File No. 711.5914/14
Greenland is looked on by the Danes very much as our people formerly
looked on Alaska. The Government here is so much occupied with
internal economic and political differences in Denmark that it gives
very little attention to the development of the resources of
Greenland, which is practically terra
incognita.
The position of Germany in the Far East will soon, it seems to me,
become untenable. I say this, with all due respect to the better
information and the result of experience always at hand in the
Department. It appears that if the Russian-Japanese-Chinese
combination grows, we shall badly need an ally in the Philippine
Islands.
The Russians, outside the court and the bureaucracy, insist that
their alliance with Japan is only a matter of self-defense. They say
that American and English feeling has not been with them and their
only safety is to make terms with their late opponent, Japan. The
synthesis which I am preparing for you implies nothing less than a
cession of Mindanao to Denmark, for which Denmark will give us
Greenland and (after certain pourparlers) the
Danish West Indies.
[Page 562]
(Denmark having the right to cede Mindanao to Germany in return for
Northern Schleswig.)
You may ask whether I consider this proposition feasible or not. I
can only answer, that I have been so much engaged in discovering
what is really in men’s minds over here that I have become, perhaps,
a little too concentrated to take that broad view which is a habit
with you, who are constantly facing many great questions and
therefore it would be unreasonable for me to make an answer, that
would imply a larger experience than I have.
I hold myself responsible for the analysis of the German Far East
condition, but I offer the report, which I shall send you on
Thursday, as only a synthesis of existing tendencies. I assure you
that it represents the desires and the opinion of some of the best
minds in Denmark, and some of them most highly placed. I write this,
as I have said, in advance, that in the midst of so many important
preoccupations, you may single out the coming synthesis of
suggestions for particular attention.
I shall ask for a month’s leave of absence, with permission to visit
America, in March or April, 1911, when, if the synthesis is
considered at all by the Secretary of State, I shall be very glad to
throw any light in my power upon the conditions that surround
it.
[Inclosure]
[Untitled]
If one carefully considers what has taken place in the Far East,
since the treaty of Portsmouth was concluded between Russia and
Japan in 1907, then one can not avoid seeing that Russia has
entirely altered her policy in the East, and her aim seems now
to be, in conjunction with Japan, and probably also later on
with China, to try to monopolize the political, financial and
mercantile affairs of the Far East.
The three agreements which have been concluded between Russia and
Japan since the Portsmouth treaty was signed, can not be
misunderstood; they abandon the whole of Korea, a country half
the size of Japan, to Japan, to be absorbed and digested, at
leisure, and by them Manchuria is to all intents and purposes
arranged to be the happy hunting ground of both nations until
such time when they, without great and aggressive opposition
from China, as the owner of Manchuria, and from America and
other nations, with vested rights and interest in “the open door
policy” in Manchuria, can agree upon a plan of partition of the
spoil.
If China has agreed to this partition of Manchuria, as she
doubtless in time must, unless support is given her, then her
time will have come to be accepted into the triple alliance of
the East, viz.: Russia, Japan and China; Tonquin is at present
“protected” by France, but it will surely prove impossible for
France to keep it, when Japan consents to give China free hands
there as compensation for Manchuria. On the whole, there can be
no doubt, but that the present position of France in the Far
East soon will become impossible, for she has not the surplus
population, and her sons have not the colonizing qualities which
are absolutely necessary should her stay there be lengthened.
The ancient, and, in their way, highly cultivated kingdoms in
the East, which France, without any provocation, despoiled and
oppressed through greater force and superior armament, will one
day rise against her, as Japan already has risen against
contempt and abuse, and they will be backed by a continent.
As to England, the ally of Japan, her present position seems most
difficult. She has by her support of Japan, during the war with
Russia, helped to raise the yellow race from its long lethargy
and made it aware of its own power, and she now stands perplexed
and amazed at the result she has helped to achieve. The yellow
spectre is out of the box, and can not be conjured into it
again; it now threatens to turn against its liberators and
supporters.
[Page 563]
On the other hand the enormous and important trade of England in
Korea, in Manchuria and partly in China, is threatened, so that
British merchants already are warning their Government against
the danger there lies in the action of its allies to the trade
and shipping of Great Britain in one of the most important
markets of the world.
On the other hand, Japan is the ally of England, and England
rules the Empire of India, containing about 250 millions
inhabitants, proud, clever and brave people, as yet peacefully
governed by England; but the yellow spirit is also in them
evidently awakening, and they may become troublesome. Should
they one day rise against England, as they have risen before,
and should England require assistance to maintain her supremacy,
then Japan is by treaty bound to send her excellent army to the
assistance of her ally,—an assistance which may become of vital
importance to England, both physically and morally; physically
through the fighting power of the Japanese soldier, and morally
by India’s knowing that the yellow race is keeping her in her
fetters. Placed in this dilemma, the position of England seems
difficult, for she can not give strong support to her trade and
shipping in the north-east of Asia, without crossing the plans
of her ally, and that would naturally cause ill feeling; whilst
the interest of England in India demands that the good feelings
of Japan are preserved. It is, however, not difficult to foresee
that in the meantime the power of India will prevail. There
remains then only one great European Power whose interest in
east Asia runs parallel with those of America, and that is
Germany. America and Germany are both great and industrial
countries with a rapidly increasing population, and for both
countries it is of the utmost importance that the immense market
of eastern Asia shall not be closed to their manufactures, or in
any way be interfered with, and neither of them could for a
moment tolerate a policy which eventually would exclude them
from the market of Korea and Manchuria, and weaken them in the
other markets of east Asia.
