File No. 861.00/863
The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 24, 2.20 p.m.]
Stevens1 arrived here to-day having left in Nagasaki the Russian railway unit. He considers it imperative that they be kept available for immediate usefulness in the event of conditions in Russia making possible the resumption of their work on Trans-Siberian system. He anxiously awaits the arrangements of the necessary credits.
At the request of Viscount Motono, I took Stevens to see him. This appears to explain his own views of the Russian situation. He expressed firm conviction that limitations on [duration of] particular coterie now exercising power in Russia is doubtless ephemeral, yet it is the fact that power has passed permanently and inalienably to the Maximalist constituency which for the time being they represent and that it would be fatal mistake for the Allied powers to attempt to support or countenance any counter-revolution or any movement by the Cadets, for instance, to obtain control in favor of less radical elements. He also dwells upon the futility and danger of antagonizing what must ultimately be the decisive influence in [Page 12] Russia by attempting any sort of armed intervention even in eastern Siberia. He considers, while there is throughout the people of Russia an earnest desire for peace, yet it may not be too late to bring about some such reconstitution of governmental authority as would defeat the intrigues for a separate peace with Germany. There are strong elements in Russia who perceive that the country must continue faithful to the alliance if it is to escape ultimate commercial and financial domination by Germany and have the opportunity to realize its own political destiny, but these elements are now disorganized and discouraged by the prevailing anarchy. They would give strong support to any administration capable of maintaining order and national unity in the pursuit of the United States ideals but there is urgent danger that the continuance of present chaotic conditions may so discourage them as to destroy their effectiveness.
In reply to Motono’s request for his suggestions as to the possibility of constructive action Stevens urged his belief that the only hope lies in sending immediately to Petrograd a large commission jointly representing the Allied powers and composed of men of well-known administrative capacity who would be at least sympathetic with the progressive spirit which in Russia, [spite of] transient personalities, is destined to control the future of Russia; this commission bearing no formal credentials but going prepared to ascertain for itself where the real power lies in Russia and to affiliate itself with those politicians who give most promise of leadership and to seek opportunities to cooperate with them in the actual reorganization and acclimate [to counsel] the government for the period of the war. Stevens considers that although this suggestion is a hazard which might not prove in the event [successful], nevertheless presents the only chance to avoid complete disintegration which would work powerfully in favor of Germany and which could be only partially nullified by treating Russia as an actual enemy.
Minister of Foreign Affairs incidentally stated that the Japanese Government is opposed to using military force even in Siberia lest such action should crystallize Russian feeling against the Allied powers. Although he made no statement to that effect, his inquiries suggested the impression that he had been inclined to consider favorably supporting Cadet Party as against the Maximalist; he appeared much impressed by Stevens’s course of action [consideration] that no change of administration can deprive of permanent power the radical masses who are now effectively represented by the Councils of Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Delegates. He proposes to have Stevens in the near future present his views to the Prime Minister.
- John F. Stevens, chairman of the Advisory Commission of Railway Experts to Russia.↩