File No. 893.00/2703
Minister Reinsch to the Secretary of State
Peking, August 9, 1917.
Sir: In continuation of my despatch No. 1549 of July 3 last, dealing with the attempted Imperial restoration, I have the honor to submit a more complete report.
As the monarchical movement instituted by General Chang Hsun was entirely his personal act, it came as a complete surprise to everybody, including the men whose names were recited in the proclamations as assisting him. It was a surprise even to men who were undoubtedly forced to assist, such as the Chief of Staff and the heads of the gendarmerie and of the police.
As reported in my telegram of June 30, 1 p.m.,4 Premier Li Chingshi, who had been influenced by Chang Hsun, found himself isolated. As important men were unwilling to take office it appeared as if a period of stagnation lasting through the summer was imminent until a complete readjustment could have been effected.
It was this very situation which seems to have inspired Chang Hsun to take this radical step. He was disappointed that the results of his mediation should not have been more satisfactory. Kang Yeu-wei, who arrived in Peking on June 29, advised him that the salvation of China lay in the restoration of the Imperial family; this would immediately bring to the active support of the Government, all [Page 91] the military leaders who were notoriously imperialistic in their inner sentiments and who had at various times expressed themselves, in that sense, to Chang Hsun.
It was therefore assumed that if the step were taken the support of these powerful men could be implicitly relied on. It is apparent that specific encouragement had been received from Hsu Shih-chang, who is generally considered the leader of the Imperialistic party, although an ex-Premier under the Republic.
It is also known to me that Chang Hsun discussed the possibility of an Imperial restoration with the Japanese Minister. The latter expressed the opinion that if the movement were undertaken the support of the chief military leaders should be made sure of. As Chang Hsun felt sure of this support he evidently took the advice of the Japanese Minister as an encouragement, and believed that his movement would have diplomatic support.
On June 30 Chang Hsun had his intimate advisers, particularly Kang Yeu-wei, draw up the necessary Imperial edicts, In these it was recited that leading governors, like Feng Ko-chang, Lu Yungting and others of like prominence, had petitioned for the restoration of the monarchy. Lists of appointments to the highest positions in the Central Government and the provinces were also prepared. The existing military governors were in most cases reappointed. The most important men designated for positions in the Central Government were Hsu Shih-chang as Guardian of the Emperor, Liang Tun-yen as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Chu Chi-pao as Minister of the Interior. Wang Shih-chen was retained as Chief of the General Staff.
The most amazing instance of presupposed consent is an Imperial edict which recites that President Li Yuang-hung has petitioned for the reestablishment of the Empire and which appoints him as a Duke of the first class.
When these various edicts bad been prepared ready for launching, a dinner was arranged for the evening of the same day, to which the heads of the Peking military and police establishments were invited. The dinner took place at the Kiangsu Guild Hall. After great quantities of wine had been consumed, Chang Hsun broached his project for the salvation of China. He stated that all preparation had been made, that military and diplomatic support was assured and then, pointing at the Chief of Staff, said: “Of course you are supporting the movement”. General Wang, completely taken aback, did not see his way to refuse—seeing that he was in the presence of an accomplished fact. The consent of General Chiang, head of the gendarmarie, and General Wu, head of the police, was obtained in the same way. The account of this affair by Premier Li Ching-hsi as given in The Peking Daily News, July 10, 1917 (herewith enclosed),4 is the best account of the events of this night.
When the enterprise had been thus launched, Chang Hsun directed General Wang and four others to proceed immediately to the residence of President Li, to wake him up and to obtain his consent to a memorial, asking for the reestablishment of the monarchy. Chang Hsun himself proceeded to the Imperial City. Not having been able to obtain the consent of the Imperial Dukes to his movement, he [Page 92] had lavishly bribed the eunuchs in charge of the palace. They opened the gates for him and his retinue and took him to the private residence of the young Emperor. Prostrating himself before the Emperor, Chang Hsun informed him that the whole nation demanded his return to the throne. He then immediately took the Emperor to the great throne room and, in the presence of his retainers and members of the Imperial family who had been summoned, formally enthroned the Emperor. Thereupon the edicts which had been prepared were formally sealed.
