Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VIII, Public Diplomacy, 1969–1972

119. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Washington, November 18, 1970

SUBJECT

• Frank Shakespeare Requests to See the President about the Mid-East

I understand from Jeanne Davis and Dick Kennedy that you already have on your desk a memo on how to clue Frank Shakespeare and USIA on Presidential decisions.² So I am sending this to you since it deals with the same basic problem—that Shakespeare feels cut out.

In the immediately attached memo to HAK, Dwight Chapin asks whether you would recommend an appointment for Frank Shakespeare with the President “to discuss the Middle East.”³

We can probably pinpoint the two points on Shakespeare’s mind from a series of recent memos: (1) Soviet duplicity in the Mid-East and (2) the importance of keeping USIA informed on the foreign policy line we want projected. Both of these were dramatized by Shakespeare in memos here after the cease-fire violations and during the recent Jordan crisis.⁴

(1) You will recall that during the height of our concern over the Soviet/UAR violations of the cease-fire/standstill arrangement—late August and early September—Shakespeare sent HAK summaries of what was being reported in foreign press and television to draw our attention to the fact that Soviet duplicity was not being given enough emphasis. He recommended that White House and State Department do everything possible to correct the imbalance in reporting. Subsequently both State and JCS made this point in their instructions to posts abroad. USIA itself urged stiff instructions to its posts. [Tab A].⁵ Shakespeare also urged the President to take a strong public stand against the Soviets. [Tab B].⁶ Further, he followed up by calling attention to American reporting such as that by Marvin Kalb [Tab C]⁷ which draws attention to “the absence of a firm decision” by the U.S. in the face of a Soviet build-up in the UAR. In short, Shakespeare feels that there is something more we could do vis-a-vis the Russians in a public way and he is ready to do it. As you know, the press has been covering him.

(2) Shakespeare also recalls a potentially embarassing situation during the Jordan crisis wherein USIA was set to go ahead and report—attributing to the Sun Times in Chicago only as instructed—the essence of the President’s Chicago background remarks about what we would do if Syria or Iraq intervened only to find out later (but before USIA had sent out its report, to Shakespeare’s relief) that everyone else had been told to play it down and that the President’s remarks were “off-the-record.” [It did result in one account of the incident in the Star]. [Memo at Tab D.]⁸

Shakespeare again draws HAK’s attention to that incident as an example of the problem which USIA consistently faces—being left out of what is going on. He makes the point that USIA has not been present at any senior meeting on the Mid-East since the beginning of the cease-fire and that it is creating problems as far as his being informed and, therefore, projecting an informed foreign policy line.

In short, it appears that Shakespeare would like the chance to promote a tougher public line on the Russians and to be better informed on what we are thinking. I can partly imagine that this is at least part reaction to his losing his seat when the Review Group became the SRG.⁹

Technically Shakespeare is under Secretary Rogers and should be taking his cues from McCloskey or from whatever he works out with Alex Johnson. I had thought of a USIA officer being included in Bob Houdek’s daily conference call, but Bob is wary of this because USIA doesn’t get all the traffic that State and Defense receive. Bob also feels USIA could easily misinterpret the shorthand exchanges in that call. All I can suggest is that HAK might offer to see Shakespeare. I can’t see the need for the President to see him on the Middle East.

Recommendation: That you check “no” on the attached and, if you want, note that HAK will see him.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 294, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. II—1970 [27 Feb–Dec 14, 1970] [1 of 2]. No classification marking. Sent for action. All brackets, except for those indicated in footnotes, are in the original. An unknown hand wrote “OBE” at the top of the memorandum next to the stamped date of November 25. Saunders signed “Hal” next to his name in the “from” line. The President met with Shakespeare on November 25 from 11:30 a.m. until 12:16 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) For additional information, see footnote 2, Document 113.
2. An unknown hand placed brackets around the word “have” and wrote “had” above it. The memorandum Haig discusses here has not been found.
3. Not found attached.
4. Presumable reference to Shakespeare’s September 2 memorandum to the President (see the attachment to Document 105) and his September 18 memorandum to Kissinger (see Document 110).
5. Attached but not printed is a September 17 covering memorandum from Shakespeare to Kissinger transmitting a copy of a September 16 memorandum from Shakespeare to Giddens, Towery, USIA area directors, and IOP, containing the instructions. For the instructions as sent in Info Guide No. 70–46, September 17, see Document 108.
6. Not found attached. Presumable reference to Shakespeare’s September 2 memorandum to the President. See the attachment to Document 105.
7. Not found attached and not further identified.
8. Not found attached. Presumable reference to Shakespeare’s September 18 memorandum to Kissinger. See Document 110.
9. In NSDM 85, issued on September 14, the President directed the establishment of a Senior Review Group (SRG) to assist him “in carrying out my responsibilities for the conduct of national security affairs.” The membership of the SRG consisted of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs. National Security Decision Memorandum 85 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. II, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 121.