Red Guards. The Czechs, having practically no rifles, fought with hand grenades, and succeeded ill routing their assailants. It appeared later that ambushes, similar to the one prepared at Omsk, were simultaneously prepared by the Red Guard all along the Siberian Railway.

The Omsk Soviet’s Version of the Incident

The Omsk Soviet’s version of the incident, as given to me May 28 by Commissar Schlichter, representing the Moscow central government, and on May 29 by Mr. Tverton, vice president of the Omsk Soviet, is as follows:

The trouble originated in Chelyabinsk (one day’s journey by train west of Omsk). There the Czechs had seized 700 rifles from the Red Guard. Since then, May 17, Czechs were assuming control of railway and telegraph stations en route and the Omsk Soviet had been receiving direct messages from Czech officers, couched in overbearing language, so that the Soviet’s position was becoming intolerable.

Further, when the Czech soldiers formed a regular fighting unit in the Russian Army, they had several Russian officers. The commander of the troops which resorted to forcible methods in Chelyabinsk was a certain Voichekhovski, who was formerly connected with the Russian General Staff; and, in the eyes of the Soviet authorities, was a counter-revolutionist. As far as the Soviet authorities understood, the soldiers in the Czech command had but one desire, and that was to reach France; but their officers, it was feared, were not so single-minded and had developed counter-revolutionary activities.

In Novo Nikolaevsk, a certain Gaida, an Austrian officer, presumably of Czech origin, had suddenly sprung into prominence and was acting in conjunction with the counter-revolutionary forces in that city, where a new government had just been formed.

A great deal of detailed information was given to me concerning the alleged activities of the Czechs, the most important elements of which were as follows:

(1) The Soviet was entirely in the dark as to what developments were taking place east of Tomsk. The new government at Novo Nikolaevsk had refused the use of the telegraph line to the Soviet authorities until the latter would recognize the new Siberian government.

(2) One Maxa, in Moscow, who represented the Czech National Council, had just wired the Omsk Soviet to inform all Czechs that all which had happened during the past few days was due to a deplorable misunderstanding; that all Czechs should cease action and remain calm; and that the whole matter of the departure of the Czechs for France would be regulated by a mixed commission with the active participation of the Allied Governments.

(3) A delegation of Czechs from Issyk-kul and two French officers (who were accompanying the Czech command) were expected in Omsk within a day or so to confer with the Omsk Soviet. In the meantime Soviet troops would not attack the Czechs at Issyk-kul to which place the latter had retired from Maryanovka.

In connection with the Omsk Soviet’s version of the incident, I enclose herewith (see appendix No. 1¹) the Soviet’s official proclamation, dated May 28, calling for volunteers to defend the city, and which sets forth that the leaders of the Czech soldiers are in the service of Franco-Japanese capitalists who covet the riches of Siberia. Attention is also drawn to an appeal to Hungarian prisoners (appendix No. 2¹) to take up arms against the Czech troops. This appeal is designed to take advantage of the racial hatred existing among the various nationalities in Austria-Hungary.

The Omsk Soviet appeared exceedingly desirous of having my support in their controversy, and I agreed to ask the Ambassador for appropriate instructions in the matter, provided the Soviet would permit me to report the situation to the Ambassador, using the code, in accordance with the following telegram received from DeWitt C. Poole, consul in charge at Moscow:

28th. Your 66 received. Chicherin has informed me American consuls in Siberia may send cipher telegrams to Washington, the Embassy and the Consulate General. Try to send a cipher telegram. If refused, telegraph immediately. Meanwhile do not inform other consuls. Poole.

The Omsk Soviet advised me that the assurances of Mr. Chicherin to Mr. Poole were probably given before the existence of martial law in Omsk. The Soviet would not permit me to send a cipher telegram, but agreed to consider an open telegram. I promptly submitted such telegram reporting the situation, as I saw it, and also submitted several open telegrams relative to purely routine consular business. On the day following, the Soviet addressed a brief letter to me saying that all of my telegrams would be delayed for the present.

