File No. 861.00/1464½
The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State
Mr. Secretary of State: Referring to the notes which I have previously had the honor to address to your excellency on the subject [Page 110] of a Japanese action in Siberia, and in particular to that of the 14th [12th?]1 of last month, I deem it my duty to let you know that fresh and highly important information on that question has just come to me from my Government.
The French naval attaché at Tokyo received word from the Japanese General Staff that by reason of the murder of three Japanese merchants in Vladivostok by Maximalists or Russian brigands it had been decided to land two companies of seamen at that port.
On the other hand, according to the same information, the Bolshevik troops which drove back the Russian General Semenov have been reinforced first by 4,000 prisoners and two guns and quite recently by 5,900 prisoners armed with 24 machine guns and 10 field guns. Six trains carrying prisoners to the east passed through Chita between the 28th of March and the 2d of April. The Cossacks and Chinese troops on the border could not withstand an attack.
There were 1,800 prisoners at Irkutsk in the early days of March; they now number 6,000 and more than 10,000 are on the way to that city. One thousand cars, a large quantity of rifles and ammunition and military automobiles have also been brought there.
According to a Russian officer 60 trains of prisoners from the west are now on their way to Irkutsk. One carrying arms has just arrived there. Arrangements have been made to organize two army corps consisting of Austro-German prisoners.
The Japanese General Staff looked as ready to act as ever to our naval attaché; but public opinion seems to be wavering and opposition to the expedition grows as the resistance to be met looms more serious. As for the Government it still holds its decision contingent on the United States Government’s adhesion and promise of financial and industrial support.
In the opinion of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic these reports are worthy of very earnest consideration. The Japanese, with their excellent means of obtaining intelligence and clear-headedness, furnish us with data which are considered by my Government to be extremely grave. Consequently the longer the intervention which continues to be the one effective mode of action is delayed, the more difficult will it be of execution, while its purpose will be thereby impaired.
The various reports at hand indicate that Japan regards it as its duty to start to-day in Vladivostok an action of a personal character in the defense of its own interests, without any guarantee to the Allies or Russia; this would seem to be a departure that may draw it away from us and nearer to the Germans.
[Page 111]Nothing final has yet happened, however, and encouragement from the United States would make it possible to carry out the plan, with its attendant pledges and guarantees, which the British Ambassador and I have taken the liberty of most urgently commending to the approval of the United States Government.
The American, French and Italian Ambassadors assembled at Vologda are under the impression that the Maximalists themselves might be induced to accept the Japanese intervention which the Ambassadors admit is necessary to combat Germany and make a reorganization of Russia possible. The Maximalists’ call on the Allied military missions for their aid in reconstituting a Russian army is from that viewpoint a significant symptom, notwithstanding the precautions and reservations with which the suggestion ought to be received. After consultation the three Ambassadors with the assistance of their military advisers and of Captain Garstin of the British Army drew up on the 3d of this month an official statement, the text of which was no doubt directly sent to your excellency1 but which, for greater safety, I deem it my duty to reproduce hereinbelow. That paper, of a very confidential character, runs as follows:
The three Ambassadors have unanimously found:
- (1)
- That Japanese intervention is more than ever necessary to combat Germany;
- (2)
- That it will only work its full effect if it bears the character of an inter-Allied participation and if the Bolshevik government is prevailed on to accept it, as grave risks would otherwise be taken;
- (3)
- That Allied personalities who have access to Trotsky are under the impression that he could probably be induced to accept Japanese intervention;
- (4)
- That the Ambassadors have deemed it expedient to maintain, by reason of those facts, the adhesion on principle given by the heads of missions and military attaches to cooperation in organizing the Russian army against Germany with the reservation that final adhesion will be put off until the drafts of decrees shall have been examined.
Informal negotiations will be entered into with a view to obtaining guarantees as to the true disposition of the Bolshevik government toward the Allies.
These guarantees will consist in the acceptance of Japanese intervention and the granting to the Allied citizens and subjects of at least the same advantages, privileges and indemnities granted by Russia to German subjects by the Brest treaty of peace.
On the other hand the detailed reports received from Colonel Pichon [Page 112] by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic show that a Siberian government which would restore order with the desired help of Japanese troops could easily be constituted. According to that high officer Russian opinion abroad and even in Russia has made considerable headway in that direction and would quite cheerfully accept the coming of the Japanese if preceded by a categorical declaration of the Allies and accompanied by an American representation.
There is no doubt that a cooperation of the United States even though it were purely nominal in the contemplated action would assume in the eyes of the Russians a capital importance as being the token of the absence of any intention that did not harmonize with their interests. To the Japanese it would stand as the best confirmation of that American approval without which the Mikado’s Government, until it just now took the purely local measure at Vladivostok where it acted furthermore in concert with the English, has refused to take any broad action.
The events that are unfolding along our front are continually showing how timely such a diversion would prove in every respect, for from all the information that comes to us it appears that the Central Empires, which are preparing a renewed effort against our troops, are in position to draw from the eastern front several hundred thousand men if they foresee no danger on that side. Now no such danger can come to them from the demobilized Russian troops or the Russian people who thrown on their own resources will remain absolutely passive, whereas they might be led to react if they felt that a powerful military force stood ready to come to their assistance. The experience of the first few months has shown to Russia what she is to expect from the Germans and there is ground for a hope that she would rally if tangible succor were extended to her.
It seems to my Government, in any event, that the attempt should be made by all means and I am instructed by it again to point out to your excellency the importance and urgency of immediately adopting measures to which, owing to the existing circumstances, the American Ambassador to Russia has just adhered. From all that we hear they will be adopted without a doubt if President Wilson so wills, and the Government of the Republic would be most grateful to him if he would, taking these new considerations into account, consent to reexamine the question with a view to the earliest possible solution.
Be pleased to accept [etc.]
- Ante, p. 75.↩
- See telegram No. 69, Apr. 4, from the Ambassador in Russia, vol. i, p. 493.↩