File No. 861.00/1726½

The British Ambassador (Reading) to the Secretary of State

[A copy of the following paraphrase of a telegram was handed to the Secretary by the Ambassador on May 1, 1918:]

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour) to the Ambassador at Washington

It is true that the formation of a correct estimate as to Trotsky is one of our principal difficulties. It has not yet been possible for me to go into the documentary evidence against him which you mentioned, but quite apart from such evidence his course of action has so frequently been exactly that which the [Page 149] Germans would have preferred that it is impossible to regard him as beyond suspicion. All witnesses returning from Russia, on the other hand, with whom I have discussed the matter, whether they like or dislike him, appear to agree in thinking that for the moment he holds an absolutely commanding position in Russia and in these circumstances we are obliged either to defy him, to work with him, or to do nothing. The first of these three alternatives is dangerous, and the last fatal, and we are therefore obliged to accept the second, whatever misgivings this may cause us.

The policy of working with Trotsky is not free from dangers. The simple fact that we are cooperating with him, even assuming that he does not betray us, will have a tendency to place in opposition large sections of Russian opinion who are at present absolutely powerless but may perhaps obtain control of Russia in the future, with or without help from Germany. As far as I am now able to judge, our only means of lessening this risk is by keeping ostentatiously apart from internal questions, and by avoiding, if we can, any formal recognition of the present government.

The actual number of troops sent by the United States to Siberia is, in my opinion, a matter merely of secondary importance, and the really vital problem with which we have to deal is to prevent the Central powers obtaining supplies from Russia and, through a renewal of the Allied menace in the east, to prevent the continued removal of troops to the western front before it has been possible for the enemy to consolidate his grip upon Russian territory and Russian resources. I am very apprehensive that we are now allowing critical moments to go by without making full use of them.

We realize that there is a fear in the minds of many Americans that a reaction in favour of an autocratic regime may be produced by Allied intervention. It appears to me that, if the present chaotic conditions continue, a reaction in this direction cannot be avoided, and that when it occurs it will take place under German inspiration and in the interest of Germany. The only chance which we have is to provide for the patriotic elements in Russia, whatever political opinions they may hold, a solid Allied nucleus around which these elements may be able to organize themselves against the common enemy and against the system of autocracy, the establishment of which is part of the enemy’s scheme. It is important to bear in mind that Russia, if she passes completely under the domination of Germany and is reduced to a condition of starvation, would furnish the enemy with an unlimited supply of man power which could be used either for war or for the purposes of industry. If the war continues for a long time, this possibility may prove to be one of the most serious dangers which we have to face.