File No. 711.12/50
Ambassador Fletcher to the Secretary of State
Mexico , June 5, 1917 .
Sir: Confirming my confidential telegram No. 211 of June 3, 5 p.m.,2 I have the honor to report that I met General Pablo Gonzalez at dinner at the Belgian Legation last Friday evening, and after dinner had a long private conversation with him on the relations between the United States and Mexico.
The General began the conversation by stating that he had wanted for a long time to have an informal talk with me, and was very glad of this opportunity. He asked me what I thought of the Mexican situation. I replied that, as far as I could see, everything seemed to be going very well. He said the situation was as good as could be expected under the circumstances, but that it was of the utmost importance for the pacification of the country, that the Mexican Government secure as quickly as possible a considerable quantity of ammunition. He intimated—which I know to be a fact—that the national production is of decidedly inferior quality, insufficient, and extremely costly. He said that the Mexican Government was in urgent need of the ammunition which they had bought and paid for in the United States, and which is now, and has been for some time, detained by orders of the United States at the frontier. He said that he personally was very anxious that Mexico should define her position in the great world war, and that he believed she should range herself alongside of the United States. He stated that during the trying times of the revolution, his family had lived in Texas and had received every consideration, and that he had very kindly feelings towards our country, to which he felt Mexico must look for moral, military and financial assistance.
I replied that I was very glad indeed to hear him express such sentiments, but felt that the active German propaganda, the speeches of Ugarte under the patronage of the National University, and the general tone of the Mexican press, indicated a very different state of public opinion. He said our enemies had taken advantage of the recent difficulties between the United States and Mexico, and that Mexican public opinion believed, and would continue to believe as long as the rigid embargo on arms and ammunition should be enforced by our Government, that the United States regards Mexico and the Mexicans with suspicion and distrust and as potential enemies. He said that now that Constitutional Government had been established and friendly diplomatic relations resumed between the two countries, the maintenance of the embargo necessarily made a bad impression, not only upon the Government, but on the Mexican public generally, and that if our Government would consent to allow the Mexican Government to receive the ammunition consigned to it and now detained at the frontier, the first and principal obstacle toward better relations between the two Governments and peoples would be removed, and that he could assure me that public sentiment would change almost instantly. I told him that one of the President’s principal reasons for maintaining the embargo was the [Page 1081] fear that the ammunition would fall into the hands of the Villistas and other enemies of the Mexican Government. The General replied that there should be no uneasiness on this score, and that he could guarantee that all proper and adequate precautions would be taken. He said that President Carranza and his leading friends and counsellors realized the absolute and pressing necessity of pacifying the country by stamping out the numerous small bands operating in the various parts of the Republic, and that while these bands do not constitute a real political menace, their suppression is a prerequisite of normal economic, agricultural and industrial conditions in the Republic. He added that without assistance and cooperation in this respect from the United States, the pacification of the country might be delayed for a long time. He said it seemed to him that the interest of the United States, both individually and as one of the Allies in the great war, was on the side of the early pacification and prompt restoration of prosperous agricultural and industrial conditions in Mexico, whose products, so necessary at this time, could only find a market in the United States and allied countries.
General Gonzalez also referred at some length to the financial condition of the Government. He said that the revolution had been won against tremendous odds, and that the Government would need financial assistance if it hoped to make any but the slowest progress towards the country’s rehabilitation. In his opinion, this financial assistance could and should come only from the United States. I pointed out to him that certain acts and decrees of the Revolutionary Government in the pre-Constitutional period, and a number of the provisions of the new Constitution itself, had caused an unfortunate impression in business, financial and religious circles in the United States, and that the Department itself was at a loss to understand the import of some of these official acts and the intentions of the Mexican Government toward American citizens and legitimate and honestly acquired American interests in Mexico. The General said that he realized that some of the things which had been done and some of the provisions of the Constitution might well raise doubts on this score, but that the Mexican Government and Congress would set these doubts at rest in case the plan of closer relations between the two Governments should meet with approval. He intimated that there would be no difficulty in this respect. He repeated that he was expressing merely his personal views, but as one of the leaders of the revolution he had certain responsibilities for its successful consolidation, and could exert considerable influence on the course of events. He said that he had discussed these matters with the President and would again confer with him the following day on the subject of his conversation with me.
As I have heretofore reported to the Department, the question of raising, to some extent at least, the embargo on arms, bought, paid for and consigned to the Mexican Government, was one of the first subjects mentioned by Mr. Carranza to me. He has frequently mentioned it to me, and referred in his public address to Congress, on the 15th of April last, to the continuance of the embargo as hard to understand in view of the resumption of friendly diplomatic relations. General Obregon has also, in informal conversation, referred to their pressing necessity for this ammunition, and hoped that our Government Would soon modify its policy in this respect. Cabrera, Hay, [Page 1082] President of the Chamber of Deputies, and, in fact, almost all the prominent men identified with the present Government of this country, have spoken to me on the subject and urged my assistance and cooperation. The press, as might be expected, has been unanimous on this subject.
I have refrained hitherto from making any recommendation on the subject, as I wished to satisfy myself thoroughly in regard to it, and I realize the responsibility involved. I recommend that five million rounds of the Mexican ammunition now detained at the border, be released as requested. Even if difficulties should subsequently arise in our relations with Mexico—which I do not anticipate—this quantity would be a comparatively negligible factor. It is to our interest that this Government be given all proper support to enable it to pacify the country and restore normal economic conditions. It is quite possible that without this support on our part, conditions may arise in Mexico which would distract our attention and seriously interfere with the concentration of all our efforts on the great enterprise in which we are now engaged. As long as the embargo is maintained as at present, internal conditions will improve but slowly, if at all, and our relations with Mexico will be clouded by suspicion and unfriendliness. The embargo, unless we contemplate war with Mexico, must be raised sooner or later, and I think the time has now come for it to be modified to the extent above indicated. This will give me an opportunity to determine whether the effect will be what President Carranza, General Gonzalez and other leading Mexicans believe it will be. If the effect on the Mexican Government and Mexican public opinion should prove beneficial, the way is open for a solution of our Mexican difficulties, along lines of friendly assistance, mutual confidence and self-respect.
While, as stated in my telegram, this to me appears to be a diplomatic rather than a military question, I would suggest that, if the War Department desires expert opinion, Major Frank R. McCoy, until recently Military Attaché of this Embassy, who should have arrived in Washington this week, be consulted.
I have [etc.]
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