On the evening of May 31, the Soviet asked me to be present at a conference then taking place between the Soviet on the one side and the French and Czech delegates on the other side. It appeared that, during the course of the meeting, the Czechs had sent an ultimatum to the Soviet. Both the Soviet and Czech representatives at the meeting exhibited lack of confidence. It appeared from an intercepted telegram read by the Soviet president that the commander of the Czech troops at Chelyabinsk had instructed other Czech echelons that the situation had developed to such an extent that the French control would have to be disregarded for the present. The single result of the meeting was a telegram composed by the French Major Guinet reading in substance as follows:

To the Czechs at Issyk-kul: Your action forces the French mission to wash its hands of this affair. It will be a disgrace for the Czechs to become involved in Russian difficulties. If the Czechs persist in their activities everything must end between them and the French Government. The Czechs must take no action whatever until the French mission (which was leaving Omsk immediately) arrives in Issyk-kul.

Asked by the Soviet President as to whether I concurred in the telegram drafted by the French officer, I replied that I was not authorized to act in the matter; that I had offered to wire the American Ambassador for authority to act but the Soviet had refused to allow me to send any telegrams. Therefore, I could not act in any way as a representative of the United States Government; but, in so far as the matter lay within my competence in a personal capacity, I supported the attitude taken by the French delegates.

On the evening of June 1, a second conference took place between the same parties who had participated in the conference of May 31. No agreement was reached. A great many excited conversations occurred. In connection with the arrest by the Czechs of certain Soviet officials in Issyk-kul, a Czech delegate stated that one of the Commissars had made the remark that the Czechs must be disarmed in accordance with the German demand. The Czech attitude toward the question of total disarmament of the Czechs is expressed in a statement made by a Czech delegate, as follows: “There is a telegram from Trotsky instructing that we be disarmed and confined in prison camps. We will never consent! Sooner will we die!” With regard to the question of total disarmament (upon which the Soviet insisted), French Major Guinet spoke as follows:

The Czechs are courageous troops. Armed, they know that they can attain their end and complete their journey. While en route they have no desire to shed blood. Their aim is France! Concessions from both sides are imperative. You possess some strength and they possess some strength. Safety is necessary to them and must be guaranteed. At present, it is only a question of a truce. It is premature to talk of the surrender of arms. This question must be referred to the coming conference at Chelyabinsk. Otherwise, the Czechs will take Omsk, and, arms in hand, will secure their onward progress.

The meeting was concluded at 2 o’clock the following morning, after which the Czech and French delegates left immediately for Chelyabinsk.

The Fall of Omsk

The longer the truce lasted the more the support of the working-men of Omsk fell away from the Omsk Soviet. Very few cared to fight the Czechs and, indeed, the chief support of the Omsk Soviet’s authority, toward the end, were Hungarian and German armed prisoners. Furthermore, the so-called Red Army had no officers and no discipline. Finally, the Bolshevik leaders left Omsk on June 7, by steamers in the direction of Tobolsk. These leaders took with them 280,000,000 rubles from the various Omsk banks. Five hours after their departure from Omsk, their official surrender of the town was published and circulated in the form of handbills. After the circulation of these handbills, the organization known as the White Guard appeared from their various homes and took possession of the city. No fighting occurred in the town. The Czechs were many miles to the west of Omsk at the time of the surrender. The deciding factor in the surrender of Omsk seemed to be that the railway workmen and other groups of workmen, after receiving arms from the Soviet, became disloyal to it and showed a tendency to cooperate with the Czechs. Thus the trouble came from within and the workingmen themselves menaced the authority of the Omsk Soviet and were prompt in supporting the new government when it announced itself.

In the meantime, before anything could be accomplished at the expected conference at Chelyabinsk, movements similar to the one at Omsk were taking place to the west and east of Omsk so that most important cities between Samara (in Russia proper) and Krasnoyarsk (in Siberia) had overthrown the Soviet authority at the time of the fall of Omsk.

