File No. 763.72/6990
The Chargé in Rumania ( Andrews) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 25.]
Sir: I have the honor to report on the present situation of the unoccupied portion of Roumania as follows:
Three weeks ago a concerted offensive was taken by the Roumanian forces and all such portion of Russian forces as could be persuaded [Page 211] or coerced into action. The German lines were known and proved to be very thin and it would have been an easy matter to pass far down into Wallachia had the conduct of the Russian troops in Galicia and Bukovina not necessitated the stoppage of the offensive here. The élan of the Roumanian Army reconstituted, reequipped and refreshed, has been the admiration of every one, but it still remains true that the soldiers are superior as soldiers than their officers as officers. They have not received the support which they had the right to expect from the Russians in Moldavia and as they are not numerous enough to form reserves for themselves they have been and are enduring constant fighting without rest.
When the unfortunate development on the Russian front in Galicia became known, and that the fact of the Russian offensive in Moldavia was very spotted, while numerous regiments declined to fight at all, the Germans assumed on their part a violent offensive in Moldavia along the whole line, but especially at Maresti and Tecuci which are situated in the southwestern part of Moldavia, in order to cut the railway line which is in the form of an extended loop and which brings supplies, munitions, etc., to that considerable portion of the front. The trains run down the western side of the loop and turn at Tecuci and come back empty to Jassy by the eastern side of the loop. For eight days and seven nights, until yesterday, an uninterrupted battle took place at the point Maresti—approximately seven Roumanian divisions against nine divisions of the Central powers, the greatest battle ever fought in Roumania. The ceasing of this battle was caused by utter fatigue on both sides as well as possible scarcity of ammunition on the German side.
It can not be known whether the German offensive against Roumania has been with a desire to secure the possession of the remaining portion of the Roumanian Kingdom or as a great demonstration to draw Russian troops from the north or as a means of exhausting the supplies and lessening the military spirit of the Roumanians and Russians in order to secure a long tranquillity on this front.
Were the Germans to break through to any considerable extent at one or more points it might make it extremely difficult for the Diplomatic Corps and the Roumanian officials to get into Russia although Jassy is so near the Russian frontier. Some hundreds of thousands of Russian troops in this part of Moldavia would probably stampede, choking and blocking all the trains and roads making it physically impossible to get out either by railroad or by motor or even on horseback. Hence the Roumanian Government, although there is still a good chance of the line holding and of it being possible to remain in the country, does not dare risk having the Diplomatic Corps and the Government here in case of a defeat. Negotiation [Page 212] and plans for removing the Diplomatic Corps are being reported by my telegram No. 117.1 The general scheme at this writing is that all the personnel, records and baggage of the various legations shall go to Kherson on Tuesday or Wednesday next, leaving only the chief of each mission with a secretary and a servant to remain here and await military developments.
The four great powers who were signatories of the convention under which Roumania entered the war insisted on remaining as they feel obliged to remain until the last in order to ensure the Roumanian Government adhering to the terms of the treaty of destroying all the supplies of use to the enemy; that this burning up of all the grain is a practical guarantee of the starvation of the Roumanian peasants and people is not a matter with which they concern themselves.
A notice from the Minister of Foreign Affairs had been sent to each legation on August 11 stating that the personnel of the various legations as well as the Roumanian Ministry for Foreign Affairs would go to Kherson, Russia, at the end of this week. When I learned of the determination of the Ministers of the four great powers, now allies of the United States, to remain on at Jassy, I informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister that I considered it would be the wish of my Government that I remain on also although the United States was not a signatory of the treaty above mentioned, because in principle the United States would not wish its representative in abandoning the country to do otherwise than those of the four great powers; that while the reason for the Ministers of the four great powers in not leaving until the last moment while the other representatives went in advance was sufficient explanation here, it would not explain to the world in general why whereas the representatives of the four great powers stayed at their posts until the last day possible the representative of the United States had left early; that in general it had always been the feeling of the American Government that its representative should be among the last to leave a post of danger—not among the first. His Excellency thereupon informed me that I would have to take my chance to get out under unpleasant conditions, probably in a third-class carriage, and that I could not be given the accommodations that the other signatory Ministers of the treaty would obtain. I replied that there were worse things than riding in a third-class railway carriage and I would take my chances. He then said that if I would write a letter to him that the United States would adhere to the treaty he would place me upon the same footing as the other Ministers. I replied that while I had no doubt that the United States felt an entire solidarity with the Roumanian Government, its ally, I could [Page 213] not possibly write him such a letter or commit my Government in any way without its authority. I then took my leave. …
Last night the Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, sent a functionary to inform me that His Excellency understood my position and that he had therefore determined on a change of the entire program, which he thought would also be agreeable to the chiefs of missions of the non-signatory powers; that is to say, the little powers with whom he had endeavored to oblige me to leave—Greece, Belgium, Servia, etc. This new plan is that each chief of mission may remain with one secretary and one servant; all the other personnel of each legation together with their records, baggage, etc., shall be sent next Tuesday or Wednesday to Kherson, Russia, in advance. This very reasonable solution is apparently acceptable to every one and will probably be carried out. …
The military situation is expected to be resolved within three weeks and we hope it will be possible to remain on at Jassy. The situation in which the Roumanian nation finds itself is truly tragic. It is now known definitely that they were betrayed under the old Russian régime; and they are the victims of the new with its lack of military discipline and condition of partial decomposition as a state.
I have [etc.]
- Received in the Department as No. 127; not printed.↩