File No. 837.00/1138
[Untitled]
Habana, February 25, 1917—7 p.m.
In two weeks of revolution Government forces have met with no reverse. Rebels hold no towns except where federal garrisons deserted at the outset and physical condition has made it impossible to reach. Loyalty of troops now with Government seems established. Total deserters not exceed seven hundred. Expected general uprising has not taken place. The army of Gómez estimated by his friends from four to fifteen thousand has not offered fight to even one battalion of federals except at Sancti Spiritus where insurgents were punished severely.
Nevertheless in Camaguey and Oriente Provinces general transportation remains paralyzed and second largest port is in the hands of rebels. Losses to all interests are great. The President is very optimistic. All business interests gloomy. In spite of the repeatedly declared position of Government of the United States revolutionary leaders are working now as on the first days of the revolt for American intervention. Then they expected United States to take charge of partial elections. Now they depend upon such intervention relieving them from punishment for illegal acts against the Government. How far will they go to force intervention? The prediction is general they will soon turn to wholesale destruction sugar cane and mills. If that is their purpose the Cuban Government cannot with forces at its command hold the towns, keep railroads open, and at the same time run down innumerable destructive bands hiding in woods and cane fields.
Whatever said to contrary I believe three or four revolutionary leaders control policy and men, Gómez having principal voice. Next week or ten days will probably reveal what policy will be. If it is destruction of property only quick action by the United States can prevent huge material losses. If that action takes form of giving physical aid to Cuban Government it can be exerted most readily by occupying ten or twelve ports and keeping open Cuba Railway, an American corporation. This alone would offer security to hundreds of American estates. If such support is given, the earlier it comes after need is determined, the greater its moral influence, and the greater its utility in releasing Cuban troops to suppress bandits.
My own view is that Gómez, failing in force, is as likely to fly from the country as resort to destruction. But in that view I stand practically alone.