Public opinion and sympathy seemed to be with the Czechs. Their discipline was good. They had paid for their food. They had not abused women. In short, their general conduct stood out in sharp contrast to that of the so-called Red Guard of the Soviet, undisciplined bodies of men who were terrorizing the peasant population.

The Czecho-Slovak Version of the Incident

The fundamental idea of the Czecho-Slovak revolution beyond the border of Austria-Hungary, is the overthrow of Teuton influence and the establishment of an independent Czecho-Slovak state in Bohemia and other Slavic countries of Austria-Hungary. This the Czech soldiers sought to accomplish by deserting (regiments at a time) from the Austrian Army. The Czech troops are generally known to have formed the most effective fighting unit in the Kerensky offensive of July 1917.

An article printed on March 21, 1918, in the daily official journal of the Czecho-Slovak Army, reads in substance as follows:

In agreement with the Allies, it has been decided by those in charge of our revolutionary movement, that our army should go to the French front via Siberia. The present Russian Government has come to the conclusion that Russia cannot fight any longer, and has concluded peace with the Central powers. We do not recognize this peace. Therefore, we are leaving Russia for another Allied front. We have remained in Russia until the very last moment. Our forces were always ready to fight for Russian freedom; and, as we leave Russia only because we cannot employ our forces here, we go to fight for Russia on another battle field.

Through the instrumentality of Reverend Kenneth D. Miller, an American citizen engaged in social work among the Czech soldiers, I obtained an authorized and verified translation (see appendix No. 3¹) of the official version of the incident prepared by the temporary executive committee of the Czecho-Slovak Army into whose hands the direction of military operations and political negotiations was placed by the assembly of Czecho-Slovak soldiers at Chelyabinsk, Russia, during May 1918. (Signatures and seals are affixed to this document which will be sent to the Department when safe communication is reestablished.)

The Department’s attention is respectfully drawn to the following points emphasized in the attached Czech official version of the incident:

(1) Strict neutrality observed by the Czechs with reference to Russian internal difficulties while these troops were in the Ukraine;

(2) Systematic hindrance by the Soviet authorities against the passage of the Czechs eastward to France;

(3) Soviet propaganda with a view to causing the Czechs to desert their command and join the Red Army;

(4) Czech account of the Chelyabinsk incident (which should be read carefully in connection with the Omsk Soviet’s version of the affair given on the second page of my despatch);

(5) The Soviet’s use of armed Hungarian and German prisoners against the Czechs;

(6) The Soviet claim that railway technical reasons prevented the passage of the Czech troops eastward in contradistinction to their readiness to provide plenty of cars and locomotives for the transport of German and Austrian prisoners to the Central powers to fight in support of German imperialism.

Informally and unofficially I have heard many accounts of the incident from Czech soldiers and officials. Their accounts differ slightly in detail; but the principal facts furnished are the same. Throughout all narratives, the justification of self-preservation prevails. All felt that the Soviet authorities, in connection with German agents, were preparing a net for the purpose of preventing the Czechs from reaching the French front, and for returning these troops to Austria where death as traitors to the Central powers would await them.

On June 22, French Major Guinet, at Chelyabinsk, received a code message brought by courier and dated Perm, May 18, reading in translation as follows:

The French Ambassador informs Major Guinet he can thank the Czecho-Slovaks for their action, this in the name of all the Allies, who have decided to intervene the end of June, and the Czech army and French mission form the advance guard of the Allied army. Recommendations will follow concerning political and military points with respect to occupation and organization.

I am firm in the conviction that the Czech soldiers are entitled to the support of the Allies. The situation between the Czechs and the Allies is a delicate one and will require tact and wisdom on the part of the latter. Czech soldiers who have managed to escape from Bohemia state that the Czech revolution beyond the borders of Austria-Hungary is secretly applauded by Slavic peoples in Austria. The Entente Allies thus have at their disposal a potent weapon for undermining the German and Austrian domination of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The New Provisional Government of Siberia

As a result of the Czech determination to defend themselves from possible imprisonment and death, a new government prematurely sprung into existence in Siberia. It is formed by the Constituent Assembly Party which maintains that all classes of people shall participate in the government of Siberia and, indeed, all Russia; and that the government of Russia should be taken out of the hands of a single political party which (whether its leaders are the paid agents of Germany or not) has served Germany’s purpose by opening up the Russian front, has given to Germany, by military submission, the control of a large part of Russia, and has prolonged the war by enabling the enemy to concentrate his forces upon the French front—all this in opposition to the will of the Russian people as a whole.