As may be imagined, there were some comic incidents. A rather distinguished man had been summoned by the Premier to discuss with the President his assumption of one of the cabinet portfolios. He was seen at the hotel by a Chinese friend of mine who had just heard of the restoration, about 10 o’clock in the morning. When asked what he had come to Peking for, he stated confidentially that he was now waiting for a carriage to take him to the President’s Palace, and was greatly surprised when he was told: “The President is finished; this is now an Empire. The Emperor was enthroned at 4 o’clock this morning.”
The assumption made by Chang Hsun, in the Imperial edicts issued on Sunday July 1, that practically all of the leading authorities of China approved of the restoration, deceived Peking for one day, as it had deceived the military chiefs on the preceding night. The population, as the news spread, showed an almost joyous excitement. The yellow dragon flags appeared everywhere, and soon the city wore a festive appearance. The population of Peking was easily made Imperialist, through its memories of past splendor. But the height of this movement was reached on the evening of July 1. From that time on it steadily went down grade.
Liang Tung-yen came to assume office as Minister of Foreign Affairs. He has always been an Imperialist, and was in the highest spirits, believing that at last China had been saved. He had been made to believe that the foreign diplomats would easily recognize the restoration. But on Monday, July 2, strong doubts as to the character of the movement appeared. Tuan Chi-jui did not figure in the official lists. When asked about this, Chang Hsun declared that General Tuan was unimportant, having no troops under his command at this time. When, about 4 a.m. on July 1, the news was telephoned to Tientsin, Liang Chi-chao was at cards with friends. He immediately proceeded to General Tuan’s residence, where the latter was also engaged in a game of cards. General Tuan, being at that time thoroughly weary of public affairs, was difficult to rouse. He begged to be spared the trouble of thinking what might be happening in Peking. But as more details came in and it became apparent how absolutely a one-man affair the movement was, Tuan roused himself and took an interest. However, he was at that time actually only a private citizen without authority or command.
On Monday he and Liang Chi-chao proceeded to Machang where the 8th Division has been encamped since the attempt to overawe President Li Yuan-hung. It is stated that General Tuan felt rather nervous as to the outcome of his venture. Arriving at the camp, he called the commanders, stated to them that he had always been opposed to the restoration of the monarchy, and that it was now being attempted by the act of a single general. He therefore proposed [Page 93] to resist this act and to take command of the republican troops for that purpose. His action was successful, and he was recognized as the commander-in-chief. President Li, on his part, did not yield to the importunities of Chang Hsun, but issued an absolute denial of the statement that he favored the restoration. On July 2 he took refuge in the Legation Quarter, after having issued a mandate turning over the exercise of presidential powers to the Vice President and appointing General Tuan Chi-jui Premier and Commander-in-Chief.
On Tuesday, July 3, Liang Chi-chao published a vigorous denunciation of the restoration movement. As the action of General Tuan became known, doubts as to the permanence of the restoration increased. Chang Hsun had committed a great tactical blunder in taking for himself not only the Premiership but also the position as military chief of Chihli Province, reducing the actual military governor, General Tsao Kun, to the civil governorship. The latter, who would probably have supported Chang Hsun, with proper inducements, now followed the lead of General Tuan and prepared for troop movements against Peking. On July 2, a personal representative of mine saw General Tuan Chi-jui, who assured him that he already had complete control of the military situation and would be able to finish Chang Hsun inside of 10 days.
As hostilities threatened in and around Peking, and as the danger of looting was always present, I discussed the precautions to be taken with my colleagues, and agreed with the Japanese Minister that we would each bring a company of reinforcements from Tientsin. Meanwhile the movements of Tuan’s troops had commenced and, to hinder their advance, Chang Hsun’s men had broken the railway at about one-third of the way from Peking to Tientsin.
The question was discussed by the Diplomatic Corps. Some urged that we should give notice that no fighting should take place on or near the railways. I took the position that as we had made no objection to the bringing in of Chang Hsun’s troops and to their stationing in Peking and along the railway we were not now in a position to object to the troops of the Government to which we were still accredited taking necessary action against Chang Hsun; that we could, however, insist upon the right of keeping the railway open. A demand was accordingly made on July 5 upon General Chang Hsun and General Tuan Chi-jui that the railway must be kept open and that at least one train must be allowed to pass in each direction every day.
