110. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
SUBJECT
- Chicago Sun Times—Middle East Incident
Sequence of events in this situation was as follows:
1. Yesterday afternoon USIA was reliably informed of the President’s remarks to the Sun Times2 and that the paper would play them on a headline-basis, starting with the edition at 6:00 p.m. Chicago time.
2. I immediately informed Al Haig and had our officers inform State. We instructed our Chicago VOA man to get the first edition of the Sun Times as it came off the press. We instructed VOA operations to stand alert for a significant news break.
3. Upon publication, VOA used the Sun Times story (U.S. might intervene if Iraq or Syria act), with attribution only to the Sun Times . . . “A Chicago paper, the Sun Times, says tonight that it has learned, etc.” No mention was made of the President or the USG. It was treated as a news item only.
4. I left the Agency to attend a reception by the American Women in Radio and Television for the new president, who is a VOA employee. Upon leaving this reception, an Evening Star reporter asked why I, as featured speaker, had arrived so late. I said a major news story had tied me up . . . a Chicago Sun Times story relating to possible intervention in the Middle East. I was asked if Nixon had been in Chicago all day, if he had met with the Sun Times and if VOA was playing the story worldwide. I said “yes” to all three. This accounts for the coverage in today’s Star.
5. Upon returning home, I was shocked to learn that the wire services were not playing the story. I called Ron Ziegler and discovered for the first time that the President’s remarks (while accurately [Page 270] reported) were completely off-the-record and that the Sun Times would play down the story in subsequent editions. VOA was immediately instructed to do the same. Fortunately, our worldwide Wireless File to the Embassies and our instruction to press officers3 throughout the world had not yet gone out.
This incident, while not really serious, focuses attention on a point we have discussed before. The international communications arm of this Government is just not sufficiently informed to give anything but a fraction of the support to our foreign policy of which it is capable. Worse, we are courting mistakes which may some day be serious indeed. To let our international media arms atrophy . . . as they may because insecurity of judgment leads to a play-it-safe and do-nothing approach . . . would be tragic. To have a situation in which we have not been present at any senior executive discussion on the Mid East since the cease-fire began is unfathomable to me in an age when communications is revolutionizing diplomacy.4
It is not enough to have occasional memos of instruction. Effective communication is an orchestrated performance. Nuances . . . long term strategy . . . and occasional very fast and deft actions . . . all play a role. Continuing knowledge is an absolute prerequisite. We do not have it. It is a mistake.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 394, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. II—1970 [27 Feb–Dec 14, 1970] [1 of 2]. No classification marking. In the top left-hand corner of the memorandum, Shakespeare wrote: “Bob—Please note last 2 paragraphs. F.S.” Haldeman sent the memorandum to Kissinger under a September 22 covering memorandum, writing: “I think Frank makes some points that are at least worth considering in his attached memorandum. Is there any way we can fold his operation more effectively into our overall communications apparatus?” (Ibid.) Both the memorandum and the covering memorandum are attached as Tab D to a November 18 memorandum from Saunders to Kissinger printed as Document 119.↩
- See Document 109.↩
- Presumable reference to USIA–15396/Info Guide No. 70–46 printed as Document 108.↩
- An unknown hand underlined this sentence.↩
- Shakespeare signed “Frank” above this typed signature. In an undated memorandum to Shakespeare, Kissinger thanked Shakespeare for his memorandum and asserted that he had done nothing “improper” regarding the Chicago Sun Times incident. Kissinger continued: “The problem in that episode was that it was not the product of a coordinated plan. You knew as much about it as I did. I was back in Washington at the time. The dilemma that emerged was between acquiescing in an advantageous story and protecting the integrity of the off-the-record ground rules.” (Ibid.) In his memoirs, Kissinger wrote: “Though Nixon was contrite after the event, I considered his statement on the whole helpful. When I was informed of it by the head of the US Information Agency, Frank Shakespeare, I told him that it gave me no pain. For one thing, it would prove to our bureaucracy that my pressures for a buildup in the Mediterranean reflected the President’s approach, not my idiosyncrasy; indeed, it brought home to them that their real choice was between systematic interagency planning and ad hoc decisions in which they would not participate. Once I had convinced Rogers that I had not put Nixon up to it, the incident led to a brief period of improved relations between us.” (White House Years, p. 615)↩