Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, Volume II

File No. 763.72Su/145

The Diplomatic Liaison Officer, Supreme War Council (Frazier), to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Paris, July 2, 1918, midnight, and July 3, 1 a.m.
[Received July 3, 10:20 and 11.30 a.m.]

100. The Supreme War Council consider that since its last meeting a complete change has come over the situation in Russia and Siberia, which makes Allied intervention in these countries an urgent and imperative necessity.

In the first place the recent action of the Czecho-Slovak troops has transformed the Siberian eclipse. There is now a force of 50,000 troops, of Slav nationality, totally disinterested in the internal politics of Russia, yet determined fight Germany for the liberation of their own country, in control of the railway in western Siberia. This success of the Czecho-Slovak troops proves that the bulk of the Siberian population are no longer sympathetic to the Bolsheviks and must be friendly disposed to the Allied cause. It also removes the apprehension that Allied intervention will meet with such serious opposition from the local population east of the Urals as would make penetration through western Siberia to the Urals very difficult. Provided intervention takes place in time, there will be a Slav army in western Siberia to which Russian patriots can rally, which eliminates the return of Russian public opinion [sic] being thrown into the arms of Germany as might have been the case if intervention were effected by forces almost entirely Japanese. This Czecho-Slovak force, however, is in grave danger of being cut off by the organization of German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war at Irkutsk, and an appeal for immediate military assistance has been made by the Czech National Council to the Allied consuls at Vladivostok. The Allies are under the responsibility of taking immediate action, if these gallant allies are not to be overwhelmed. To fail in bringing support to these faithful troops, now desperately fighting for the Allied cause, would not only forever discredit the Allies, but might have a disastrous effect on the Slav population both of Russia itself and of Austria-Hungary and the Balkans as proving that the Allies are unable or unwilling to exert themselves effectively to save the Slav world from falling wholly under German domination. On the other hand to push a force through to Irkutsk to overwhelm the German prisoner organization and join hands with the Czechoslovaks would probably be a simple and rapid matter if it were taken in hand immediately. Intervention in Siberia, therefore, is an urgent necessity both to save the Czecho-Slovaks and to take advantage of an opportunity of gaining control of Siberia for the Allies which may never return.

In the second place a great change has come over the internal situation in Russia itself. There is no doubt that the Bolshevik power is waning. It is daily becoming clearer to all classes in Russia including ex-soldiers, peasants, and workmen that the Bolsheviks cannot fulfil their promises of the social millennium, and that anarchy, disorder and starvation lie ahead under the Bolshevik regime. The accounts from all our representatives agree upon this. It is further clear that the Bolsheviks have no real power with which to support their rule. They have entirely failed to raise an effective army. They remain in office simply because Russia is too divided to create any alternative organization with which to supplant them.

There is much evidence, however, that the best liberal and democratic elements in Russia are beginning to lift their heads and to get into touch with one another. They are animated partly by disgust with the autocratic methods of the Bolsheviks, partly by the determination not to submit to the humiliation and partition of the Brest Litovsk treaties, and partly by a growing fear of German domination.

Practically all elements of the Russian population indeed except the dwindling minority of the Bolsheviks now recognize intervention of some kind to be necessary and inevitable because it is the only alternative to continuous anarchy and disorder ending in universal starvation. The only difference of opinion is as to whether intervention should be Allied or German. The reactionaries and the pro-German agents among the Bolsheviks naturally prefer German intervention. The liberal and democratic elements urgently ask for Allied intervention, and make it clear while they desire economic assistance, the essential need is military support. Unless they can secure effective Allied support in the field, and a base upon which to rally, the reactionary forces, backed by German bayonets, will inevitably crush the movement for national freedom and regeneration.

Allied intervention therefore is urgently necessary in order to save Russia from the establishment of autocracy supported by German bayonets. If, however, the Allies are to bring effective assistance to liberal Russia, not only must they occupy Murmansk and Archangel in order to retain the bridgeheads into Russia from the north from which forces can eventually advance rapidly to the center of Russia, they must also control Siberia to the Urals without delay. If the Germans gain control of western Siberia, as well as of Archangel and Murmansk, they close the last means of contact between Russia and the outside world, and they obtain possession of the supplies of food without which Russia will starve. The Germans have already made the Black Sea a German [lake]. They are advancing as fast as they can on the Caspian which will give them control of the Volga and its water communications with western Siberia, and they are preparing to occupy the Murman coast before winter. If they once succeed in these objects the German domination of Russia would be complete. They will then not only control Russian resources, but under penalty of starvation they may be able to compel the Russian people to serve as labor, and possibly even as recruits for their armies in the field. All hope of the regeneration of Russia on truly democratic lines depends upon the seizure by the Allies of the granary of western Siberia without delay.

In the third place Allied intervention is essential in order to win the war. There is no doubt that if the Germans fail to gain a decision in the west in the next few weeks they will turn east and endeavor with all their power to paralyze any possibility of the national regeneration of Russia during the war. They know as well as we know that there is but the smallest chance of an Allied victory on the western front in 1919 unless Germany is compelled to transfer a considerable amount of her strength back again from west to east. It will therefore be a primary object of her policy to prevent the re-creation of an eastern Allied front. During the forthcoming autumn and winter she will endeavor to do this either by establishing in Russia a government favorable to herself or destroying all possibility of organized resistance to her domination. If the Allies are to win the war in 1919 it should be a primary object of their policy to foster and assist the national movement in Russia in order to reform an eastern front or at least to sustain such a vigorous spirit of independence in the occupied territories behind the German lines as will compel Germany to maintain large bodies of troops in the east. Allied intervention at the earliest moment is therefore a necessity if any headway is to be made in organizing that eastern front which is essential, if the Allies are to win the war in 1919 before Germany has concentrated her whole strength once more on the encirclement and domination of Russia. At the present moment intervention as a practical policy is easier than it has ever been.

