File No. 763.72/7956

The Special Representative ( House) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

For the President:

Mr. Balfour and I [had] a conference last night. This morning he has prepared this despatch to send to the British Ambassador at Petrograd provided that his Government will agree:

I gather from your reports that the present provisional government at Petrograd has, without consulting the Allies, requested the enemy to grant an armistice on the Russian front. It is well aware that this is contrary to Russia’s treaty with her allies but they argue, it seems, that inasmuch as the treaty was concluded while the autocracy was still in power it can have no binding force on the democracy which has succeeded it. I doubt whether this doctrine, inconsistent as it clearly is with any kind of stability in international agreements, will commend itself to a Russian government which can claim with justice to represent the Russian people. But, in formally repudiating it, His Majesty’s Government desire to say that it is not by an appeal to treaties however binding that they desire to induce an unwilling ally any longer to contribute its share to the common effort. They base their claims on deeper principles accepted to the full by the provisional government itself. According to your report the peace which the latter desires is a democratic peace; a peace which accords with the wishes of the smaller and weaker nations; which repudiates the idea of squeezing plunder out of conquered enemies under the name of war indemnities; or adding by force of arms reluctant populations to great empires. This, speaking broadly, is also the kind of peace which His Majesty’s Government desire to see secured for the world; and they have always expressed their willingness to discuss the details of the Allied war aims in the light of these general principles. But evidently this policy cannot be effectively carried out until Russia has established a stable government acceptable to the Russian people, a consummation which has not been reached. In the meanwhile you are at liberty to point out, should you think it expedient, that the very worst way of obtaining the sort of peace which the provisional government and His Majesty’s Government alike desire is the method which the provisional government appears to have adopted. The provisional government puts its trust in an immediate armistice which it hopes will be followed by a satisfactory agreement: the Allies desire that a satisfactory general agreement may be reached (in general harmony with their declared aims) to be followed of course by an armistice. By which method are our objects most likely to be gained? When arms have failed rhetoric is not likely to succeed. So far as His Majesty’s Government are aware of, no responsible German statesman has ever said a word indicating agreement either with the ideals of the provisional [Page 257] government or with the Allied declaration of policy. Their attitude is not likely to become more accommodating nor will Russian aims be nearer of accomplishment if the Russian Army is permitted to become negligible as a fighting force. The only peace which could be secured by substituting argument for action is one which would be neither democratic nor durable nor Russian. It would be German and imperialistic.

Edward House