File No. 763.72119/1856½
The Russian Ambassador ( Bakhmeteff ) to the Secretary of State 1
In regard to the present conditions, I am guided by the following considerations:
Notwithstanding the fact that the government of Lenin, which has seized power through violence, can in no way be considered as representative of the Russian people, his proposal of an armistice to the Allies should not be left without answer, because the declining of the Allies to express themselves on the question of peace and war would only strengthen the Bolsheviki in their efforts to create in Russia hostile feeling towards the Allies. An identical result would be reached by a formal protest of the Allies against the actions of Lenin and in general by threats, which could only deteriorate the conditions and help the Bolsheviki to carry out extreme decisions, which, although not legally binding for the Russian people, in their essence would be of irreparable character to the cause of Russia and the Allies. It seems on the contrary necessary to approach the position of Russia in its acute reality, and analyzing the true causes of the success of the Bolsheviki, to strain all endeavors to formulate such theses concerning the question of war and peace which would contribute to the enforcement in the popular feeling in Russia of the necessity of all possible efforts for the continuation of war with the Allies and which thereby would undermine in substance and not only formally the success of the Bolshevism. In this respect, it seems at present especially propitious for the Allies to formulate in their answer their conception of the basis of a just and democratic peace as the aims of the war. It should be clearly formulated why the unrelinquished endeavors to such a peace and the great efforts made thereto could receive incurable damage if a truce was made, thereby removing the attainment of the desired aims. The main point is [Page 255] that, by their answer, the Allies must deprive the Bolsheviki of any possibility to throw upon the Allies the responsibility of impeding the conclusion at the present moment of such a democratic peace. On the contrary, in their answer the Allies should clearly lay the whole weight of such responsibility on the German people, from whom the world’s democracy is obliged to await the first active steps directed towards the liquidation of war and which are to testify the real desire of the German people to enter into the circle of democratic nations. As a wise basis of such a declaration appears the formula emphasized by President Wilson in his reply to the Pope’s peace proposal. At the same time so as to avoid interpretation of this answer as a formal recognition of the Bolsheviki government, the reply of the Allies could be realized in the form of declarations of Prime Ministers or as a proclamation to the Russian people. The answer is to be made in the most definite expressions as only resolute politics can paralyze the work of the Bolsheviki and allow to gain the time indispensable for the rallying of constructive democratic elements in Russia.
- Note in the margin of MS.: “Handed to F[rank] L[yon] P[olk] by Russian Ambassador (his views to Paris).” This paper was probably handed to Mr. Polk, Counselor for the Department of State, early in December 1917.↩