File No. 893.00/2712
Minister Reinsch to the Secretary of State
Peking, August 24, 1917.
Sir: I have the honor to report on the reception accorded the note of the American Government which, under your telegraphic instruction of June 5, I delivered to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on June 7.
In my interview with Doctor Wu Ting-fang, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on this occasion, I expressed myself with respect to the motives of the American Government in making this declaration, in, substance as follows:
Having on February 4 addressed to the Chinese Government an invitation to take action similar to that of the United States in severing relations with Germany and having under date of February 9 received the assurance that the Chinese Government fully associated itself with the action of the United States, the American Government feels morally responsible that there should be no misunderstanding as to the implications of its invitation: that the United States and all other countries engaged in war against Germany would welcome the participation of China in behalf of the rights of humanity if such participation should be prompted by the interests, the conscience [Page 101] and the sympathies of the Chinese people as manifested by their constitutionally established executive and legislative representatives; but that the Government of the United States, conceiving the war to be one for the principle of democracy, would deplore any construction of its invitation which would lend itself to the idea that it contemplates any coercion or restriction upon the freedom of action of the Chinese people in determining through their appropriate and recognized national authorities their relation towards the issues at stake in the war.
Doctor Wu Ting-fang expressed himself as highly gratified that the American Government should, at a time of great internal difficulty, show its good-will towards China, not by openly or secretly supporting one or the other party, nor seeking to draw advantage from the troubles of China, but by prominently bringing to the attention of all factions the compelling need of national unity.
Through two personal messengers, Doctor J. C. Ferguson and Roy C. Anderson, Esquire, I brought the note of the American Government directly but unofficially to the attention of the opposition leaders then assembled at Tientsin. They also acknowledged the good motives of the American Government as well as the soundness of the advice. General Tuan Chi-jui stated on this occasion that he had totally disinterested himself in all policies.
The reception of the note by the Chinese press was equally favorable. There is herewith enclosed an editorial from the Peking Gazette of June 8, on this subject.4
At this time there came an irruption of excited criticism and invective directed against the American action on the part of the Japanese press in Japan and China. The burthen of their song was that the United States should have consulted Japan before addressing the Chinese Government and that the action of the United States constituted interference in the domestic affairs of China. This matter was reported in my telegram of June 12, 8 p.m.
The Chinese press quite unanimously repudiated the Japanese claims and accusations. The translation of a characteristic editorial from the Sin-Wen Pao of June 13 is herewith enclosed.4 The general substance of such editorials was that the Chinese people welcome America’s advice and recognize its timeliness; and that as China is not a dependency of Japan, that country has no right to ask explanations.
It is my belief that the American note of June 7 will have a lasting effect upon public opinion in China. When it is sometimes stated, as it has been in some of the European papers in the Far East and in practically all of the Japanese papers, that the note produced no result, it is thereby assumed that the note was intended to strengthen the hands of a party and to produce a direct result upon the distribution of political power in China. It has, however, by this time become quite Perfectly plain and’ has been accepted by the public opinion of the far East that such was not the motive which inspired the American Government.
The permanent good effect of the note was exercised in making abundantly clear that the American Government did not desire the war issue used for the purpose of enabling any faction or party to override the general and free determinations of the Chinese Government [Page 102] and people. This has made everyone more cautions in the manner of urging the war action upon the Chinese. The effect produced by the note has been to emphasize in the minds of the Chinese of all parties and of all provinces the primary importance of subordinating all other wishes to the maintenance of national unity and of representative institutions. In this way the note has contributed and will continue to contribute towards strengthening Chinese nationalism and the desire for an efficient and representative central government.
From all directions has come testimony upon the good effects of the American note. The Consul General at Canton, the political centre of the South, reports, “The note presented by the American Government to the Chinese Government deploring the internal dissension in China and urging the necessity for national unity was warmly welcomed by the Cantonese officials and press.”
In a conversation which I had with President Feng Kuo-chang on August 22, he brought up the subject of the American note and spoke of the salutary influence which it had exercised upon public opinion in China. Far from being regarded as undue interference in Chinese internal affairs, the note is considered as an additional assurance by the Chinese people that the American Government desires to see China so well organized that no such interference from any source will be possible.
I have [etc.]