File No. 861.00/2146
Mr. Alexandre Konovaloff2 to the Secretary of State
My Dear Mr. Secretary: During our interview you requested me to present further expression of my views in regard to certain questions raised during our conversation; namely, you expressed the desire to have my opinion as to the effect it would have on the Russian people that, in case of inter-Allied action in Siberia, the predominant part of troops would have to be necessarily Japanese; further what would be the attitude towards Japanese military commandership and ultimately what use could be possibly made of the Czecho-Slovak troops.
[Page 228]I take pleasure in presenting to you my answers with all frankness and liberty of opinion which, may I request, you will treat absolutely confidential and private.
I
As I have told you, some months ago when the question of a Japanese intervention into Russia was raised I was opposed to such idea. If I do at present with all emphasis urge active inter-Allied action in the Far East, this is for the following reasons:
Firstly, since then, German progress in Russia and the sufferings of the people have performed a deep change in the spirit of the Russian people. This change has manifestly reflected itself in the opinion of leaders both in Russia and abroad. It is but a few days that a new confirmation of this change was received from Far East groups representing different political parties which, convened in Harbin, adopted resolutions calling active Allied assistance to Russia. The resolution explicitly mentions the participation of Japanese in an Allied expedition and I call your attention to the fact that feeling in the Far East is especially delicate.
On the other hand at the present moment the very conception of the aims and procedure of action in Russia appears entirely different. No mention is any longer made of independent Japanese action and especially no plans are entertained of forceful passage of numerous Japanese troops through Russian territory without consideration to the attitude of the people, their spirit and needs. The aim of the enterprise is conceived as an endeavor to assist the Russians in a process of self-organization, it being expected that the Allied force will encourage the development of national feeling and patriotism which through consolidation will enable the people to throw aside German grip. It is a national movement brought into effect by the Russians themselves which is the basis of success.
As I have stated in the notes that I have presented to you, I perceive two phases in the development of the proposed action. In the initial I visualize a relatively small inter-Allied force entering Russia under an Allied and not a Japanese supreme chief. To this could be added numerous detachments of Czecho-Slovaks. In this phase, as I foresee, activities would largely tend to encourage and assist the people to organize themselves. Military operations will be more of a passive character. Although Japanese troops will form the majority, the whole operation would bear a distinctively inter-Allied character. Further Japanese troops, possibly in large numbers, would be necessary only in a later stage when the national movement. [Page 229] spreading westward would meet German opposition and necessitate action of military character. But this will take place only as a result of the success of a national consolidation in which an active anti-German spirit would develop, rallying, in particular, Russian volunteer forces as a nucleus of the future Russian army. Military action against Germans in such case will be a natural act of self-defense in which the Japanese troops would be considered by the population not as invaders occupying territory of powerless Russia, but would be looked upon as Allies cooperating and helping resurrected Russia to defend herself against the common foe. In this form the entrance of Japanese troops could provoke but welcome, especially if Allied action is preceded, as it naturally should be, by a solemn declaration of all the Allies guaranteeing the integrity of Russian territory.
II
It will undoubtedly be difficult to have a non-Japanese in control of troops of which the majority would be Japanese. On the other hand the Russians would raise objections to Japanese commandership. The difficulty is solved by the fact that the discussed inter-Allied enterprise does not bear a narrow military character, but is conceived as a vast liberating action. It is, therefore, presumed that the expedition as a whole will be headed by a supreme chief who, besides military functions, would be intrusted with varied functions of most important character. This head of the expedition, a civil high commissioner or even a military supreme chief, an American or Frenchman, should necessarily be a person possessing universally acknowledged high moral qualifications and authority. In such case it should not be offending for a Japanese military commander to be under the orders of such a chief. This Japanese commander, however, would be independent in his special military activities which would represent but a branch of the general Allied action.
III
It is hardly necessary to emphasize how fortunate is the presence of the Czecho-Slovak troops in Siberia and how highly desirable is their participation in inter-Allied action in Siberia. The fact that Czecho-Slovak detachments are spread over the whole of Trans-Siberia appears to greatly assist the initial step in protecting the railway from wanton destruction and enabling the formation of a screen in western Siberia or the Urals.
Accept [etc.]
- From March to June 1917, and again in the fall of 1917, Russian Minister of Commerce and Industry.↩