America’s position in the Far East has been immensely
strengthened by the acquisition of the Hawaii Islands and of the
Philippines; possessions which are expensive, but which are
absolutely necessary for America, in order that she through all
time may be able to maintain her position as the “Great Power”
on the Pacific, and in order that she may be able to secure for
her industries, which become of more and more importance to her
as her population increases, their due share of the great market
in east Asia.
Germany has, as already mentioned, great interests at stake in
east Asia, and these are threatened as those of the United
States, but Germany has not, as she is situated now, the same
prospect of being able to protect them in the long run as the
United States has. The only foothold which Germany has in east
Asia, where her ships and people can now seek protection is Kiao
Chou in the northeast corner of China. The place is valuable
enough under present circumstances but the territory is very
small and is rented from China under a yearly lease. The time,
however, will come when the “lease” will expire and the China of
that time may refuse to renew the lease, and what then? In a
very short time China will become a very important military
power and to defend Kiao Chou against her, surrounded as it is
on all sides by Chinese territory, would require enormous
preparations and fortifications and soldiers out of all
proportion to the size of the place. And still it is an absolute
necessity for Germany to have a place in the Far East where she
can safeguard her vital interests in the East, and where her
people and ships can rely upon finding shelter and protection in
time of trouble; but for these purposes her colonies in New
Guinea and her other islands are too distant.
It seems that the interests of America and Germany are the same
in eastern Asia, where neither of them wish to encroach on the
territory of the natives, but where both of them wish to keep
the “open door” and the “fair faced policy” in force. It seems
only natural that, if these two countries came to an
understanding with regard to the protection of their common
interests, back to back, they would represent a force great and
powerful enough to secure quiet and peaceful developments of
affairs in east Asia.
Some few years ago England gave back to China, of her own accord,
and to the great satisfaction of China, the harbor of Waihaiwai,
which England had rented from China for use as a naval station,
in the same way as Germany holds Kiao Chou.
If Germany were to do the same before her lease expires and give
Kiao Chou back to China, it would surely do much to establish
confidence and create the most friendly relations between
Germany and China and it will save Germany much trouble and
immense expense in the future.
[Page 564]
But in order for Germany to be able to do this, it would be
necessary for her to acquire another place, where she, with
advantage and security could establish herself and where she
could remain in undisturbed and undisputed possession.
For this purpose the southern group of the Philippines,
consisting of the Islands of Mindanao, Palauan and some small
islands south of these, would seem to be eminently suitable.
These islands are about 35,000 English square miles in area and
very fertile and prosperous. They have good harbors and a
central position in east Asia, and they would form a most
excellent basis for a strong German position in the East, not
too far away for mutual support from the great naval station
which America is establishing at Manila.
Being islands and large enough to support themselves, the
southern group of the Philippines would be easy of defence and
of administration, and as they have never belonged to any of the
sovereign natives of Asia, neither China nor Japan, nor any
other Asiatic Power has any claim on them. If the southern group
of the Philippines therefore could be acquired in a friendly
way, from the present possessors of them, they could be held in
security and safety forever by Germany as her station in the
East.
The southern group of the Philippines, as well as the rest of the
Philippines, however, are in the possession of the United States
of America.
If, however, the United States should be of the opinion that it
would be to her own interest and in the interest of the peace of
the East and in the Pacific, that Germany should work hand in
hand with her in east Asia, the following proposal could,
perhaps, be acceptable to both countries and form a basis for an
arrangement, whereby the interest of America as well as of
Germany would be benefited, and whereby also, all tension,
friction and unfriendly feeling between Germany and Denmark,
consequent upon the last war, could be brought to a satisfactory
and permanent conclusion.
The proposal is:
- 1.
- That Denmark should surrender to the United States of
America all her enormous possessions in Greenland,
estimated to be more than 800,000 English square miles
in area.
- 2.
- The United States of America should in return give
over to Denmark the southern group of the Philippines,
consisting of the Islands of Mindanao, Palauan and the
small islands south of these.
- 3.
- Denmark should then surrender to Germany all her
rights to the southern group of the Philippines as she
received them from America.
- 4.
- Germany should then in return for the southern group
of the Philippines, give back to Denmark that part of
the province of Schleswig which lies north of a line
along the middle of “Slien,” along Dannevirke to
“Trenen,” following that river to where it joins
“Eideren” and then following that river to the point
where it flows into the North Sea.
That part of the province of Schleswig to be given back to
Denmark would comprise about 2,400 English square miles, or only
about 1/15 part of the area of the islands of the southern group
of the Philippines to be surrendered to Germany by Denmark.
The possession of Denmark in Greenland to be ceded to the United
States would exceed more than 30 times the area of the islands
of the southern group of the Philippines, that is to say, that
Denmark would in exchange for the above-mentioned part of the
province of Schleswig, give territory in Greenland of over 300
times larger an area.
Or, in other words, Denmark would, in exchange for a part of
Schleswig, only 2,400 English square miles in area, give to
America territory in Greenland as large as about one-fourth of
the total area of the United States of America, or a territory
as large as the whole of Mexico, or about 2½ times the size of
Alaska.
