File No. 861.00/3478
The Ambassador in Great Britain ( Page) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 30, 6.18 a.m.]
8090. The Foreign Office has given me the following memorandum:
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the United States Ambassador and has the honour to transmit herewith for his excellency’s confidential information a copy of a memorandum regarding policy of the Allies in Russia which was agreed to at the conference held at Paris on the 22d instant.
Foreign Office, December 28, 1917.
Circulated to the King and War Cabinet
Memorandum Prepared for Lord Milner and Lord R. Cecil on Suggested Policy in Russia and Accepted by M. Clemenceau and M. Pichon on December 22, 1917
At Petrograd we should at once get into relations with the Bolsheviki through unofficial agents, each country as seems best to it.
We propose to send Sir George Buchanan on leave for reasons of health but we shall keep a Chargé d’Affaires there. We do not suggest that our allies should follow our example. Sir George Buchanan’s long residence in Petrograd has indelibly associated him in the minds of the Bolsheviki with the policy of the Cadets and he stands to them for much the same as, say, M. Milyukov.
We should represent to the Bolsheviki that we have no desire to take part in any way in the internal politics of Russia and that any idea that we favour a counter-revolution is a profound mistake. Such a policy might be attractive to the autocratic governments and Austria but not to the western democracies or America. But we feel it necessary to keep in touch as far as we can with the Ukraine, the Cossacks, Finland, Siberia, the Caucasus, etc., because these various semiautonomous provinces represent a very large proportion of the strength of Russia. In particular we feel bound to befriend the Ukraine since upon the Ukraine depends the feeding of the Rumanians to whom we are bound by every obligation of honour. As for the war, we should carefully refrain from any word or act counter to [sic] condoning the treachery of the Russians in opening peace negotiations with our enemies but we should continually repeat [Page 331] our readiness to accept the principles of self-determination and this includes that of no annexation or indemnities. We should present [impress] on the Bolsheviki the importance of not being satisfied with empty phrases from the Germans and point out that unless they get specific undertakings from them as to such questions as Poland, Bohemia, the Rumanian parts of Transylvania, not to speak of Alsace-Lorraine and the Trentino, they will get nothing. Meanwhile their powers of resistance are melting away and they will soon be, if they are not now, at the mercy of the German Kaiser who will then snap his fingers at all their fine phrases and impose on them any terms he pleases. They should be told that it is now probably too late to do anything to save the personnel of the army but the material of the artillery can still be preserved and at the very least it should not be transferred to our enemies to be used against the western democracies. Most important of all, the Bolsheviki should prevent if they can the wheat districts of Russia, such as the Ukraine, falling into the control of or being made available for the Central powers. This makes another reason why we are anxious to support and strengthen the Ukraine and why we urge on the Bolsheviki that far from trying to coerce the Ukrainians they should enter into close cooperation with them in southern Russia. Our principal object must be, if we can, to save Rumania. Next we must aim at preventing Russian supplies from reaching Germany. Finally we are bound to protect, if possible, the remnant of the Armenians not only in order to safeguard the flank of our Mesopotamian forces in Persia and the Caucasus, but also because an Armenian union, if possible with a Georgian autonomous or independent state, is the only barrier against the development of a Turanian movement that will extend from Constantinople to China and will provide Germany with a seaport of even greater danger to the peace of the world than the control of the Baghdad Railway.
If we could induce the southern Russian armies to resume the fight, that would be very desirable, but it is probably impossible to secure these objects. The first thing is money to reorganize the Ukraine, to pay the Cossacks and Caucasian forces. … The sums required are not, as things go, very enormous but the exchange presents great difficulties. If the French could undertake the finance of the Ukraine, we might find the money for the others. It is understood that the United States will assist.
Besides finance, it is important to have agents and officers to advise and support the provincial governments and their armies. It is essential that this should be done as quickly [quietly] as possible so as to avoid the imputation as far as we can that we are preparing to make war on the Bolsheviki.
We would suggest that the Ukraine should be again in this matter (dealt with?) by the French while we would take the other southeast provinces. A general officer from each country would be appointed to take charge of our respective activities but they would, of course, keep in the closest touch with one another through carefully selected liaison officers in order to ensure the utmost unity of action.
It is for consideration whether we should facilitate the return to southern Russia of the numerous Russian officers at present in France and England.
Paris, 22 December 1917.