File No. 861.00/2008

Memorandum of the Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long)

The Russian Ambassador called to-day and read telegrams to me which contained the following information:

There are, for the purpose of anti-Bolshevik activity in Siberia, three military fronts being located respectively as follows: West front at Irkutsk, north front at Khabarovsk, east front at Vladivostok.

The strength of the Bolshevik forces at each of these fronts is as follows:

  • Irkutsk: Infantry 7,000 (of which 1,000 are German prisoners, and of which about 5 per cent must be kept at Irkutsk), cavalry 800, guns 70, machine guns 50. This is under expert command.
  • Khabarovsk: Infantry 1,500, cavalry 700, guns 16, machine guns 26, 4 gunboats on the Amur River.
  • Vladivostok: Infantry 1,500, armed workmen (Red Guard) 3,500, cavalry 600, guns 100, machine guns 35.

The latter two are under very mediocre command.

The total strength of Semenov with his base on the Onon River: Infantry 1,500, Cossacks 2,000, guns and machine guns 70. Their discipline is reported as very good but their management is bad.

The forces under Admiral Kolchak, operating with a base at Pogranichnaya on the border of Manchuria, have a strength of—infantry 1,000, hired Chinese infantry 1,000, 8 guns, 12 machine guns.

The Ambassador’s information was to the effect that Semenov and Kolchak combined had a force equal to approximately one half of the Bolshevik western front or equal to that part of the Bolshevik west front which could [not?] be supported from Irkutsk.

The logic is that Semenov could advance to a point near Chita, possibly west of Chita, but could not advance to a point farther west which would permit the entire Bolshevik force (including that half of it stationed at Irkutsk) to be brought into action.

The Ambassador is arguing for intervention of an Allied character and says that the Czecho-Slovak troops, of which 15,000 are now encamped just out of Vladivostok, could be used for a military force under the leadership of an Allied staff. He feels that, in spite of Masaryk’s declaration that these troops will not fight on Russian soil against any part of the Russian population, they will eventually [Page 193] become antagonistic to the Bolsheviks and will then be available to be used as a military expedition to overcome Bolshevik influence, and under Allied guidance to restore order.

Breckinridge Long