The details in connection with the formation of the new government will be made the subject of my next despatch.

I have [etc.]

Alfred R. Thomson

[Enclosure 1—Translation]

Appeal of the Magyar Section of the Communist Party to Magyar Prisoners of War

Comrades! An enormous danger is approaching us. The Czech formations which were bought by the Tsar, and afterwards by the government of Kerensky, have sold themselves to the counter-revolutionary Russian bourgeoisie. Under the pretense of being dispatched to the French front, they are traveling to the heart of Siberia, to the grain-producing regions. When they saw they were many, they treacherously fell upon the Soviet authority and introduced in Chelyabinsk a régime of terror. They shot and robbed the town and Soviet, who, attacked unexpectedly, were not in a position to resist. Seizing the power, they began a bloody reckoning with the prisoners. If some Magyar or German prisoner of war fell into their hands, not one was left alive. They murdered mercilessly under the influence of national hatred. This corrupted miserable band sprang from Chelyabinsk to Omsk. The Omsk Soviet of Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Deputies took steps to prevent this dangerous company from reaching here. To meet them was sent out a delegation for negotiation accompanied by 200 Red Guards. According to the order of the Commissary for Foreign Affairs, they were told to lay down their arms. The rascals did not submit to the order, and began to fire at the Red Guards. A fight ensued. Comrades Rakop and Babka were taken prisoner and slaughtered without mercy. In every place hitherto occupied by them, they have opened fire on the German-Magyar prisoners and slaughtered mercilessly whoever fell into their hands. Savage national hatred has transformed them into mad animals, and now they wish to take into their hands our fate.

Comrades! It must not be permitted that we sit idly like dolls while this band fastens itself on our necks. The Soviet hasdecided to defend itself. The Omsk proletariat is fighting against the Czech formations at Maryanovka. But the Soviet forces are insufficient. Every moment threatens dangers and therefore we must prepare for defense in the widest measure. Before us stands open the question: to exist or not to exist. The Soviet has placed at the disposition of the central organization 1,000 rifles. These 1,000 rifles we must use if we wish to guard ourselves and the Russian revolution, which is our ally and the basis of our future revolution.

Comrades! The leaders of the country call to arms. Every organized workman must take arms. As soon as we shatter the formations, peaceful relations will again insue and we will lay down our arms, but until then we must hold them in our hands.

Comrades! The innocent blood of our brothers must be avenged. Our lives and the salvation of future proletarianism demands that we honorably take our place in the fight of the Omsk proletariat.

Each foreign organized proletarian to arms!

Long live the world revolution begun by the Russian proletariat!

Away with the corrupted troops falling upon us!

Long live the victorious proletariat dictatorship!

Long live the armed foreign proletariat!

The Magyar Section of the Russian Communistic Party

[Enclosure 2—Translation]

Official Statement by the Temporary Executive Committee of the Czecho-Slovak Army, Placed in Charge of Military and Political Affairs by the Assembly of Soldiers at Chelyabinsk

The principle of the neutrality of the Czecho-Slovak Army as regards the internal conflicts and battles of Russia was definitely expressed and recognized both in the agreement and treaty made by the Czecho-Slovak National Council with the Temporary Government of Russia, and in that arrived at later with the government of the Ukrainian republic, the Ukrainian National Council. To this principle both political and military leaders adhered firmly, and succeeded in implanting it so deeply in the minds of the soldiers, that, in spite of the attempts made right and left to induce them to break it, not a single section of the army could be induced to do so.

