Minister Swenson to the Secretary of State
Copenhagen, December 21, 1901.
Sir: In my cablegram of the 18th instant, relative to the signature of the treaty, for the cession of the Danish West Indies, I reported that the Rigsdag proposes to submit the question of sale to a vote in the islands; and that the Minister of Foreign Affairs might yield to such demands.
When I called on Mr. Deuntzer, on Wednesday, to urge the desirability of having the treaty signed before the Senate adjourned for the holidays, he informed me that the Rigsdag appeared to be yielding to the popular demand for a plebiscite; and that he was under such pressure from that quarter that he would, in all probability feel constrained to give his consent.
It was especially the Landsthing, which is controlled by the opposition, that he feared. The dominant party in that body was striking a popular chord by protesting against selling Danish citizens “as cattle”; and, what was more, it had it in its power to reject a treaty without the desired stipulation and this would, perhaps, be done. He asked my opinion on the subject, and inquired if I thought it likely that my Government would accept a proposal for a plebiscite. I told him, politely, that the treaty had been agreed upon by the two Governments; that the Danish Foreign Office had desired to examine the text as accepted by the Secretary of State, pledging itself to cable Mr. Brim full power to sign the document as soon as it had been verified, and that Mr. Hay, in consequence, considered the negotiations ended, and nothing wanting but the formality of signing. I further called his excellency’s attention to the fact that at no time during the negotiations had the Danish Government proposed—leave alone insisted on—a plebiscite; that, on the contrary, the Minister for Foreign Affairs had, in a note to me, expressly mentioned the fact that no vote was expected; and that the Rigsdag, which had been consulted at every step, had not even intimated that it desired such a stipulation inserted in the proposed treaty. As for the political considerations and the fear of the Landsthing, I remarked that the opposition [Page 503] had initiated the negotiations, continued them through two ministries, and consented to far less favorable terms—no plebiscite ever having been demanded—than those now obtained by the party in power. These circumstances, I thought, made it highly improbable that the Landsthing would assume the responsibility of rejecting the treaty, thereby indirectly pledging itself to voting extraordinary appropriations for the improvement of the islands, especially inasmuch as a large majority in that branch is understood to favor the sale in order to relieve the Danish Treasury of the continual drain caused by the annual deficit in the colonial budget; and inasmuch as the sale is advocated by the larger part of the Danish people. Mr. Deuntzer agreed with me, except as to the improbability of adverse action by the Landsthing. He was not so sure that the Right would not consider it a good opportunity to play him a “political trick”. He also feared that the King was inclined to consider the demand for a plebiscite as reasonable.
However, he was to meet with the Finance Committee of the Folkething that evening, and he would advise against a plebiscite, both because he did not favor it personally and because he considered my objections against introducing new subjects at this stage in the negotiations as weighty and as well taken.
At the meeting held in the evening, he prevailed upon the Finance Committee to take his view of the matter and to pledge its support to the ratification of the treaty as drafted.
Notwithstanding this action, fifteen Folkething members of the Ministerial party succeeded in having a secret meeting of the Rigsdag members of the Left called for the following evening—Thursday—for the purpose of discussing what attitude the Government party ought to assume in respect to a plebiscite.
Some fifty members attended this meeting, which did not adjourn till after eleven o’clock. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was present. Most of the speakers expressed the opinion that the party could not afford to ignore the popular clamour for a vote in the islands.
The Schleswig question was referred to; it being said that the Danes would justly be accused of inconsistency and lack of patriotism if they parted with the West Indies without consulting the wishes of the inhabitants. They could not thereafter complain of Germany’s conduct towards Schleswig. A demand that was so fair and reasonable could not be disregarded with impunity. A precedent had been established in 1867. The royal proclamation of that year had committed the King and the Government to a plebiscite as a condition for an eventual sale. No party could afford to incur the odium of reversing history on this point.
Even if the United States Government would not give its assent to the proposed treaty stipulation, the Danish Government ought to call an election independent of treaty provisions, in order that the Rigsdag might be guided by the result, when the question of ratification came up. About twenty members expressed themselves as above. Many others informed Mr. Deuntzer—privately—that they shared the views of the speakers. A large part of the press of Copenhagen and the provinces is agitating in the same vein.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs said to me yesterday that he was tired of the whole business; and that he did not know what to do. He wished my Government could see its way clear to agreeing to a [Page 504] plebiscite, either by treaty stipulation or independent of treaty, and thus extricate him from the embarrassing position in which he found himself. He again expressed apprehension lest the Landsthing might withhold its sanction to a sale without plebiscite. Yet, if Mr. Hay insisted on it, he declared himself willing to have the treaty signed in its present form, unless the King should interpose his objection, which he thought possible. I told him that I had nothing to add to what I had said in my previous interview, but that I would earnestly request that he communicate with Mr. Brun by cable, so that the signature might take place without unnecessary delay. I reminded him that the Senate would resume its sessions shortly after the holidays and that the treaty ought to be transmitted to that body immediately after its reconvening. I inquired if the subject had been discussed in the Council of State that day—yesterday—, and was told that the King had asked about the status of the negotiations. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had informed him that a résumé of the correspondence between the two Governments and an account of such other matter as had a bearing on the subject was being prepared, and would soon be submitted to His Majesty. Thus you see that it is quite impossible to secure as early action as we had hoped, and had been given reason to expect. I am unable to say when the formalities and conferences will come to an end. The Rigsdag has adjourned for the holidays; and both houses will not be in session again before January 10.
I shall leave no stone unturned to gain our point.
As to the danger of having the treaty rejected by the Landsthing, in the event of no plebiscite, I can not believe that any such danger exists. If it does, the sentiment must have changed incredibly much within the last few days.
From official information furnished the Foreign Office by the Governor of the Danish West Indies, it appears that a large majority of the inhabitants would vote for a transfer to the United States. The owners of sugar plantations and the leading merchants favor the proposed cession. The official functionaries and some of the smaller merchants are opposed to it. The laboring classes are largely an unknown quantity; but it is thought that they would nearly all be influenced in favor of a sale.
The influence of the large steamship companies touching at St. Thomas would be exerted in the same direction.
On St. Croix the vote would be well-nigh unanimous for being brought under the United States flag. On St. Thomas the majority would be large.
Such is the opinion of Governor Hedeman; and the best informed persons here agree with him in this.
I have [etc.]