On July 6, the reinforcements arrived in Peking—having been delayed by the necessity of reconstructing the damaged line. On July 7, the first trains passed between Peking and Tientsin—one of these trains passing between the armies during a battle. During these days fighting was going on between the troops of General Tuan, under direct command of General Tuan Chi-kwei, and Chang Hsun’s forces in which, with a great deal of firing and small loss of life, the latter were driven back towards Peking. The troops of General Tsao Kun also advanced upon Peking from the West.
On Sunday, July 8, I discovered in the afternoon that through the mediation of a certain Colonel Hu, Chang Hsun had persuaded the French Minister to believe that the city was in imminent danger of looting, fighting and general disturbances, and that the only salvation lay in inducing Hsu Shih-chang to come from Tientsin to mediate. [Page 94] The French Minister induced his Entente colleagues to agree to transmit a note to General Tuan Chi-jui urging him to persuade Hsu Shih-chang to come to Peking as mediator. This action seemed to me to be decidedly ill-advised as it would mean that at a time when Chang Hsun was already thoroughly defeated he would be solemnly treated by an influential part of the Diplomatic Corps as entitled to dictate the terms and personnel of mediation. I expressed myself very strongly in this sense. * * * The British Chargé, who had then just received a telegram from his consul in Tientsin to the effect that General Tuan was absolutely opposed to any mediation, withdrew his consent, so that the action contemplated was not taken. Chang Hsun persisted to the last in his attempts to get the Diplomatic Corps to give him position as a party to a solemn mediation. The French Minister, originally disposed to support him in this, probably on account of his violent hatred of Dr. Wu Ting-fang, gradually came to see the unwisdom of such a policy when certain Germanic affiliations of Chang Hsun became known. The other ministers appreciated the difficulty somewhat earlier.
On July 8, Kang Yu-wei presented himself at my house seeking refuge. I had no alternative but to assign him rooms, where he still remains. He informed me that Chang Hsun had had the fullest assurances of support on the part of Hsu Shih-chang and other important monarchists.
Prince Tsai Tze called on me on July 9. He stated that the Imperial House had not been in favor of a restoration movement at this time; but he still hoped that the bringing of Hsu Shih-chang as mediator would help to preserve the favorable treatment agreement. He was greatly depressed and seemed to fear deep injury to his house.
On this day the Diplomatic Corps held a long meeting to discuss suggestions of mediation between the contending factions, or other means of averting disturbances in the city. I strongly opposed all suggestions of mediation. The Diplomatic Corps adopted a moderate resolution practically indicating its belief of the defeat of Chang Hsun, and the possibility of avoiding bloodshed by granting safe-departure to Chang Hsun’s troops.
On July 10, I was approached by a representative of General Chiang, Chief of the Gendarmerie. He stated that it was desired to bring Chang Hsun into the American Legation, and that an agreement to this effect had been made between the different commanders. I stated that under the circumstances it would be best for the Diplomatic Corps to discuss what protection could be extended to Chang Hsun. An informal meeting was held at which the British Chargé agreed that he would receive Chang Hsun if he were brought in.
Late in the afternoon of July 11, the Legation received notice from General Tuan that during the night the troops would move against Chang Hsun’s forces in the city and that bombardment of the Temple of Heaven and the quarters near the Imperial City held by Chang Hsun would begin at dawn on July 12. In concert with the commandant of the Legation Guard, I sent notice to the American residents in the quarters particularly affected directing them to seek safety. Eighteen refugees came to the Legation, where they were taken care of for the day at the students’ mess.
[Page 95]At the beginning of the fighting a great many people out of curiosity went upon the city wall to see what was going on. When it became apparent that stray bullets were frequently falling on the wall, the commandant ordered the wall to be cleared. Unfortunately, several of these onlookers were injured, among them three Americans. While the battle was going on I received word from the Imperial tutors that the Empresses Dowager were preparing to bring the Emperor to the American Legation. I found later that ever since July 9 there had been a desire to remove the Emperor to this Legation for safety. While the Empresses and some of the Dukes desired this to be done, the eunuchs under Chang Hsun’s influence were opposed to his removal. The Prince Regent, also under Chang Hsun’s influence, took the same view. Thus on various occasions the eunuchs, whose existence had almost been forgotten, came out on the stage again in this curious affair.