Later, when the Ukrainian National Council was defeated and gradually driven out of the governments on the eastern side of the Dnieper and later out of Kiev and the rest of the Ukraine, the commander in chief of the Soviet forces, Colonel Muraviev, and Mr. Kochubinski, the Minister of War of the Soviet government of the Ukraine, recognized the strict armed neutrality of the Czecho-Slovak Army. (See official order to the Czecho-Slovak Army Corps No. 12, January 28, 1918, published in the Czecho-Slavenny Dennik [Czechoslovak Daily], the official organ of the Czecho-Slovak National Council.)

Prior to this, when on January 12, 1918, the Ukrainian Central Council adopted the “fourth universal,” which expressed the desire of the Ukrainian government “to live on terms of friendship and harmony with all neighboring states,” and especially with Austria, it was decided at a meeting of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, at which Professor Masaryk himself presided, “to declare the Czecho-Slovak Army in all parts of the former Russian state as a part of the autonomous army of the Czecho-Slovaks in France.” This proclamation was published on February 10, 1918, after the arrival of the Bolsheviks in Kiev. Soon after that, simultaneously with the success of the peace negotiations of the delegates of the Soviet and Ukrainian governments with the representatives of the Central powers at Brest Litovsk, definite steps were taken to arrange for the departure of the Czecho-Slovak Army to the French front.

The first movement was to be the concentration of all our forces on the eastern side of the Dnieper, and this was to be carried out on the basis of an agreement made with the Ukrainian Soviet government, which at one time planned to establish a front against the Germans in the Ukraine. (See Czecho-Slavenny Dennik, No. 102.) In the meantime, however, the Germans began to threaten the Czecho-Slovaks from both flanks, and they were obliged to retire into the territory of Great Russia. Again this retirement was made in complete agreement with the Soviet authorities in the Ukraine, an arrangement having been reached with the Czecho-Slovak National Council and the commander of the Soviet forces of the south Russian republics, Antonov-Ovseinko. On the basis of this agreement an order was issued to the Czechoslovak Army Corps (No. 26, March 16, 1918) to turn over to the Soviet forces all superfluous arms and other military equipment, while Antonov on his part issued an order to all revolutionary forces of the south Russian republics (No. 92, March 16) from which the following is a literal extract:

Our comrades of the Czecho-Slovak Army Corps, who fought so bravely and gloriously at Zhitomir, Kiev, Grebenka and Bakhmach, defending the way to Poltava and Kharkov, are now leaving Ukrainian territory and are turning over to us a part of their military equipment. The revolutionary army will never forget the fraternal assistance rendered by the Czecho-Slovak Army Corps in the battle of the working people of the Ukraine against the thieving bands of imperialism. The military equipment given up by the Czecho-Slovaks the revolutionary army accepts as a fraternal gift.

On the basis of this agreement, Antonov consented to the departure of the Czecho-Slovaks from the Ukraine, and the staff of the Soviet Army of Great Russia also agreed to our departure towards the east and issued the necessary orders to the railway officials who were to attend to the details of the transport on behalf of the Soviet government. Agreement to our departure from Russia via Vladivostok was also expressed in telegrams sent by Lenin and Trotsky.

In Penza, however, a new set of negotiations was begun. The Council of People’s Commissioners in Moscow demanded the complete disarmament of the Czecho-Slovak Army. As the result of the negotiations between the Czecho-Slovaks and the Moscow authorities a telegram was sent from Moscow on March 26, signed by Stalin, in which a certain number of arms were to be left to each echelon to provide protection against attack by counter-revolutionists. In this same telegram the promise was made to “help in every way possible the Czecho-Slovaks as long as they remain on Russian territory, provided they maintain an honest and sincere loyalty.” Further the Penza Soviet was ordered to appoint reliable commissioners who were to accompany the Czecho-Slovak echelons to Vladivostok, see that their unity as an organization was unimpaired, and at the same time keep the Council of People’s Commissioners informed as to the progress of the transport. In this same telegram it was stated “that telegrams with necessary instructions would be sent by the Council of People’s Commissioners to all interested parties.”

