Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VIII, Public Diplomacy, 1969-1972

105. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant (Haldeman)¹

Washington, September 2, 1970

SUBJECT

• Memorandum on Middle East from Director, USIA to the President

The attached memorandum was dictated to Marge Acker by Frank Shakespeare this morning with an urgent request that it be given directly to the President. Marge brought it to me, I showed it to Henry, with the comment that it did not contain an appropriate course of action at this time. Shakespeare, however, is very concerned that the President see the memorandum, recognizing that it may not be well received. He told me that world-wide reaction is mounting on this issue and that consequently he wants the memorandum to go to the President. I told Henry that I would bring it to your attention first.

Yesterday’s meeting set in train a series of diplomatic actions which must be undertaken promptly before any public posture is taken on recent evidence of Soviet/Egyptian cheating in the Middle East.² Only after this diplomatic route has been properly assessed can we determine what kind of public posture the President should take. In either event, I doubt that he would wish to resort to such a drastic solution but rather that we will proceed much along the lines of the earlier violation case by using a fairly controlled public release stance. On the other hand, Shakespeare’s memorandum does suggest that a head of steam may be building which is somewhat more severe than yesterday’s meeting would have reflected.

Attachment

Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare) to President Nixon³

Washington, September 2, 1970

I address you directly because I believe we are faced with an immediate psychological problem of enormous world-wide dimension.

It is my firm belief that unless the Soviets are sternly called to account for their violations of the Mid-East cease-fire agreement,⁴ credibility of the United States and of your own will be put in serious doubt throughout the world.

At your July 30 Los Angeles press conference you said, “I believe that Israel can agree to the cease-fire and can agree to negotiations without fear that by her negotiations her position may be compromised or jeopardized in that period.”⁵

I recommend the following action:

A. That you appear promptly on nation-wide television to nail down the Soviet challenge. This program should be satellited world-wide and foreign networks tipped off that it will be “very important” so that many will carry it live and all will tape it for fast play back.

B. Your statement should consist of (1) evidence and (2) conclusions. All relevant photos and technical data proving the violations of the cease-fire should be released and as much of Soviet private assurances on the cease-fire as you may choose.

C. That you emphasize violations by the Soviet Union rather than Egypt. The Soviets would surely like any confrontation on violations to be between Egypt and the United States and will make every effort to play it that way. This should be precluded by the nature of your remarks. In doing so, you will also put considerable psychological pressure on Nasser by implicitly reducing him to a Soviet puppet.

D. Having proved the violations beyond doubt, declare that unless the missiles are removed to their pre-August 7 positions within a reasonable time, you will take steps to provide the Israelis the means to redress the military balance.

E. Make clear that the Soviet perfidy places in serious doubt the validity of the SALT talks which, in the final analysis, are based on the faith and confidence the contracting powers have in each other.⁶

I am convinced that unless we react strongly and promptly against these violations, the credibility of the United States and your credibility will suffer almost irretrievable damage.

By linking Middle-East missilery violations to the SALT talks which themselves relates to missilery, you will help Jewish and liberal bodies throughout the world to view the SALT talks in a more realistic light.

Another effect will be to raise a major caution light to the West German government as to the wisdom and possible dangers of Ost Politik.

Frank Shakespeare⁷

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 294, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. II—1970 [27 Feb–Dec 14, 1970] [1 of 2]. No classification marking. Printed from an uninitialed copy. A notation in an unknown hand in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum reads: “Orig hand carried by Gen Haig to Bob Haldeman 9–2–70.”
2. Presumable reference to the September 1 NSC meeting, which took place at the Western White House in San Clemente, California, from 10 to 11:47 a.m. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972, Document 156.
3. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Haldeman and Kissinger.
4. On August 7, Rogers announced that the Governments of the United Arab Republic (UAR) and Israel had informed the United States of their acceptance of the U.S. proposal for a standstill cease fire. The 90-day cease-fire would take effect at 2200 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) that day. (Department of State Bulletin, August 31, 1970, p. 244) The text of the Israeli-UAR cease-fire agreement is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972, Document 145. In a separate memorandum to the President, September 2, Shakespeare characterized the violations as “Soviet perfidy in the Middle East.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 294, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. II—1970 [27 Feb–Dec 14, 1970] [1 of 2]) On September 3, McCloskey read a statement to reporters indicating violations of the cease-fire agreement had taken place: “We are not going into details. We are taking up this matter with both the U.A.R. and the U.S.S.R. through diplomatic channels. We are continuing to watch the balance closely and, as we have said previously, have no intention of permitting Israel’s security to be adversely affected.” (Department of State Bulletin, September 21, 1970, p. 326)
5. For the text of the President’s news conference, which took place in the Santa Monica Room of the Century Plaza Hotel in Los Angeles, at 8 p.m. and was broadcast live on television and radio, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. 626–635.
6. The formal talks began in Helsinki on November 17, 1969, and concluded on December 22. The second round of talks took place in Vienna beginning on April 16, 1970.
7. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.