Shortly before noon, Chang Hsun was brought to the Dutch Legation. He was accompanied by a German employee of the Chinese police. Chang Hsun had been persuaded almost by force to come, by his Generals. He was still under the illusion that he could mediate. When the Dutch Minister informed him that this was impossible he wanted to return to his troops. Chang Hsun is still in the Legation Quarter under the control of the Dutch Minister.
Firing was very violent from dawn until 11 a.m. The firing of field guns, machine guns and rifles filled the air with an enormous tumult. From 11 o’clock on the firing gradually diminished. It entirely ceased at 4 p.m.
After this I immediately proceeded by motor car to the various centers of fighting. I found that Chang Hsun’s house had been struck by several shells, and that the indirect artillery firing of the Government troops had been managed with considerable accuracy. The human dead had already been removed from the neighborhood, although numerous dead horses remained. From there I proceeded to the Temple of Heaven. I was astonished to find Chang Hsun’s troops there encamped with all their arms and artillery, all in the best of spirits, eating, drinking and talking. They told me that they had five men killed, whose bodies were still there. The absence of visible results of the enormous expenditure of ammunition witnessed during the day was astonishing. I found, however, that the method of fighting employed by the troops was to get as close as possible behind a high wall and fire into the air in the general direction where the enemy might be. Hence the danger to bystanders was rather greater than that of the combatants themselves. As a matter of fact, the total number of killed as a result of the fighting of July 12 was twenty-six (26); seriously wounded, seventy-six (76), more than half being civilians.
The Chang Hsun contingents in the Temple of Heaven had hoisted the Republican flag at 10 a.m. An agreement was arrived at by which they were to be paid $60 per man upon the delivery of their arms. Chang Hsun’s troops about the Imperial City held out for a larger payment. To my astonishment I saw as late as Saturday, July 14, fully armed soldiers of Chang Hsun on guard at the central police headquarters. When I asked for the reason of this phenomenon (Chang Hsun’s troops having supposedly been absolutely defeated in pitched battle on July 12) I was told that the commanders had not [Page 96] yet arrived at an agreement as to what these contingents were to be paid. Eighty dollars per man was finally agreed upon, and by July 15 Chang Hsun’s troops, deprived of their arms and their pigtails, had left Peking with their money, entrained for their rural homes in Shantung.
It is not surprising that the Government troops also demanded a reward for the services which they had rendered. It was finally arranged that they should have one month’s extra pay.
For one or two nights there was a little sporadic looting in various parts of the city. Nearly all shops remained closed. But the looting did not become general, nor was there a panic.
General Tuan-Chi-jui arrived in Peking on July 13. I saw him on the following day, when he told me that he would carry out his original foreign policy, and that he had complete assurance that the Vice President would come to Peking to assume the presidency.
The dragon flags disappeared on July 12, as suddenly as they had appeared on July 1, and the city quickly resumed its ordinary life.
The rapid failure of Chang Hsun’s enterprise was not due to any inherent weakness of the monarchical sentiment in North China. In fact monarchist leanings of the Northern military party are quite well known. It had been assumed that such a movement would be launched; and if it had been more prudently planned and prepared it might easily have been successful, at least for a time. Its total failure was due entirely to the fact that Chang Hsun, counting on monarchist tendencies of the Northern military men, neglected to make those preparatory negotiations which would have turned the potential support into real strength. While the above is true, however, there can be no doubt that Chang Hsun’s failure imports an enormous setback to the cause of monarchism in China. After two failures of a monarchical movement, ambitious men will think many times before embarking on such a venture again; and it will take a strong man and careful preparation indeed to assure even temporary success in the future. The Republican form of government in China has been greatly strengthened.
There are forwarded herewith a number of clippings from the Peking press containing documents and articles relating to the subject of this despatch.
I have [etc.]