Our army maintained an honest and sincere loyalty. But meanwhile the Soviet government proceeded to break its word at every step. The Penza Soviet named but one commissioner, who went on ahead to Vladivostok with the first echelon, and there sat down and did nothing. In spite of our repeated requests that other commissioners be named, the Penza authorities absolutely refused to do this, giving as an excuse the lack of suitable men.

The local Soviets one after another put all sorts of obstacles in our path. In Samara, but 400 versts beyond Penza, the local soviet demanded that we give up more of our arms. These demands were repeated in Ufa, Zlatoust, Omsk, Irkutsk, Chita, and so on all along the line. The representatives of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, as well as the commanders of the various echelons, used every possible means to prevent the movement of our transports from being halted. In Samara the echelons gave up 138 rifles apiece, leaving only 30 to an echelon; in Omsk each echelon gave up a machine gun, and in Irkutsk more rifles, until there were left but 20 to an echelon. The negotiations of these local Soviets, being in clear opposition to the orders of the Council of People’s Commissioners quoted above, often had the appearance of bargaining at the bazar, and for the Czecho-Slovak soldiers were insulting in the extreme, and had the effect of increasing every day their mistrust of the Soviet government, and in creating a disgust for them which ever grew stronger.

One great reason for this lack of confidence and disgust was the attitude assumed by the Soviet authorities, both local and central, towards those who had deserted the Czecho-Slovak Army and joined the ranks of the Red Army. There were not many of them, and they were bad soldiers and men of weak character. They went over to the Soviet army for mercenary reasons. The munificent salaries, the opportunity to at once assume a position of high rank, fear of the French front, petty personal spite—these were the motives that led these men to desert their comrades. Our soldiers knew these men, and were glad that they were rid of them. The Soviet government welcomed these deserters and supported them in every way possible. At Penza the Soviet named some of these deserters as their representatives on the commission which had charge of receiving the arms given up by the Czecho-Slovaks. Other deserters holding documents from the Soviet political or military authorities insisted on coming into the Czecho-Slovak echelons to carry on agitation for the Red Army, and to determine if we did not have some arms hidden away.

These deserters, who called themselves Social Revolutionists, internationalists and communists, often declared that the holding up of our transport and all the obstacles put in our path were for the purpose of causing dissension within our ranks, and gaining as many recruits as possible for the Red Army. They declared that this was the reason why the Soviet government wished a part of the troops to go by way of Archangel; that somewhere on the way in a region where no food was to be had they planned to halt us, and compel us from very hunger to join their ranks.

The Czecho-Slovak National Council exercised all its influence with the army to keep them from taking stock in these tales, and to induce them to keep their patience and as good soldiers not to make any reply to the unfaithfulness and insulting behavior of the Soviet government.

The atmosphere was therefore highly charged with electricity when the Chelyabinsk incident occurred. At Chelyabinsk besides the Czecho-Slovak echelons there stood several trains filled with prisoners on their way home to Austria and Germany. The relations between the Czecho-Slovak soldiers and these prisoners was good, as it was uniformly whenever they came in contact with one another on the road. The soldiers did carry on an agitation amongst them against Austrian and German imperialism, and laughed at them for returning to serve once more under Austrian and German officers. But at the same time they felt sorry for them, and often shared their food with them. On May 14 one of these prisoners threw a piece of iron out of a train that was just leaving, wounding one of the Czecho-Slovak soldiers. The soldiers immediately surrounded the car from which the iron had been thrown, and demanded that the guilty prisoner be given up to them. When this was done, they immediately killed him. In the course of the investigation of this affair, the local Soviet called as witnesses the members of the guard which had been on duty at the station. But, instead of hearing their testimony, they put these men under arrest. A deputation which was later sent by the Czechoslovaks to demand the release of the guard was likewise put under arrest. This illegal imprisonment of their fellows was more than the soldiers in the echelons at Chelyabinsk could stand, and, led by their commanders, they marched into the city, released their imprisoned comrades, and returned immediately to their trains. No attack by force was made, the whole proceeding was conducted in an orderly and quiet manner, hardly a shot being fired.

