File No. 861.00/1876
The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 27, 10.55 a.m.]
3999. The third bureau of the staff has drawn up for the French Government under date of May 23, 1918, a memorandum concerning the decisions to be taken in regard to Russia for the occupation of the two ports to the north, Alexandrovsk and Archangel, as well as Siberia and for preventing the Germans from capturing Petersburg, Smolensk, and Moscow, and seizing the Trans-Siberian Railroad as far as Irkutsk. The Germans are so organized as to be ready to begin this movement in two weeks. This note is based on information received from official sources by the third bureau, among these sources being General Niessel; also reports from the French Ambassador M. Noulens, from the Consuls in Moscow and Finland, military and naval attachés in Peking, etc., M. Boppe, French Consul in Siberia, etc. One piece of information which has reached the bureau from the French Consul in Finland, which information is not how [Page 173] ever included in the above-mentioned note, is that the American Consul in Finland, Mr. Haynes, has recommended to the American Government to send wheat to Finland. The French Consul protests as this is directly contrary to the French and British policy, all food given to Finland going to the Germans. The note is textually as follows. …
To the above note issued by the third bureau of the staff are appended telegrams from the French Ambassador to Russia, M. Noulens, now at Vologda, and the French Consul at Moscow, M. Grenard. These telegrams for the most part covered the period from the 9th to the 18th of May, all of which telegrams, which are very brief, bear substantially the same message, that the hour has come for active intervention in Siberia, and that no hope can be placed in the restoration of order by the Bolsheviks with whom an alliance would be fraught with the danger of losing Russia by allowing Germany to do there what she is now doing in Ukraine. One telegram from the French Ambassador under date of the 14th instant is interesting as reflecting the attitude of mind of the French Government toward the position assumed by both the English and American Governments on this question. More than a month ago M. de Margerie of the Foreign Office, as mentioned in a former telegram, said to me that he was at a loss to understand the reason of the American Government’s opposing Japanese intervention. The telegram from the French Ambassador referred to reads as follows. …
Yesterday General Berthelot, until recently in command of the French forces in Rumania for more than two years past, called to see me to tell me of the situation existing in Rumania at the time of his departure and also of that in Russia. As the General informed me that he came to see me at the request of M. Clemenceau, there is no doubt that the Premier not only indorsed the views expressed by the General, but desired me to know them. It may be added that General Berthelot leaves in a few days for America where he goes upon a mission with which he is charged by the French Government. As the facts told me by the General and the views expressed relative to conditions in Russia are so similar to those of General Niessel, reported by me in a recent telegram, there might be little need to repeat what he told me. He is, of course, an interventionist, expressing no faith in the sincerity of purpose of Trotsky or his ability to restore order. One point which he brought out, not mentioned by General Niessel, was to the effect that the Bolsheviks themselves are so alarmed over the German threats to make further invasion of Russia that they would naturally be restrained from asking for Japanese intervention. Their peace treaty at Piraeus [Brest] [Page 174] might in addition estop them from seeking new alliance which would, in fact, place them in a hostile position towards those powers. The General also said that delay might enable the German prisoners in Russia, numbering approximately 150,000, to become armed, in which event this will make a very formidable force in exercising authority in a country which was tired of the war and which could offer little resistance from a disorganized army. As to Rumania, the General was very emphatic in declaring that in his opinion the Allied representatives should remain there even if compelled to submit to certain abridgments of their privileges, for the people of Rumania were not only very loyal to the Allies, but would be otherwise left in a most helpless state under complete German domination.