File No. 893.00/2627
[Untitled]
Peking, June 25, 1917, 1 p.m.
Your June 19, 4 p.m. Have to submit the following considerations: The claim made by Japanese Ambassador would imply that in 1915, Secretary of State had admitted that China had ceased to be an independent State and that diplomatic relations between the United States and China could be controlled by Japan. No matter how friendly Mr. Bryan’s intentions, he could certainly not have admitted the existence of a Japanese protectorate over China at a time when China herself was successfully resisting far less radical inroads on her sovereignty. Even at present were the above claim to become known a storm of indignation would arise in China. While the European Powers have been forced through the exigencies of war to allow Japan somewhat of a free hand in China during the war, it is believed that there would be a day of reckoning should unfair advantage be taken of this opportunity. What is asked of the United States is far more than the European Powers have actually conceded, being a recognition on principle of a preferential and dominant position of Japan in China.
That such a recognition, involving abandonment of a national policy and a position gained through successful work of a hundred and thirty years, involving also the betrayal of a friendly country, should be claimed as resulting from an incidental note, shows that the Japanese are overreaching themselves in an effort to secure their object while the war lasts.
The note issued by the American Government in May, 1915, to both the Japanese and Chinese Governments negatives the implication now attempted to be fixed on the earlier note and leaves it plain that the latter could have referred only to the result of the specific concessions acquired by Japan in Manchuria and possibly to the territorial contiguity of Japan and China.
Only in this sense could a special position be recognized at that time, not in a sense of protectorate limiting freedom of diplomatic intercourse between the United States and China; and the assurance of good will toward the development of Interior [Inner] Manchuria given without quid pro quo was indeed sufficient warrant of friendship.
As the term “special position” has no definite connotation it might indeed have been used to indicate that Japan, like, for instance, Russia or Great Britain, through specific concession and contiguous territorial possessions, had certain relationships with China which give it special reasons to interest itself in developments there; that such interests were however not expected to extend to anything which [Page 78] would impair the full political sovereignty of China is abundantly clear from preceding and subsequent declarations of the American Government. In recognizing the existence of such relationships the Government of the United States at the most would indicate its good will toward the development of the specific interest involved and disavow any desire to obstruct or to raise difficulties for the neighbors of China. Revision and specification of the assurance given in this sense is certainly all that could be granted without disastrous consequences to our national interest, not to speak of vital interest of a friendly country. The United States has long since won a special position in China.
The note presented to the Chinese Government is in fullest accord with traditional American policy as directed not towards internal affairs but the maintenance of external unity and sovereignty of China. It is thus understood by all others in China.