The local Soviet proceeded to describe this action on the part of the Czechoslovaks in lurid colors in telegrams sent out in all directions. Believing the information thus imparted to them, the Council of People’s Commissioners issued an order to completely disarm all Czecho-Slovak echelons. At the same time orders were issued to the Soviets of all cities where our echelons were then located to proceed against them by force. Accordingly almost on the same day the Soviet forces, composed for the most part of Magyar and German prisoners of war, fell upon the Czecho-Slovak echelons which were almost entirely disarmed. At the attack made upon echelons of the Sixth Czecho-Slovak Regiment at Maryanovka, near Omsk, the Czecho-Slovaks suffered losses amounting to 10 killed and 10 severely wounded. The staff of the First Regiment, whose echelon was attacked at Zlatoust, defended itself with stones against the machine guns and rifles of the Bolsheviks, but lost 6 men killed and 10 severely wounded, and was compelled to make its way across the Urals on foot. Similarly the staff of the Second Artillery Brigade was attacked at Innokentevskaya, near Irkutsk, when they had already given up their arms. Machine guns placed in the windows of the railway station opened up a heavy fire upon the Czecho-Slovaks, but in spite of the fact that the men had no arms except a few hand grenades, they succeeded in clearing the station of Bolshevik forces and in capturing their machine guns. A fourth attack was made at Serodobsk, south from Penza, but as yet there is no detailed information in regard to it, owing to the fact that communication has not yet been established with the so-called Penza group of echelons. All of these attacks were made on May 27 and the following two or three days, immediately after the issuance of the order from Moscow to disarm the Czecho-Slovaks at any cost.

Prior to these events, but after the first incident at Chelyabinsk, the assembly of Czecho-Slovak soldiers, met for its annual meeting, had decided that in view of the tense situation existing between the Soviet government and the Czechoslovaks, vigorous measures must be taken immediately in order to secure the rapid passage of the trains towards Vladivostok. Accordingly delegates were dispatched to all echelons with instructions to proceed ahead at any cost, and an executive committee was appointed to see that these plans were carried out. The executive committee in formulating its plans counted on the probability of an armed conflict with the Bolshevik forces, but felt confident that they would be able to force their way through to Vladivostok in spite of any resistance that might be offered by the Soviet forces. The reason for their confidence in the successful outcome of their new plan lay not only in the well-known weakness of the Red Army, but also in their knowledge that the people at large were sick and tired of the Bolshevik rule, and that therefore they would not turn a hand to help the Bolsheviks in any possible conflict with the Czecho-Slovaks. Furthermore, the Czecho-Slovaks from their intimate, knowledge of political conditions throughout Russia judged that the feeling against the Bolsheviks was strongest in the very regions where most of their echelons were located, namely in the Urals and western Siberia. The executive committee, therefore, in planning their action, took cognizance of these facts, and planned to take advantage both of the weakness of the Red Army and of the strong popular feeling against the Bolsheviks to force their way through to the east. That their action would be accompanied by or followed by the overthrow of the Soviet government and the establishment of a new government in western Siberia never entered into their calculations, although later when the fall of the Soviet government was an accomplished fact, the Czecho-Slovaks were the first to welcome the new government and to lend it their moral and armed support.

The plans of the executive committee for the forcing of the passage to Vladivostok had not been thoroughly worked out when the events of May 25–26 brought things to an issue. By its cowardly attacks upon the Czechoslovak echelons the Soviet government began a warfare against the Czechoslovaks, the object of which was, according to the command of Trotsky, to disarm and disband the Czecho-Slovak Army Corps, place them in prison camps, and there try to enlist them in the ranks of the Red Army or to put them out at hard labor. In short, they wished to destroy entirely the Czechoslovak Army, that important moral support of the revolutionary movement of the Czecho-Slovaks and the other oppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary.