The Japanese have now agreed to send an expedition into Siberia provided they are assured of the approval and active support of the United States Government and though they have not engaged themselves to go beyond Irkutsk there is no ground for thinking that this necessarily represents the limits of their effort. They have also accepted the two conditions which the Supreme War Council has considered as necessary conditions of Allied intervention; namely, disinterestedness in Russian internal politics and guarantees to evacuate Russian territory after the war. The Czechoslovak forces are already in occupancy of western Siberia. The addition of American and Allied detachments would create a force really Allied in character and acceptable to both Russian and Allied occupants especially if Russian forces under Russian leaders were associated with it as soon as it was established in territory. If action were taken immediately it ought to be possible for the Allies to gain control of the railway through the whole of Siberia as far as the Urals in a very few weeks. Only the assent and cooperation of the United States Government is now required in order to set in motion a policy which promises success and which if successfully accomplished is bound to have decisive results on the future of the war.

On the other hand the Supreme War Council feel bound to point out that in their judgment failure to intervene immediately must inevitably cause effects which can only be described as disastrous to the Allied cause. In the first place it would mean the abandonment of the Russian people to the [triumphant] militarism of Germany and the destruction of all hope of the resuscitation of Russia as the liberal ally of the western democracies during the war. In the second place it would mean the permanent impairment of the blockade for if Germany were to establish effective control over central Russia and Siberia her chief anxiety as to the supply both of raw material and food would be removed. In the third place it would mean the indefinite prolongation of the war and the surrender of any real prospect of victory for the Allies in 1919. Fourthly, it would mean the abandonment of the army of yet another little nation, the Czechoslovaks, to the mercies of Berlin with inevitably disastrous consequences to the sentiments of the Slav peoples of Russia, the Balkans and throughout the world.

If the policy of intervention however is to be really successful, an adequate military force must be employed. The Allied representatives in Russia are agreed that while economic assistance is important, military intervention is absolutely essential. The Czechoslovak leaders have informed the Allied consuls at Vladivostok that in their judgment 100,000 men are necessary to save the situation. It is evident therefore that while the rest of the Allies should send what troops they can, the bulk of the force must be provided by the Japanese.

For these reasons the Supreme War Council, having carefully considered the military situation and the prospects of the Allies in all the theaters of war, have come to conclusion—

I. That immediate Allied armed assistance to Russia is imperatively necessary for the following reasons:

(a) To assist the Russian nation to throw off their German oppressors and to prevent the unlimited military and economic domination of Russia by Germany in her own interests.

(b) For the decisive military reason given by General Foch in his telegram to President Wilson; i.e., that the Germans have already called back from Russia a number of divisions and sent them to the western front. Allied intervention will be the first step in stimulating the national uprising in Russia against German domination which will have an immediate effect in renewing German anxiety in regard to the east and compelling her to refrain from removing further troops westward and perhaps to move troops back to the east.

(c) To shorten the war by the reconstitution of the Russian front.

(d) To prevent the isolation of Russia from western Europe. They are advised that if action is not taken in Siberia the existing Allied forces in northern Russia may have to be withdrawn and Russia will be completely cut off from the Allies.

(e) To deny to Germany the supplies of western Siberia and the important military stores at Vladivostok and to render these available for the Russian population.

(f) To bring assistance to the Czecho-Slovak forces which have made great sacrifices to the cause for which we are fighting.

II. That the intervention should be Allied in character, should be accompanied by pledges to the Russian people as agreed to at the last Versailles conference, and should include the following:

1. An Allied force to operate in Siberia. Circumstances render imperative that the force shall be considerable in number, military in character and Allied in composition, and that above all things it should operate immediately; delay would be fatal. It is recognized that owing to geographical and shipping conditions Japanese troops will comprise the larger portion of the force but its Allied’ character must be maintained and it must include American and Allied units. The force should be under a single command appointed by the power that provides the largest number of troops.

2. Such developments of the Allied forces in Murmansk and Archangel as the military advisers of the Allies may recommend.

3. Relief expeditions under American direction and control to supply the wants and alleviate the sufferings of the Russian people.

The primary object of Allied action being to cooperate with the Russian nation in re-creating the eastern front as a first step towards freeing Russia, the closest coordination must exist between the above forces and the Russian people.

III. Therefore, in view of—

1. The unanimous opinion of General Foch and the Allied military advisers of the Supreme War Council that immediate dispatch of a considerable Allied force to Siberia is essential for the victory of the Allied armies;

2. The fact that no adequate expedition can be sent without Japanese cooperation and that Japan will not undertake effective action without the encouragement and support of the United States Government; and

3. The shortness of the time available before the winter for initiating active operations in Siberia and the rapid German penetration into Russia:

the Supreme War Council appeal to President Wilson to approve the policy here recommended and thus to enable it to be carried into effect before it is too late.

Frazier