File No. 861.00/1658½
The British Embassy
to the Department of State
[April 27, 1918]
[A copy of the following paraphrase of a telegram was left at the
Department by the Counselor of the British Embassy on April 27,
1918:]
The British Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs (Balfour) to the Ambassador at Washington (Reading)
The most recent reports from our representative at Moscow
indicate that the attitude of the Bolshevists on the question of
intervention has undergone a marked change. If we can accept the
assurances given by Trotsky and Mr. Lockhart’s interpretation of Trotsky’s views, the
government at Moscow is no longer unwilling to see action by an
Allied force in Russia operating through Vladivostok and under
Japanese command, subject to the provision that the integrity
and independence of Russia are properly guaranteed. The
principal difficulty from the Russian viewpoint now therefore
seems to be that it is impossible for the Bolshevist government
to take any open steps against Germany until they have
sufficient strength to enable them to make some kind of
resistance against the German armies: that without help from the
Allies it is impossible for them to be strong enough for this:
that the Allies wish for an invitation before helping them and
that an invitation from the Bolshevists would constitute an
overt action against Germany on their part. The immediate
problem therefore is to discover some means of circumventing
this deadlock.
The second problem is to reach an understanding with Japan
relative to the operations in which it will be necessary for
them to play the principal part and as to the strength of the
forces which should be employed. We are of opinion that the aim
of the military operations should not be less than that of
driving out the Central powers from Russian territory. As
regards the numbers of troops to be put in the field, the
Russian military authorities consider that, in view of the
support which would no doubt be afforded by the elements in
Russia hostile to Germany and of the decreasing power of the
enemy, an army of from 250,000 to 300,000 men would suffice.
It is, however, clear that until the policy of intervention has
been completely accepted by the United States, we can do nothing
with the Japanese Government. It is unnecessary for me again to
indicate the arguments in favour of intervention with which you
are familiar, but since our last communication the statements of
the Bolshevist authorities have been far more in favour of
intervention than before, and we have also information which
appears to indicate that the desire for peace which is now
strong in Austria might be made still stronger if it was found
that the eastern frontiers of Austria have not been made secure
by the collapse of Russia.