After the first order to disarm completely the Czecho-Slovak echelons, there still remained the possibility of diplomatic negotiations. But after the attacks made upon the echelons on May 25–26, the soul of each soldier cried out for revenge for the blood of his innocent comrades. And so there was nothing left but war, a war which has already resulted in the seizure of almost the entire Siberian Railway by the Czecho-Slovaks and the fall of the Soviet government all along the line.

The Czecho-Slovaks are convinced that the action taken against them by the Soviet government was dictated from Berlin by Von Mirbach. This conviction is based on the opinion, very widely spread throughout Russia, that the Soviet government are the paid agents of Germany. This conviction grew stronger as repeated attempts were made to disarm the soldiers, for the men could not but see in this disarmament real danger, knowing as they did that the central Soviet government was really powerless, and that in most places the chief strength of their armed forces consisted in armed German and Magyar prisoners. For example, in Omsk the commander of the forces of the internationalists composed of prisoners was an Austro-Hungarian officer, a Magyar by race. This officer, Ligeti by name, had all the Czecho-Slovaks and other Slavs who were serving in the Red Army disarmed, so that Omsk was really in the hands of this Austro-Hungarian officer. In Ishim the Red Army was composed entirely of Magyars. In Petropavlovsk the men who came to negotiate with the Czechoslovaks in the guise of Czech communists afterward proved to be the representatives of the German section of the internationalists. The commanding officers of the Red Army were in many cases Germans and Magyars, judging by the orders and the curses in those tongues that were heard on all sides during the battles. When the echelon was attacked near Irkutsk, there was heard the command: “Schiessen!”

The conviction that the Soviet government wished to destroy our forces was also strengthened by the constant holding up of the transport, for which no adequate cause could be found. At first the delay was blamed upon the Amur Railway, where transportation was reported to have been halted. The advance of Semenov upon Irkutsk was given as an excuse. But the Czecho-Slovaks soon learned that transportation on the Amur Railway had been soon resumed, while the advance of Semenov existed more in the imagination of the Soviet authorities than in reality. Amongst other excuses given was that of a lack of locomotives on the Amur road, but all the while German prisoners were being merrily transported towards the west, and there were plenty of locomotives for them.

On April 20, the People’s Commissioner for Foreign Affairs Chicherin sent the following telegram to the Siberian Soviets: “Transport German prisoners as rapidly as possible towards the west. Hold back the Czecho-Slovak echelons.”

It was only after a long and tedious session of negotiations that there was secured an order for the renewal of our transport towards Vladivostok. One day, about May 15, a member of the Czecho-Slovak National Council was officially informed that the trains would now be moved. On the very next day, however, he learned through private conversation with the railway officials that another order had been issued in Irkutsk to stop the movements of the Czecho-Slovak trains. He finally learned that this command had issued from the commander of the Soviet forces at Irkutsk, General von Taube, a German, whose adjutant had issued the order by “mistake.”

The Seventh Czecho-Slovak Regiment captured a German engineer, who had been commandeered from Moscow to destroy the bridges and tunnels on the railroad beyond the Baikal. In Troitsk the commanders of the Soviet artillery were all Austrian officers.

From all these facts even an uninterested onlooker may picture to himself the net which had been spread for the Czecho-Slovak Army. Inasmuch as the warfare is still being carried on on all sides, it has not been possible to gather all the evidence from the Soviet offices, and unfortunately in many cases the Bolsheviks succeeded in carrying away with them or destroying all their papers before our men took possession. Later however there will be certainly found many proofs of the truth of the assertion made by the president of the Chelyabinsk Soviet and the military commissioner in that town, who informed our representatives in confidence shortly before the outbreak of hostilities that the cause of all the acts against the Czecho-Slovaks was the German Ambassador at Moscow.

1. As enclosure No. 7 to despatch No. 8 of July 29 from the Consul General at Irkutsk; see post, p. 309.
1. Not printed.
1. Printed post as Enclosure 1.
1. Printed post as Enclosure 2.