File No. 763.72119/886
The Special Agent in Corfu ( Dodge) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 11.]
Sir: I have the honor to report that Mr. Pashitch, President of the Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has been absent since my arrival here, returned to Corfu on the 12th instant and received me to-day. In the course of our conversation, which lasted about one hour, Mr. Pashitch made some statements which may be of interest to the Department.
[Page 234]Mr. Pashitch began by requesting me to convey to my Government an expression of his pleasure that it had sent a representative to reside near the Serbian Government: Serbia was a democracy like the United States in many ways and the relations of the two countries were bound to become closer in the future, especially when Serbia obtained seaports. He trusted that a separate American Legation might always be maintained to Serbia. He also appreciated highly the financial help which the United States was giving to Serbia, which would prove of such immense benefit to her people. He referred to the fact that Bulgaria had until recently refused to give any information regarding her Serbian prisoners but now showed a disposition to do so: like Mr. Nintchitch, Mr. Pashitch attributed this new attitude largely to anxiety on the part of Bulgaria caused by the entrance of the United States into the war.
The question of the Serbian Government’s removal to Salonica, which had remained unsettled for so long, was about to be decided in the affirmative, although on account of the great damage caused there by the recent fire, it might be necesssary for the Government first to stop some weeks at Volos. (about 100 miles northwest of Athens). It was important that the Prince Regent and the Government should all be together in order to facilitate consultation and also so as to encourage the Serbian Army. The army at the front and in and about Salonica now numbered about 130,000 men altogether, with however only about 26,000 effectives actually on the firing line. The troops were feeling the effects of five years of fighting, of their situation as exiles, and of their families being in want and oppressed by a foreign occupation of their country: their morale had become greatly lowered but recent reports received showed that it had somewhat improved. It would still further improve when the entire Government was established at Salonica.
Mr. Pashitch then referred to his visits to Paris, London and Rome and said that I might inform my Government that he had been greatly gratified by his reception at these capitals and at the statements made to him by the leading French, British, and Italian statesmen. There could no longer be any question that the Allies would push the war to a victorious conclusion and that Serbia would be restored.
I am informed that Mr. Pashitch had a long and private conference with the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs Baron Sonnino. As to this portion of his trip, and the possibility of an agreement with Italy, Mr. Pashitch said that both the Governments of Great Britain and France had urged the Serbian and Italian Governments to come to an understanding and that the latter Government now appeared inclined to do so: he thought that it would be possible to [Page 235] reach an agreement in the future. However the matter was an extremely delicate one and public opinion in Italy would have to be prepared. It was already somewhat more sympathetic. The pro-German and Irredentist press was a danger and would take advantage of any concessions made by Italy to attack the Italian Government. Also the Italian Government was always referring to the territorial advantages which had formerly been promised to them by the Allies. The Italian statesmen spoke of the necessity of Italy’s controlling the Adriatic for her own protection. He did not like this point of view but considered that the protection of Italy would be better secured by an arrangement which would eliminate so far as possible the causes of friction and content the peoples concerned. Italy would never have anything to fear from Serbia even if united with Croatia and Slavonia. However he was prepared to allow Italy to have Valona, Pola, Trieste, “if she wished it,” and certain strategic points on the Dalmatian islands. This would give Italy every guarantee of preponderance in the Adriatic. The Adriatic must however remain open to Serbia and all other nations; it could not become an Italian mare clausum. He added that he thought that the entrance of the United States into the war and President Wilson’s proclamation of the right of all peoples freely to dispose of themselves had exercised a considerable influence in making Italy more willing to come to an agreement with Serbia.
Mr. Pashitch finally referred at some length to the future of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, stating that so long as it existed it must continue to be under direct German influence. Moreover whatever concessions it might consent to give through stress of circumstances to the Slav races within its borders, these would prove in the future as in the past wholly illusory: this would be the case even if Austria-Hungary granted to them complete autonomy. If autonomy were granted, foreign policy and the Army would remain in the Austrian Emperor’s control and would therefore be directly controlled by Germany. He considered the liquidation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to be the only solution, in which case, in accordance with President Wilson’s views, all the races composing the Empire would be given an opportunity to dispose freely of themselves. The Jugoslav peoples would then undoubtedly unite themselves to Serbia, Galicia would join Poland, the Czechs and Slovaks would form an independent state as would also Hungary, deprived however of its Rumanian population which would unite with Rumania. This would only leave the German provinces of Upper and Lower Austria, the original possessions of the House of Hapsburg, which would remain an independent state or enter the German Empire. This accretion of strength to the German Empire would be almost exactly [Page 236] compensated by the loss to France of Alsace-Lorraine, to Denmark of Schleswig-Holstein and to Poland of the Polish provinces of Prussia.
Germany would thus be completely surrounded by a barrier of democratic commonwealths which would have every reason for allying themselves together politically and economically against her until she also was forced to adopt a truly democratic and responsible form of government. Mr. Pashitch intimated that this solution of the Austro-Hungarian problem was one which the Italian Government also considered favorably. I may add in this connection that my Italian colleague here appears to be strongly in favor of an agreement between his country and Serbia which he states that he considers quite possible. He would seem to be somewhat anxious lest, in the absence of such an agreement, it may be possible for Austria-Hungary to make some agreement with her Jugoslav subjects which will make them satisfied to remain in the Empire. He lays considerable stress upon the differences between the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the two last being peoples of advanced civilization with prosperous industrial interests, while the Serbs, although a fine race, are extremely primitive and exclusively peasant-farmers. He, as well as others who know all three races well, express doubt as to whether they could unite happily in a single state and even whether the majority of the Croatian and Slovene peoples really desire such a union.
In ending I may mention, also in this connection, that a Serbian military mission, headed by General Vassitch, has recently visited Italy, ostensibly to present certain decorations to Italian officers. They appear to have been extremely well received and were taken to the Carso front. They also participated at a ceremony in Home in honor of the Italian dead at which the better understanding between Italy and Serbia was mentioned by the official speakers.
I have [etc.]